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 This dissertation examines the effects of institutional change in Congress on 
interest group activity.  The research looks specifically at groups with a stake in health 
insurance policy during the 1990s.  Interviews were conducted with lobbyists for 34 
organizations.  Respondents were asked about their work on three issues: the Clinton 
administration’s effort to reform health care, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, and the debate over a Patients’ Bill of Rights in the latter 
part of that decade.  Analysis of campaign finance contributions from 1990-1998 
supplements the interview data.  A comparison of group activity across these issues 
illuminates group behavior in light of the reforms introduced to the House of 
Representatives by the new Republican majority in the 104th Congress.   
The main argument presented in the dissertation is that groups in the health 
community responded to these reforms by changing the ways they lobbied Congress 
and otherwise sought to influence legislation.  Organizations were not, however, 
uniformly affected by the changes; a number of intervening variables mitigated their 
effects.  These variables include a group’s partisanship, its available resources, and the 
nature of each issue.   
The analysis suggests the changes in House institutions mattered to the interest 
group community for two reasons.  First, these changes were driven by partisan 
concerns.  Second, the reforms had important consequences for the long-term 
relationships that interest groups develop with members of Congress.  These results 
highlight the importance of group access to key members of Congress.  The need for 
access drives the pragmatic behavior of interest groups, allowing them to adjust to the 
changing political and institutional environments in which they work.  Groups will 
place more or less emphasis on certain strategies in order to increase their access.  If 
institutional changes affect the capacity of certain interest groups to generate or 
maintain this access – or if they affect the nature of existing relationships – they can 
have important consequences for how interest groups pursue their policy goals.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENT 
 
 The 1994 midterm elections had significant consequences for the United States 
House of Representatives.  Not only did the Republican Party gain control of the 
chamber for the first time in decades, the leaders of this party also implemented a 
series of reforms that altered the balance of power in the House and changed the way 
the chamber conducted its legislative business.   
In particular, the new Republican Party leadership strengthened its control over 
the legislative process, the policy agenda, and its own rank-and-file members.  In 
doing so, it weakened the committee system and took away a good deal of its 
autonomy to pursue policy beyond the goals of the majority party.  That this 
occurrence had importance implications for the House is undisputed.  What has been 
largely unexplored, however, is the degree to which these internal changes to the 
chamber affected external political actors, specifically the interest group community. 
Scholarly assessments of the interest group literature have pointed out that 
research into group lobbying and other activities has largely ignored the context in 
which strategic decisions are made.  This dissertation sheds light on one aspect of the 
political context in which interest groups work: the internal institutional arrangement 
of Congress.  In its most basic sense, an institution is defined as “a significant practice, 
relationship, or organization in a society or a culture” (Merriam-Webster’s Deluxe 
Dictionary, 10th Collegiate Edition, 956).   
Clearly, the U.S. House of Representatives qualifies as an important institution 
– or organization – within the United States.  But within the chamber, a number of 
practices and procedures, rules, and systems of organization themselves qualify as 
institutions.  The role of party leadership, the committee system, and House procedure 
are all House “institutions.”  Each of these institutions has undergone substantial 
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change throughout congressional history.  This project focuses on specific rule 
changes, but also on a larger consequence of such reforms: the relative balance of 
power between the committee system and party leadership.  Interest groups hope to 
make the best use of their limited resources and thereby should target policy makers in 
the best position to work on their behalf.  The balance of power in Congress, which 
was strongly affected by the Republican reforms in the 104th Congress, affects how 
useful certain legislators can be to an interest group.  Therefore, it is one contextual 
variable a group should consider when making strategy decisions. 
In order to assess how interest groups respond to changing institutional 
arrangements in the House of Representatives, this study examines the years 
surrounding the Republican takeover of the chamber.  The project focuses on the 
health policy interest group community.  Organizations with an interest in health care 
represent a wide range of interest group types.  Also, health issues were an important 
part of the congressional agenda throughout the 1990s.  Combined, these two points 
make health policy an appropriate topic of study.  Interviews with lobbyists 
representing a wide range of organizations serve as the basis for this research.  Small 
businesses, large corporations, labor, health facilities, and professional trade 
associations are among the groups included here.   
In particular, the lobbyists were asked about their work on three prominent 
pieces of health legislation, one prior to the reforms of the 104th Congress and two 
after these changes were implemented.  The three issues are as follows: efforts to 
reform the health care system under the Clinton administration, the passage of the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and the debate over health 
maintenance organizations and a Patients’ Bill of Rights.  Comparisons of group 
activity on these issues as well as anecdotal evidence from individual lobbyists 
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provide the opportunity to assess how the Republican reforms impacted the lobbying 
strategies of the interest group community. 
The reforms of the 104th Congress provide a unique opportunity to assess the 
ways in which the modern lobbying community responded to institutional change in 
the House of Representatives.  Certainly, many historical examples of congressional 
reform and reorganization exist.  Three profound instances of institutional change, in 
fact, took place in the twentieth century: the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 
the congressional reforms of the 1970s, and those from the mid-1990s addressed here.  
Examining group responses to institutional change in the mid-1990s makes good sense 
because it was at this period of history that the lobbying industry had undergone 
substantial professionalization.  Kerrigan (1993) writes, “As the tools of electioneering 
are being used in issue lobbying, and the principles of business management are being 
applied to both, the professionalization of the political process is giving way to a new 
industry.  It’s called advocacy.  And it’s redefining what we mean by the word 
“campaign”.”   
After the House reforms in the 1970s, the number of interest groups exploded 
in size and diversity.  The lobbying community itself has expanded from an 
arrangement of pressure groups to a vast array of private lobbying firms, corporate in-
house lobbyists, and well-staffed organizations.  Lobbying has become so 
professionalized, in fact, that how-to courses are offered at a number of colleges, 
including George Washington University and American University.   This recent 
environment sets the era of the 1990s reforms apart from earlier instances of 
congressional reform and makes it a particularly useful area of study to assess the 
contemporary world of lobbying. 
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Dissertation Argument 
The main thesis of this study is as follows: groups in the health policy 
community did, in fact, respond to the institutional change in the House of 
Representatives during the 104th Congress by adjusting the ways they lobbied and 
otherwise sought to influence legislation.  Organizations were not, however, uniformly 
affected by these changes; a number of intervening variables mitigated the impact of 
the reforms.  Each group’s partisanship was particularly important in determining how 
an organization adjusted its strategy.  In some cases, the resources available to a group 
affected its response to the reforms as well.  Finally, the nature of each issue under 
consideration before the legislature also made the House reforms more or less 
important for the organizations.   
Figure 1.1 depicts the various factors through which the effects of the House 
reforms were filtered.  The arrow through the center of the diagram demonstrates that 
the reforms affected interest group activity.  Yet, as noted, three intervening variables 
served to mitigate these overall effects.  The most powerful of these intervening 
variables – indicated by the bold-faced arrow – is group partisanship.  Here, 
partisanship is defined as the tendency of an interest group to align itself with one or 
more of the political parties, as based on the interview respondent’s own assessment.  
Groups with similar goals and long-term connections to the new Republican majority 
leadership responded to the reforms very differently than those groups without.   
In some cases, and with less sweeping consequences, two other variables 
altered the effects of the House reforms on interest group activity.  The first of these is 
the amount of resources available to a group; many groups with limited resources were 
not impacted in the same manner as those with a larger budget, larger staff, or other 
organizational advantages.  My analysis also found that the impact of changing 
institutions can vary with the nature of each issue under debate.  Groups’ strategy 
 
 
4
choice depends on the degree to which an issue is technical and laden with policy 
detail, for example, or how mobilized the public is around a specific concern.  In 
certain cases, the strategy associated with these circumstances can outweigh the 
impact of any internal arrangement in Congress on lobbying decisions, making the 
effect of reform less powerful. 
 
 
Changes in Institutional Context 
 
 
Nature of the Issue  
     
       Group Partisanship 
 
Group Resources 
 
 
Interest Group Activity 
 
Figure 1.1, Overall Effects of Institutional Change on Interest Groups 
 
 
Taken together, the changes to House institutions in the mid 1990s served to 
centralize power and decision-making within the House of Representatives.  The 
specific reforms introduced to achieve this result can be categorized into two groups: 
first, those reforms that strengthened majority party control – over both the legislative 
agenda and Republican rank-and-file membership – and, second, those that took away 
committee autonomy.  Each trend is discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  The new 
Republican leadership jointly pursued these two ends with much success, especially in 
the months immediately following their takeover of Congress.  Figure 1.2 provides an 
overview of how these two trends affected group activity.   
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Changes to House institutions and norms 
 
 
Centralization of power and decision-making 
 
 
Stronger Majority Party Control   Less Committee Autonomy 
 
 
            Changes across    Changes within House Direct 
         Modes of Influence    Lobbying Mode of Influence 
 
Figure 1.2, Resulting Changes in Interest Group Activity 
 
At the top of the figure is the overall result of the many reforms; as noted just 
above, the changes to the House centralized power and decision-making within the 
chamber.  The Republican Party leadership simultaneously increased its control over 
the majority party and weakened the ability of the committees to pursue goals beyond 
those of party leaders.  There is a dotted line between these two components of the 
reform because they are closely intertwined; many of the means by which the majority 
party gained more authority also resulted in a committee system that was unable to act 
without majority leadership approval.   
Research into interest group strategy suggests that the main methods by which 
interest groups influence members of Congress can be divided into three categories.1  
Throughout the text, I will refer to these categories as the Modes of Influence 
available to interest groups.  The three Modes of Influence are as follows: direct 
lobbying of either the House or Senate; indirect influence; and group involvement in 
campaign finance and the electoral scene.   
                                                 
1 For a basic introduction to interest group research, see the following textbook-like overviews: 
Ainsworth (2002); Cigler & Loomis (1998 and other editions); Herrnson et al (1998); Rozell & Wilcox 
(1999 and 2005); Wright (1996); and Schlozman and Tierney (1986).   See Grossman and Helpman 
(2001) for a formal treatment of the influence of special interest groups.  For a scholarly article intended 
to review the literature on the topic, see Lowery and Gray (2004); Baumgartner and Leech (1998);  
Knoke (1986); Mitchell and Munger (1991); or Smith (1995). 
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Each of the two trends resulted in unique behavioral changes across and within 
each Mode of Influence.  The reforms impacted interest groups primarily because they 
affected groups’ access to legislators in key institutional positions in the House of 
Representatives.  Stronger majority party control made it difficult for certain types of 
groups to accomplish their goals in the House of Representatives.  As a result, they 
turned to other Modes of Influence.  The weakened committee system had important 
effects for one specific Mode of Influence: the ways in which groups conducted their 
Direct Lobbying in the House.  These topics are addressed in turn in Parts I and II of 
the dissertation.   
The two chapters that comprise Part I of the dissertation examine how interest 
group use of the various Modes of Influence was affected by strong party control.  Of 
particular interest is a renewed emphasis on Indirect Influences among some groups as 
well as a strong preference for work with the Senate instead of the House.  Campaign 
finance behavior and group hiring practices are also explored.  In Part II, the focus 
shifts to the weakened committee system and the impact of this change on the direct 
lobbying Mode of Influence in the House.  The relationship between groups, majority 
party leaders, and committee chairmen is examined.  The analysis also explores the 
ways in which the reforms impacted other aspects of direct lobbying; this includes 
work with moderate members, the policy education of committee chairmen, and group 
interaction with task forces. 
Through the analysis in Parts I and II, a picture of the interest group 
community emerges.  What becomes apparent is how partisanship – of the groups 
themselves and the partisan make-up of the House – affects the lobbying environment.  
In the analysis presented below, a group’s partisanship depends on the classification of 
the lobbyist who represented that group; each respondent was asked about his 
organization’s tendency to align itself with one of the political parties.  Based on these 
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lobbyist responses, the groups were divided into three categories: Democratic-leaning, 
Republican-leaning, and bipartisan or nonpartisan.  Based on the answers provided by 
the lobbyists, it became clear that a group’s view of its own partisanship is largely 
driven by the group’s policy preferences on specific issues and how those preferences 
align with the conventional wisdom regarding the platforms of the two major parties.  
For example, business groups desiring fewer government regulations typically align 
themselves with the Republican Party, while groups that represent labor unions tend to 
align with the Democrats.   
Partisanship is obviously an important organizing factor within Congress and 
the House of Representatives in particular.  It also has important consequences for the 
legislators in the House with whom an interest group will tend to interact.  The 
research here suggests that the impact of group partisanship is felt most strongly in an 
organization’s work with party leadership; party has far fewer consequences for work 
at the committee level.  Here, the pragmatic concern of access, the substance of policy, 
and the importance of maintaining good working relationships dominate interest group 
decision-making.   
The picture of the interest group community presented here demonstrates the 
pragmatism of groups and the lobbyists that work on their behalf.  Such pragmatism, 
especially as it applies to the committee system, is driven by two hallmarks of group 
behavior: the ever-present need for interest groups to have access to policymakers and 
a strong desire on the part of interest groups to, as many lobbyists described it, “get 
things done.”  As a result, groups adjust their strategies along with changing 
congressional institutions; they make do with the institutional context they are given. 
In general, the analysis in the following chapters suggests that these changes in 
House institutions mattered to the interest group community for two reasons.  First, 
these changes were driven by partisan concerns.  The partisan motivations behind the 
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reforms placed certain groups at a disadvantage.  As a result, the disadvantaged groups 
pursued different strategies.  Second, the House reforms had important consequences 
for the long-term relationships that lobbyists and interest groups develop with 
members of Congress.  Both of these points are closely connected to an essential 
strategy of any successful interest group: generating and maintaining access to the key 
members of Congress as it relates to an organization’s legislative interests.  If 
institutional change affects the capacity of certain interest groups to generate or 
maintain this access – or if change affects the nature of existing relationships – it can 
have important consequences for certain members of the interest group community. 
 The analysis presented throughout the dissertation outlines changes in group 
behavior following the reforms of the 104th Congress.  Identifying differences before 
and after the reforms, however, only tells half of the story.  The causal aspect of the 
argument is not demonstrated by the quantitative data comparisons.  This second step 
lies in identifying the specific reasons behind these changes in group behavior.  The 
reforms were not the only change in Congress during the years in question.  In fact, 
they were a direct result of the switch in party control of the chamber.  Thus, we must 
ask the following question: did groups change their approach to lobbying because of 
the reforms or simply because a new party was in control?     
 It is difficult to separate partisan and institutional change in this period of 
congressional history; partisanship was a motivating factor for the reforms.  In fact, I 
argue that the partisan motivation for the reforms played an important role in how 
groups reacted to the changes.  The partisan nature of the reforms increased the 
importance of group partisanship in explaining reactions to the changing context.  
Demonstrating causation is certainly a difficult aspect of social science research.  My 
assessment of group behavior cannot rule out the effects of partisan change in favor of 
institutional reform.  The anecdotal evidence from the interviews, however, supports 
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my argument that the trends evident in the quantitative data analysis are based on the 
new institutional environment, not simply the change in party control.  Specific quotes 
and examples from the lobbyists indicate that the reforms were the impetus for the 
changes in group activity.  Certainly, partisan alignment and policy preferences played 
a role in how groups developed legislative strategy.  Yet, the anecdotal evidence 
presented in the following chapters also suggests that the new institutional order – 
such as strong majority control, strict party discipline, constraints on committee 
chairmen, and an increased reliance on task forces – had important consequences for 
group decision-making as well. 
Before presenting the evidence in support of this argument, however, I first 
review the literature on interest group strategies and the aforementioned Modes of 
Influence.  At the end of the chapter, I discuss the criticisms of the interest group 
literature and assess how my own research fits into these debates. 
 
Early Scholarship on Interest Groups 
Groups and the goals they pursue have been a topic of interest and concern 
since the country was founded.  In Federalist #10, Madison expounded on the 
problems of factions and the ways in which the new republic would be able to mute 
their negative effects (Rossiter, 1961).  Early political scientists understood the 
political process in terms of the interaction among groups.  These pluralists gave 
American political science many of its most classic texts.2  Their arguments suggested 
that the American political system is government by coalitions of groups. 
Though the pluralist paradigm dominated the study of American politics 
during the early to mid-twentieth century, a number of criticisms soon emerged.  
Schattschenider (1960) suggested that the balance of group power described by the 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Truman (1951) and Dahl (1961). 
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pluralists ignored the fact that certain interests have greater access to the political 
arena than others.  Others charged that defining the political system’s power players 
by looking at group influence in key legislative decisions misses the point.  True 
power lies in the ability to set the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1962).  Lowi (1979) 
argued that pluralist theory overlooked the fact of imperfect competition among 
groups.  Powerful groups in the private sector could gain extensive control and 
influence over the workings of executive agencies, making the government less 
responsive to new, outside demands. 
Rational choice arguments illuminated the theoretical aspects of group 
formation and longevity.  Olson (1965) refuted the pluralists’ contention that group 
formation occurs spontaneously.  He argued that, given the collectively held benefits 
of public goods and the incentive to free ride, individuals with common interests are 
often unlikely to organize themselves.3  The explosion of interest groups in the 1960s 
and 1970s prompted further scholarly attention.  These works described the changing 
nature of the group system and the new ways in which groups interact with each other 
and the state.   
The aforementioned body of work focuses, in large part, on the overall picture 
of group representation and influence.  This literature asks questions, many of them 
normative, that include inquiries into which segments of society are represented; how 
groups form and what influence this process has on representation; the role of the state 
in the group-government relationship; and the changing nature of the interest group 
universe.  In addition to answering these comprehensive questions, a substantial effort 
has been devoted to describing the details of lobbying strategy and group behavior.  
                                                 
3 Many prominent studies of interest groups frame their analysis in light of this collective action 
problem.  This subset of the literature often emphasizes the provision of selective benefits (Wilson 
1995) and the need for outside actors to provide groups with organizational resources (Moe 1980; 
Walker 1983, 1991).   
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That is the topic of the next section and it is into this debate that my dissertation 
enters.   
 
The Modes of Group Influence: Research on Strategies 
As described above, research suggests that groups pursue three types of 
activities:  direct lobbying on Capitol Hill, indirect influence such as grassroots work, 
and campaigning in support of candidates.  What makes each Mode of Influence 
distinct from the others depends on what exactly an interest group seeks to 
accomplish.  Groups engaging in direct lobbying hope to inform legislators of their 
position and, in some cases, change a legislators’ mind on an issue.  The indirect 
influences mode is used to change the political context in which legislators consider 
and vote on legislation by swaying public opinion, mobilizing group members, or 
exerting pressure through other bodies of government.  Interest groups that engage in 
the Indirect Influence mode are hoping to create a political environment in which it is 
easier for the group’s allies in Congress to express this support and more difficult for 
legislators opposing the group to register that opposition.  In the case of the campaign 
finance and elections Mode of Influence, interest groups seek to change – or in some 
cases maintain – the makeup of the legislature.  Groups have a vested interest in the 
relative balance of power between parties in Congress, and they also want to have as 
many supporters holding office as possible.  Active participation in the electoral 
process is one way for groups to reach this goal.  What follows is an overview of the 
scholarly literature on each Mode of Influence. 
 
Direct Lobbying 
The first of the three categories, direct lobbying of either the House or Senate, 
is the most common and widely studied.  This Mode of Influence includes meeting 
 
 
12
with individual members Congress and their staffs, especially those with positions on 
relevant committees and subcommittees.  Direct lobbying also includes meeting with 
the separate staffs of committees and subcommittees, meeting with majority or 
minority party leadership, and testifying before congressional committees.  
Essentially, this Mode of Influence encompasses the work that lobbyists conduct when 
they visit Capitol Hill. 
These tactics involve direct contact between an interest group and a legislator 
or his staff and they have been the focus of a large portion of the scholarly research on 
interest group behavior.  Some scholars have examined the stages of the legislative 
process as varying points of entry for groups seeking to influence legislation.  Wright 
(1996) outlines group activity during bill-writing, committee hearings and markups, 
floor debate, and conference proceedings.  Research often focuses on lobbying in 
congressional committees (Evans 1996; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999).  Groups see this 
point in the process as an opportunity to shape legislation in its earliest stages, rather 
than waiting to exert influence once a bill reaches the floor.   
One major question in this literature asks which legislators groups tend to 
target on issues of concern.  Very little consensus has been reached, despite its being a 
focus of research for much of the last four decades.  The authors of a 1963 case study 
of interest group activity on foreign trade suggest that lobbyists largely serve as 
sources of information for those members of Congress who already agree with their 
policy position (Bauer, Poole, and Dexter 1963).  Hojnakci and Kimball (1998) 
present evidence that groups lobby their allies in a given legislative committee in the 
hopes that these allies draw other members into the coalition.  Alternatively, Denzau 
and Munger (1986) develop a theoretical argument that groups will seek out those 
legislators whose are undecided or indifferent on a particular policy.   
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A lengthy exchange among scholars began with Austen-Smith and Wright’s 
(1994) contention that groups will lobby legislators who are against their position in 
an attempt to counteract the lobbying of that group’s political opponents.4  Kollman 
(1997) suggested that the friend versus foe distinction is a false one, since most 
committees share ideological biases with the interest groups by which they are 
typically lobbied.  In their 1998 article, Leech and Baumgartner attempt to reconcile 
the debate by making a rather obvious point: interest groups alter their lobbying in 
different situations, allowing for a wide range of tactics to be used. 
 Regardless of the target of a group’s lobbying efforts, scholars are in 
agreement that an important function of interest groups is to provide information to 
legislators.  As Arnold (1990) and Krehbiel (1991) describe, legislators are uncertain 
about the effects of policy outcomes.  As early as Milbrath’s (1963) survey of 
lobbyists, scholars recognized the unique role that interest groups play in providing 
legislators with information to decrease their uncertainty.  The information can be 
policy-specific – in which a group outlines the possible economic consequences of a 
given proposal, for example – or it can be more political in nature.  Political 
information – such as popular support for a bill – is highly valued by legislators 
seeking reelection.  In recent years, researchers have examined how groups can use 
their information in a strategic way.  Ainsworth (1993) highlights the informational 
advantages groups have over uninformed legislators, and Ainsworth and Sened (1993) 
demonstrate that an interest group with information can make the interactions between 
government and society function more efficiently. 
 Direct lobbying is a major focus of this study.  Because this sort of activity 
deals directly with members of Congress, it is the most likely to be affected by 
                                                 
4 This article triggered a dialogue between the authors and Baumgartner and Leech.  For all four 
articles, see Austen-Smith and Wright (1994); Baumgartner and Leech (1996a); Austen-Smith and 
Wright (1996); and Baumgartner and Leech (1996b). 
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changes within that institution.  The literature asks whether groups lobby their 
opponents or allies.  Groups should also target those members in the best position to 
provide the results they seek; these include legislators with considerable power within 
the House.  The shifting balance of power between majority party leadership and the 
committee system, then, presumably had important consequences for interest groups’ 
direct lobbying strategies.   
 
Indirect Influences 
Though the direct lobbying Mode of Influence has been the area of greatest 
research among interest group scholars, “outside” attempts to influence legislation 
have also been the subject of investigation.  These sorts of strategies can be highly 
effective and are utilized by many groups, increasingly so within the past few decades.  
This Mode of Influence includes a diverse array of strategies aimed beyond Capitol 
Hill.  Indirect influence typically includes efforts designed to change public opinion in 
three ways: by generating grassroots support; second, by contacting group members; 
and finally, advertising in the mass media and local Washington, D.C. outlets.  This 
Mode also encompasses meeting with officials in other branches of the federal 
government; working with state-level government officials and agencies; and working 
as part of a coalition with other interest groups. 
Historically, the distinction between the two categories of direct lobbying and 
indirect influences was not always so clearly defined, even in the federal government’s 
definition of such activities.  Shortly after its implementation, the Federal Regulation 
of Lobbying Act of 1946 came under scrutiny for its rather ambiguous language.  Of 
particular concern were the activities that constituted “lobbying” and how the term 
was legally defined.  According to Zeller (1958), a series of cases argued before the 
Supreme Court helped to better define the activities regulated by the statute.  In one 
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particular case, United States v. Rumley (1953), the court held that “The phrase 
‘lobbying activities’ in the [1946] resolution is to be construed as lobbying in the 
commonly accepted sense of ‘representations made directly to the Congress, its 
members, or its committees’; and not as extending to attempts ‘to saturate the thinking 
of the community’.” 
Such a distinction is consistent with the typology used here.  Direct lobbying is 
treated as distinct from grassroots efforts, or even work with other federal branches of 
the federal government.  Given the structure of the U.S. government, there are many 
points of entry for a group seeking to influence public policy.  The separation of 
powers provides groups with three branches of government – and various points 
throughout the policy process – through which they seek to change or maintain the 
status quo.   
A number of scholars have examined how and why certain groups use the 
judicial system to reach their goals (Caldeira and Wright 1988, 1990; Epstein 1991; 
Epstein and Rowland 1991; Epstein and Knight 1999).  Though not as fully developed 
a literature, other researchers have examined the extent to which corporate interests 
exert influence over the bureaucracy in the implementation of policy (Gordon and 
Hafer 2005, 2007; Spiller 1990).5  Holyoke (2003) has examined how groups make the 
decision to target one branch of government over another.  He concludes that the 
decision is often a strategic one: groups may pick a venue based on the opposition they 
expect to face from political opponents on a given issue.  Many groups also make the 
decision to lobby beyond the federal government at the state level as well (Epstein 
1994, Zeigler and Baer, 1969). 
                                                 
5 The literature on public policy subsystems and issue networks from the mid-20th century also 
examines the relationship between interest groups and the bureaucracy.  See, for example, Cater (1964); 
Heclo (1978); and Berry (1989). 
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 Besides the obvious decision regarding which branch or level of the 
government to lobby, research also indicates that groups typically select from a wide 
range of methods beyond that of direct contact with officials in the federal 
government.  Three prominent outside strategies, as these other methods are often 
called, are grassroots lobbying, advertising, and working in a coalition with other 
organizations.6   
Grassroots mobilization has received a significant amount of attention from 
interest group scholars.  By rallying their membership – or the wider public – around 
an issue, groups are able to accomplish a number of tasks, including getting an issue 
onto the legislative agenda.  Membership associations also call on their members to 
write letters or call their member of Congress in the hopes of swaying the legislator’s 
opinion in favor of the group’s preferred position.   Perhaps the most prominent and 
widely-referenced studies of grassroots lobbying are Kollman (1998) and Goldstein 
(1999).  Kollman examines the ability of groups to mobilize public opinion as a 
resource and argues that interest groups are able to increase the salience of an issue 
through grassroots mobilization.  Goldstein explores how groups are able to encourage 
individuals to participate in the political arena through grassroots mobilization. 
 Many large, well-funded interest groups also engage in paid advertising.  Some 
of the most prominent advertising campaigns have been chronicled in case studies, 
including the Health Insurance Association of America’s highly touted “Harry and 
Louise” campaign against the Clinton health plan (West et al 1996).  Groups can also 
benefit from publicity when they receive coverage in various media outlets.  Danielian 
and Page (1994) explore the varying degrees to which range of interest groups – 
                                                 
6 Another outsider strategy is civil disobedience.  Some groups resort to protests and demonstrations as 
a means of influence.  Often, groups that engage in these sorts of activities lack the resources to 
participate within the more traditional lobbying community.  See Chapter 14 in Wilson (1995) for a 
detailed discussion of this outsider strategy.  The literature on social movements also explores these 
methods in depth. 
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including corporations and businesses, labor, professional associations, and citizen 
action groups – receive coverage on the television news. 
 Finally, some groups elect to join a coalition of other groups with similar goals 
or interests on a matter of public policy.  This topic has received an increasing amount 
of attention in recent years.  Two frequently cited studies are Hula (1999) and 
Hojnacki (1997).  Both of these studies explore a group’s decision to join a coalition 
or go it alone.  More recently, Heaney (2004) analyzed individual interest groups as a 
part of a broader social network of groups.  His study focused on how membership in 
a coalition can influence a group’s strategy and overall effectiveness. 
 At first glance, the indirect influence Mode of Influence is not directly linked 
to institutional change in Congress.  Since reforms like those in the 104th Congress 
only alter rules and norms within the House, presumably, groups’ external activities 
remain unaffected.  In Part I, however, I demonstrate that the institutional reforms in 
the House limited the effectiveness of certain groups in that chamber; they turned, 
instead, to external methods.  The literature on indirect influences, with few 
exceptions, does not comprehensively explore why certain groups choose to pursue 
these strategies over others.  My research indicates that the institutional environment 
of the House plays a part in this decision.  As such, indirect influences, too, can be 
affected by internal congressional reform. 
 
Campaign Finance & Elections 
Another major topic of the scholarly literature revolves around the campaign 
contributions groups make to support legislators’ efforts to win office.7  Strategies 
within this Mode of Influence include making monetary contributions to individual 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Biersack et al (1994); Rozell and Wilcox (1999 and 2005); and Morton and 
Cameron (1992). 
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members’ reelection campaigns or making contributions to leadership PACs.  The 
current system of regulating campaign contributions originated with the 1971 Federal 
Elections Campaign Act (FECA), which was amended by the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (BCRA) in 2002.  This system allows corporations, unions, and interest 
groups to create political action committees (PACs) designed to raise money and 
subsequently distribute this money to candidates for federal office, subject to legally 
imposed limits.       
The research on this particular Mode of Influence tends to follow two distinct 
trajectories.  First, like the direct lobbying literature, scholarly inquiry has revolved 
around which legislators a group will target with donations.  Many articles on this 
topic test for contribution strategies based on legislative characteristics like committee 
membership, seniority, majority party status, and party leadership.  The assumption is 
that these traits affect a given legislator’s ability to provide the services sought by the 
interest group; they determine a legislator’s “quality” (Mebane et al, 2001).  A series 
of articles published by Munger et al pursues this topic.8  These authors develop a 
formal model of campaign contributions and conclude that the productivity of a 
legislator – the ability of a legislator to pursue a group’s desired outcomes – plays an 
important part in the decision process.  They focus their bulk of their analysis on 
committee membership, but also note that seniority and majority party status play a 
role as well. 
The second research trajectory concerns the actual influence of campaign 
contributions; research in this area asks “What do campaign contributions actually 
buy?”  Many studies have focused on the extent to which PAC contributions influence 
congressional voting behavior.  Little consensus, however, has been reached on this 
                                                 
8 See Denzau and Munger (1986), Grier and Munger, 1986, 1991; Munger, 1989; Endersby and 
Munger, 1992; and Grier et al (1994).  
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topic.  According to Baumgartner and Leech, “Virtually every review of this literature 
spends time discussing how it is that some researchers have found PACs to be 
influential, while other researchers have found the opposite…” (Baumgartner and 
Leech, 1998: 134).   
Some scholars argue that money is influential in floor voting (Wright, 1985; 
Grenzke, 1989), while others disagree (Peltzman, 1984; Saltzman, 1987; Stratmann, 
1991).  Various studies have also explored the conditions under which contributions 
might have more or less influence on roll call votes.9  Many scholars suggest instead 
that money buys access to a legislator (Sabato, 1985; Langbein, 1986; Sorauf, 1992).  
Finally, other research focuses on the extent to which donations can increase the 
attention and effort a legislator devotes to an issue (Hall and Wayman, 1990).   
 Institutional change presumably has important implications for the campaign 
finance behavior of the interest group community.  As with direct lobbying, the 
changing balance of power within the House should correspond with changing 
patterns of group donations.  Groups wanting to get the most for their money should 
target those individuals with substantial power in the chamber – and with jurisdiction 
over issues of importance to these organizations; a change in this power should result 
in a change in contribution levels.  Campaign finance is a key concern of the House 
and its members – and therefore to interest groups.  Institutional change in that 
chamber should also impact group behavior within this Mode of Influence. 
 
Criticisms of the Interest Group Literature 
 While the current literature provides a comprehensive picture of interest group 
activity in and out of Washington, D.C., it has come under criticism by some scholars.  
The above discussion highlights a few problems.  First, there is little consensus about 
                                                 
9 See Smith (1995) for a comprehensive review. 
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how groups go about lobbying or making campaign contributions.  While some argue 
that they focus on allies, others suggest that they target legislators who disagree with 
them.  Likewise, scholars have failed to demonstrate the effectiveness of interest 
group activities.  In some cases, groups were able to sway public opinion, exert 
substantial influence over Congress, or otherwise achieve their goals to pass or block 
legislation.  In other examples, groups have been ineffective.  The campaign finance 
research has also failed to make a convincing case that donations do or do not 
influence legislative voting.  In their comprehensive literature review and assessment, 
Baumgartner and Leech (1998) express their concern:  
 
Lobbying and related activities have been studied by dozens of scholars during 
the past thirty years, and yet we can draw few firm conclusions about interest-
group behavior.  How is it that with so much research we still know so little 
about interest-group influence and the strategies they use to affect public 
policy?  Why are these studies so contradictory? (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998: 120). 
 
They point out that a good portion of the research on interest groups has been 
conducted using case studies, and they suggest that the use of case studies hinders 
researcher’s ability to make broader generalizations about group activity.  
Additionally, the authors argue that the large scale surveys used to collect information 
about group behavior “ignore important variation in what groups do, and to what 
effect, in different circumstances” (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 121).  In short, 
context matters a great deal and context has rarely been systematically accounted for 
in studies of interest group activity. 
The assumption that groups only use one strategy at the expense of another is 
quite naïve.  It is reasonable to expect that groups would cover all their bases in a 
legislative fight.  They would want to ensure they had the full-fledged support of their 
allies, but also try to convince undecided voters and educate their opponents.  In 
certain policy debates, groups might emphasize one strategy more than another.  Since 
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each legislative battle is unique in its policy and politics, such an approach is only 
natural.  As Baumgartner and Leech (1998) point out, lobbyists are reluctant to make 
broad generalizations about their work; instead, they emphasize that their choice of 
tactics varies across issues and situations. 
 Baumgartner and Leech (1998) argue that interest group research should take 
into account to political circumstances surrounding interest group activity.  They 
identify two important realities about lobbying behavior: first, that groups select from 
a number of strategies rather than using only one and, second, that the unique political 
context surrounding each issue has an impact on this selection process.  They also note 
that case studies of interest group activities and large scale surveys of interest groups 
often fail to measure contextual variables:   
 
[These studies] often look either at a single case of policymaking or consider 
no specific cases of policymaking.  As a result, many potentially important 
explanatory variables are held constant within each study.  Critical variables 
are designed into the project as constants or remain unmeasured…All of the 
survey researchers agree that the external political context is an important 
determinant of interest-group decision-making, and yet the surveys for the 
most part do not systematically collect information about that context 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 166). 
 
An important part of the political context that often remains constant in these 
studies is the internal arrangement of Congress.  Interest groups consider the 
institutional characteristics of a legislator, among other things, when deciding which 
members of Congress to target with lobbying and campaign contributions.  These 
characteristics include committee membership, seniority, majority party status, and 
party leadership roles.  A change in the institutional structure of Congress should also 
result in a change in interest group behavior.  For example, as committees become less 
powerful relative to other collective organizations in Congress, such as parties, groups 
should alter their strategies to reflect these changes.   
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 This dissertation directly addresses Baumgartner and Leech’s above criticism 
by allowing congressional institutions to vary over the course of the years under study.  
Since the project examines group activity both before and after the Republican 
changes to the House of Representatives, congressional organization and 
congressional institutions do not remain constant.  The project also directly asks 
lobbyists how the political context affects their decisions.  During the interviews that 
serve as the basis for this analysis, each lobbyist was asked how the 1995 changes in 
House rules and procedure affected their organization’s lobbying strategy. 
The explicit recognition that groups face a changing legislature in their 
attempts to influence policy provides a more accurate picture of how groups make 
their strategic decisions.  By examining groups’ reactions to House reform, the 
research identifies the patterns by which groups react to one instance of change in the 
internal workings of the House.  It offers a more nuanced picture of lobbying decisions 
by paying specific attention to the political context in which groups lobby Congress. 
A few scholarly publications on this topic have already been conducted.  None, 
however, have asked the research question as directly as this study.  Many textbook-
type reviews on interest groups have briefly mentioned the importance of 
congressional organization on group activity.  During the course of their extensive 
interviews with 175 organized interests, Schlozman and Tierney (1986) asked 
lobbyists how prior changes in Congress influenced their workload and effectiveness.  
Their questions focused on the congressional reforms of the 1970s; they asked about 
the increase in legislators’ staff size, the growth in subcommittees, Congress’s ability 
to conduct its own research through organizations like the Congressional Budget 
Office, and the sunshine laws, among other changes.   
The authors found that these changes contributed to an increase in group 
activity across the board, but that the changes had a varied influence on groups’ 
 
 
23
effectiveness.  In particular, citizen groups found the lobbying process easier.  
Schlozman and Tierney conclude by noting that “the relationship between the political 
system and organized interests is reciprocal.  Interest organizations are not 
autonomous units; rather, they reflect the constitutional, legal and electoral systems in 
which they are embedded” (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986: 390).  Along similar lines, 
Wilcox (1998) notes that the direct lobbying strategies used by groups have changed 
over time due to a number of factors including “changes in the levels of 
decentralization in decision making” and changes in party control, both of which are 
important elements of the 1994 Republican takeover of the House.  Ainsworth (2002) 
also offers a brief discussion of how the institutional context affects day-to-day 
lobbying activities. 
Beyond these brief references, Heitshusen (1995) offers the only 
comprehensive analysis of the effects of congressional institutions on interest group 
decision-making.  She examines changes in legislative lobbying – measured by 
congressional testimony – following the decentralization of House decision-making in 
the 1970s.  Her dissertation focuses entirely on environmental and labor groups.  
Relying solely on congressional testimony to measure interest group activity is not an 
especially accurate representation of interest group work in Congress.  As discussed 
above, direct lobbying entails a number of more informal activities that arguably have 
greater consequences than prepared testimony.  Also, groups must typically be invited 
to testify before the House, making it an unreliable indicator of how they choose to 
allocate their resources and decide strategy. 
Heitshusen’s analysis places a great deal of emphasis on the role of lobbyists 
as information-providers to members of Congress.  She argues that the 
decentralization of the House in the 1970s “expanded the scope of conflict to different 
committees” which required lobbyists and interest groups “to lobby a wider variety of 
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legislators” (Heitshusen 2000: 152).  The impact of these reforms varied across 
groups, depending on whether or not they tended to provide members of Congress 
with technical policy or political information.  Heitshusen concludes that “theories of 
lobbying can attain higher generalizability only if theories account for institutional 
arrangements and changes in those arrangements” (Heitshusen 2000: 171).     
 The changes in the 104th House were also significant because they were 
implemented by the new majority party.  Scholars have examined the effect that a 
change in party control has on interest group activity.  Nelson (1998) examines 
campaign finance data from the 1994 and 1996 elections to determine how PAC 
contributions to committee chairs changed following the Republican takeover.  She 
concludes that the change in party control – and therefore control of the chairmanships 
of House committees – had an effect on group contributions: “By becoming 
committee chairs Republicans received more money from PACs then they did when 
they were in the minority, even though twelve of the fourteen had been ranking 
minority members on the committees they now chaired” (Nelson 1998: 60).   
Campbell and Davidson (1998) discuss how the 1994 election influenced 
patterns of coalition building among interest groups.  They highlight the new 
Republican majority’s close relationship with various conservatively-minded interest 
groups.  The authors describe how these groups were actively involved in formulating 
the Contract with America that brought electoral success to the Republicans, and they 
chronicle group involvement in the drafting of the legislation that resulted from this 
plan.  After presenting their anecdotal evidence, Campbell and Davidson conclude that 
“the new majority changed congressional rules, structures, and operating modes in 
ways that had the effect (often intended, sometimes unintended) of promoting certain 
interests and disadvantaging others” (Campbell and Davidson 1998: 136-137).  My 
findings, especially those outlined in Chapter Four, support these conclusions. 
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Journalists have also highlighted the consequences of these changes in various 
articles chronicling the turnover in the House.  The majority of these articles focus on 
partisanship, not institutions.  Berke (1995b), for example, concentrates on the 
Republican Party’s direct solicitations for PAC contributions and its strategy to direct 
this pressure towards lobbyists so as to increase campaign funds.  The K Street project 
– the Republican leadership’s efforts, led by Representative Tom DeLay, to pressure 
interest groups to hire Republican lobbyists – also received coverage (Berke 1995a).  
Journalists devoted a good deal of attention to how changes in party control would 
open doors for many groups previously excluded during the years of the Democratic 
majority (Stone 1994; Weisskopf and Maraniss 1995).   
Issues of access are often the concern of major lobbying firms who want to 
ensure that their lobbyists have the necessary connections to meet with the 
Washington community’s power players, who are typically determined by party 
control.  Moore (1994) highlighted the effects of partisan connection on lobbyists’ 
salaries and employment opportunities after the Republican’s 1994 victory, and 
Wayne (2001) wrote about the reverse after the Democrats regained control of the 
Senate in 2001 when Senator Jim Jeffords (D-VT) left the Republican Party.  The 
analysis presented in Chapter Five lends further support to these points. 
Despite their partisan focus, however, these articles do imply that the 
institutional changes have some effect on lobbying activity.  Moore points out that 
Republican cuts to House staff size and the elimination of certain committees and 
subcommittees “could lessen demand for lobbyists” (Moore 1994).  Abramson (1998) 
suggests that the presence of divided government may be to blame for the growth in 
the Washington lobbying community.  To be successful and maintain access to 
lawmakers under these circumstances, firms needed to hire lobbyists with connections 
to both parties. 
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Taken together, the above references provide some understanding of how 
changes within Congress can influence the interest group community.  Of these 
sources, however, only Heitshusen’s conclusions are based on comprehensive 
empirical research and the analysis of extensive conversations with the lobbying 
community.  This study provides another such source.  While Heitshusen places a 
great deal of emphasis on the ability of groups to be effective, my work emphasizes 
how groups recognize change in the House of Representatives and incorporate this 
recognition into daily lobbying decisions. 
 
Chapter Overview 
The above discussion has outlined the ways in which the interest group 
literature can benefit from research into the effects of institutional context on group 
behavior and strategy choice.  Over the following chapters, this project offers such 
insight.  Chapter Two describes the institutional context of the mid-1990s U.S. House 
of Representatives with an emphasis on the two reform trends: an increase in majority 
party control and a decrease in committee autonomy.  Chapter Three addresses the 
research design of the project by outlining the various selection processes for the 
groups included in the study.  It also provides an overview of the characteristics of 
these groups and the lobbyists who represent them before Congress. 
Following this introductory material, the dissertation shifts its focus to the 
substantive findings of the interviews and additional analysis.  Part I consists of two 
chapters, both of which deal with changes in group behavior across the Modes of 
Influence described above.  Chapter Four examines the use of indirect influences in 
detail, especially grassroots work and attempts to influence other branches of the 
federal government beyond the House of Representatives.  In Chapter Five, the focus 
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shifts to changes in campaign finance activity and the effects of the House reforms on 
group hiring practices under the new Republican majority. 
The two chapters that comprise Part II examine changes in one specific Mode 
of Influence: direct lobbying in the House of Representatives.  Chapter Six explores 
the changing nature of interest group work with both majority party leadership and the 
committee system in light of the shifting balance of power between these two 
organizing bodies.  In Chapter Seven, the focus is on additional changes in the interest 
group community’s direct lobbying; in particular, the discussion addresses the effects 
of the reforms regarding three topics: an interest groups’ role as a source of policy 
information, the use of task forces, and the degree to which groups pay attention to 
House rules and procedure. 
Finally, Chapter Eight reviews the project’s conclusions and provides 
additional perspective on how these findings contribute to political scientists’ 
understanding of interest group behavior in a changing environment.  The conclusions 
presented here shed light on the importance of institutional context for interest group 
behavior, especially as it relates to partisan control of the House and the long-term 
relationships organizations develop with members of Congress.  I also address the 
historical tension between the committee system and party control of the House of 
Representatives.  Finally, I assess how the reforms of the 104th Congress affected the 
ability of the interest group community to serve an important democratic function: 
transmitting public preferences to the House of Representatives. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HOUSE REFORMS OF THE 104th CONGRESS 
 
As noted previously, this project focuses on the reforms implemented at the 
beginning of the 104th Congress.  Since the goal of the study is to assess group 
reaction to internal congressional changes, it is necessary to analyze group behavior 
over a period of time when dramatic changes such as these occurred.  The research 
also focuses exclusively on legislation in the House of Representatives since these 
changes were most profound in this chamber.  Typically, procedural reforms are most 
common and have the greatest impact in the House of Representatives.  By design, the 
Senate is much less rule-oriented and less majoritarian.  For these reasons, the project 
focuses only on the House. 
The goal of this chapter is provide a discussion of House institutions.  In doing 
so, I first review the scholarly literature on the topic.  The chapter also provides an 
assessment of the two major trends of the 104th House reforms: strengthening majority 
party leadership and weakening the autonomy of the committee system.   
 
Scholarship on Congressional Organization and Institutional Change 
Given the dissertation’s emphasis on congressional institutions, it is worth 
reviewing the scholarly literature on this topic.  What follows is a discussion of two 
distinct but related areas of research by political scientists.  The first – the rational 
choice models of congressional institutions – sheds a great deal of light on why 
Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, takes the shapes it does.  This 
research does not explicitly address actors outside of the legislative branch, like 
interest groups, but the various arguments presented by these scholars have important 
consequences for how groups are expected to lobby Congress.   
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In contrast to the ad hoc, rather non-theoretical literature on interest group 
tactical choice, the literature on Congress and congressional organization is highly 
formalized and theory-driven.  The rational choice literature on Congress places a 
great deal of emphasis on the degree to which the rules of the institution structure 
relationships and the policy agenda.  For the purposes of the proposed research, four 
citations from this literature are particularly relevant.  Together, these texts comprise 
the bulk of the theoretical literature on congressional organization.   
The first two works place the committee system at the center of congressional 
organization.  Weingast and Marshall (1988) argue that Congress is structured to 
maximize opportunities for legislators to make “gains-from-trade” or cooperative 
logrolling agreements.  The committee system – with its split jurisdictions for various 
policy areas – allows legislators to specialize in areas most relevant to their 
constituents.  Such an arrangement theoretically allows members of Congress to trade 
votes with their colleagues who have interests in areas different from their own, 
thereby furthering both members’ reelection interests. 
Krehbiel (1991) also stresses the importance of the committee system, yet 
emphasizes the informational advantages gained from issue specialization.  He argues 
that legislators lack information about which policy choices will lead to which policy 
outcomes.  Congressmen hope to avoid any unintended consequences that may 
negatively affect their chances for reelection.  Therefore, it is in the interest of all 
members to organize the chamber in a way that encourages members to gain expertise 
in certain policy areas and share this information with their colleagues when the House 
makes collective policy decisions.  Though not explicitly modeled, interest groups – 
and the information they can provide – figure most easily into Krehbiel’s argument.  
As Heitshusen concludes, “To the extent that legislative information-provision is 
contingent on specific committee-based institutional arrangements, congressional 
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theories that focus on chamber reliance on committee information-gathering may be 
strengthened by attention to the role of interest groups in this process” (Heitshusen 
2000: 171).  Since legislators – both on and off the relevant committee – hope to 
minimize their uncertainty about the outcome of a particular policy, they may rely on 
information from knowledgeable outside actors.  While the Weingast-Marshall and 
Krehbiel models may disagree on the logic behind the committee system, they share 
the idea that the committee system is the dominant mode of institutional arrangement.   
Alternatively, Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that parties are the most 
pertinent organizing features of the House of Representatives.  They claim that 
legislators are especially concerned about their reelection chances and, in light of this 
concern, join together to reap the benefits of a collective party label.  Party reputation 
and legislative records, as understood by the public, are collective goods shared by all 
members of a party.  It is in the collective interest of all party members to pursue goals 
that strengthen the electoral value of the party label.  These collective goals, however, 
may not directly align with an individual’s own preferences, electoral or otherwise, 
making the likelihood of defection high.  Party leaders, though, have an incentive—by 
virtue of the power they hold as leaders—to pursue the collective goals of the party.  
More recently, Cox and McCubbins have extended their argument on the importance 
of parties in the House, especially majority party control; they suggest that its agenda-
setting ability is paramount to its power (Cox and McCubbins 2005). 
A number of the topics that Cox and McCubbins investigate to support the 
party relevance argument are also those areas that underwent significant changes 
following the GOP takeover.  New Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) took control of the 
committee assignment process and also violated long-held seniority norms.  One could 
make a convincing argument that the changes following the 1994 election support a 
party-driven model of congressional organization.  The Republican Party leadership 
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consolidated its strength, especially relative to committees and their chairmen.  The 
rank-and-file members of the party willingly went along with these changes; the 
collective party ID – and its manifestation in the Contract with America – was a 
powerful explanation for the recent success of the party as well as its future prospects. 
Rohde (1991, 1995) develops a “conditional party government” model that he 
and Aldrich expand in a series of papers.  They argue that, as the heterogeneity of 
between-party preferences and the homogeneity of within-party preferences increase, 
legislators will strengthen party institutions in the hopes of achieving shared policy 
goals (Aldrich and Rohde 1997-1998; Aldrich and Rohde 2000b).  Though parties 
may not always be the most powerful component of legislative organization, they will 
be very strong when the conditions are right.  This theory emphasizes, contrary to Cox 
and McCubbins, that party leadership is responsible to the rank-and-file members, not 
the other way around.  Regardless of their varied nuances, though, these two sets of 
authors stress the institutional power of parties. 
 The conditional party government thesis also fits nicely with the story of the 
1994 takeover.  Arguably, the two parties were clearly and distinctly divided.  The 
collective support of the Republicans for the Contract with America fostered within-
party homogeneity as well.  Leadership consolidated its influence over the party.  An 
important difference, however, is that the leadership was the driving force behind the 
party activity and the legislative agenda.  Gingrich gave substantial influence to those 
rank-and-file members who supported him.  This may be inconsistent with Rohde’s 
argument that, under conditional party government, the leadership acts as agents of the 
party members, as opposed to the older “Boss” image of party leaders. 
These four models of Congress are intended to describe power within the 
House of Representatives; they do not address the ways in which these various 
arrangements may shape the behavior of external political actors like interest groups.  
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External political actors are largely left out of the models, though they are implicitly 
incorporated as components of a legislator’s preferences, as Heitshusen (2000) points 
out.  Given the premium legislators place on what groups have to offer – such as 
campaign contributions and policy information – these theories would benefit from an 
understanding of how the organization of the House can shape the behavior of external 
political actors, like those in the interest group community.  These models offer 
competing views of congressional organization, and they do so by looking only within 
the legislature itself.  Clearly, though, these alternative arrangements have important 
consequences for external political actors like interest groups. 
A second research trajectory into congressional institutions has devoted 
substantial attention to the ways in which Congress, specifically the House of 
Representatives, has developed and changed over time.10  The analysis often focuses 
on the strength of the Speaker’s office and other party-based organizations relative to 
committees.  The relative autonomy of committees, subcommittees, and their 
chairmen likewise garners substantial attention.  This shifting balance of power is a 
dominant theme of the 104th Congress reforms and also the analysis presented below. 
Various editions of Dodd and Oppenheimer’s Congress Reconsidered provide 
timely scholarly analysis of institutional change in Congress.11  For example, Evans 
and Oleszek (1997) offer an important perspective on the Republican Party’s 
committee reforms in the mid-1990s, highlighting how an examination of these 
changes illuminates the politics of congressional reform.12  Along similar lines, 
                                                 
10 For a review of such changes, see Schickler (2005).  Bensel (2000) suggests that scholarly attention 
should be directed toward creating a theoretical explanation for these changes, rather than the narrative 
accounts that presently dominate the literature. 
11 See in particular Dodd and Oppenheimer (1993 and 1997a). 
12 See also Evans and Oleszek (1997) for a comprehensive review of reform efforts under both the 
Democratic and Republican majorities. 
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Sinclair (1997) provides a discussion of the role of party leaders in changing 
legislative processes. 
Binder (1997) compares institutional development in the House and Senate, 
arguing that various partisan alignments create opportunities to sway procedure in 
favor of majority party control or, alternatively, in favor of creating rights for the 
minority.  Her analysis suggests that procedural developments depend on the strength 
of the majority party and the balance of power between coalitions favoring or 
opposing reform.  In perhaps the most comprehensive explanation of changing 
institutions, Schickler (2001) argues that no single theory can explain the institutional 
development of Congress over time.  Instead, he suggests a theory of “disjointed 
pluralism” in which “many different coalitions promoting a wide range of collective 
interests drive processes of change” (Schickler 2001: 4).   
Polsby (2004) attributes changes in House structure to changes in the 
composition of the political parties.  He argues that the changes in the 1970s, in 
particular, were party-based; that is, these reforms were driven by the Democratic 
caucus.  He suggests that changes in the Democratic Party, in turn, “were the product 
of the nationalization of the South, of demographic changes that had made the South 
more like the rest of the country, and of the party realignments that made it possible 
for southern Republicans to run for House seats and win” (Polsby 2004: 150).  A 
party-based assessment of institutional changes also seems an appropriate explanation 
for the changes in the 104th Congress, which were driven almost entirely by the 
Republican leadership. 
Polsby’s emphasis on the socio-political factors that influence congressional 
change does turn scholars’ attention to circumstances beyond Capitol Hill.  Yet, while 
comprehensive in their assessments of House institutional development, the majority 
of these works look at change in Congress entirely from within the legislative branch 
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itself.  The authors examine the effect of reform on House procedure and the balance 
of power within the chamber.  Very little attention is given to the effects that these 
changes have on political actors outside of Congress, including the interest group 
community.  Understandably, such an assessment is often beyond the scope of these 
scholars’ research goals.  The analysis in the following pages, though, offers insight 
into this missing link.   
 
The 104th Congress Reforms 
The Republican Party victories in the 1994 midterm elections constitute an 
important landmark in congressional history.  First and foremost, the results meant a 
new majority party in the House for the first time in 30 years.  This change meant new 
committee chairmen, new House leadership, the existence of divided government, and 
new legislative priorities.  Additionally, the change in party control resulted in a 
substantial change in congressional institutions and procedures.   
At the start of the 104th Congress, new Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich 
instituted a number of drastic reforms, many of which altered majority party 
leadership practices.  Table 2.1 provides a comprehensive list of the changes.  Each 
specific change is discussed in great detail in the following sections of the chapter.  
These sections outline the two major shifts in congressional norms that occurred as a 
combined result of these specific changes to House practices: a strengthening of 
majority party control and a weakening of the committee system.   
Perhaps one of the most important concepts for the purposes of this 
dissertation is that of “reform” or “change,” especially as it relates to House 
institutions.  The concept of institutions was carefully defined in the beginning of 
Chapter One.  To review, an institution is a prominent organization within a society – 
such as the nuclear family, a large company, a powerful group representing a subset of 
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citizens, or also a governing body, like the legislative branch.  An institution is also a 
significant practice or norm –  for example, marriage, doctor-patient confidentiality, or 
a widely accepted procedure, such as how a bill becomes a law.  Institutional change 
or reform, then, can be described as changes to a prominent societal organization or to 
the way such an organization operates on a day-to-day basis.   
 
Table 2.1, House Reforms in the 104th Congress 
• The Speaker was limited to a term of eight years.1 
• The Speaker was granted more authority in the appointment of committee chairmen. 
• Majority party leadership increased its control over the committee assignment process within 
the party. 
• Many of the administrative offices were reorganized and placed under the authority of the 
Speaker’s office 
• Members were limited to two full committee assignments and four subcommittee assignments. 
• Members were allowed to chair only one committee or subcommittee. 
• Committee and subcommittee chairmen were limited to six year terms. 
• Committee chairs were granted the authority to appoint subcommittee chairmen. 
• Most committees were limited to a maximum of five subcommittees. 
• Separate subcommittee staffs were abolished and subcommittee funding was consolidated 
under the full committee. 
• Three standing committees were abolished. 
• A portion of the work of the Energy & Commerce Committee’s jurisdiction was transferred to 
other committees. 
• Many committees were renamed to reflect the priorities of the new Republican majority. 
• Proxy voting in committees was abolished. 
• Joint referral of bills to committees was abolished. 
1Though this term limit was established, there has yet to be an opportunity for its imposition.  Gingrich 
resigned from the Speaker position after the 1998 midterm elections.  Before Hastert’s eight years was 
complete, the Republicans lost majority status in the House in the 2006 elections. 
 
The changes outlined in Table 2.1 qualify as both.  For example, the abolition 
of three standing committees constituted a significant alteration in the structure of the 
House.  Also, many of the reforms listed in the Table were changes to congressional 
practice and procedure; these include the implementation of term limits on committee 
chairmen, the abolition of proxy voting, and changes to bill referral, for example.  
Thus, each unique item in the list itself can be seen as a change in House norms and 
thereby House institutions.  Taken as a whole, the reforms also jointly qualify as 
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institutional reform; they significantly altered the structure of the House, a prominent 
institution within the United States government. 
As described above, institutional change consists of changes to the practices, 
procedures, norms, and structure of a prominent organization within society – in this 
case, the U.S. House of Representatives.  The House is also subject to additional 
change that is worth distinguishing from that of institutional reform.  Two types of 
change, in particular, are quite common.  The first of these is partisan change.  Given 
the two-party system of American government, each chamber of the legislature 
oscillates between the control of one party or the other depending on which holds the 
majority of seats.  When an election results in a new majority party, the House is then 
subject to partisan change.  The 1994 midterm elections ushered in partisan change 
when the Republicans gained control of the chamber for the first time in decades.  It 
was this partisan change, in fact, that spurred the institutional changes introduced by 
the new Republican majority.   
As noted in Chapter One, separating partisan and institutional change in this 
period of congressional history is complicated.  The challenge for my research is to 
differentiate between the effects of partisan and institutional change on group 
behavior.  As I address throughout the analysis below, the evidence collected during 
my interviews with lobbyists supports my argument that the changes in group 
behavior are due to the institutional reforms listed in Table 2.1 and not just a change in 
partisan control of the chamber. 
In addition to partisan and institutional change, the House is also subject to 
change as a result of new policy.  In many instances throughout history, the House has 
implemented institutional change via the policy process, including changes to the 
chamber itself.  Campaign finance reform and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1946 are just two examples of the House passing legislation that had profound effects 
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on the norms and practices of the legislative and electoral processes.  It is worth 
nothing here that the changes implemented at the beginning of the 104th Congress 
were not pursued through the policy process.  The House did not pass legislation 
imposing the new structures and procedures outlined in Table 2.1.  Instead, these 
changes were realized through the party caucus, particularly that of the Republicans.  
These changes mainly affected majority party procedures; as such, they were handled 
in the party caucus and not through the formal legislative process of the House. 
The 1990s offer a particularly ripe period in history to study the effects of 
institutional change on interest group behavior.  The reforms constitute the most 
profound changes to the House since of the 1970s – a time when the interest group 
community was just beginning its rapid growth.  Also, as Aldrich and Rohde (1997-
1998) point out, the reforms of the 1970s took place over a number of years, while the 
1994 GOP reforms occurred within a few weeks.  Since the changes were so drastic 
and sudden, they allow for a straightforward before-and-after comparison of interest 
group behavior.  In the remainder of the chapter, I outline the specific changes listed in 
Table 2.1 as they relate to two broad trends: the strengthening of majority party 
control and the weakening of the committee system.   
 
Strengthening Majority Party Control 
 The trend toward stronger party leadership in the House began long before the 
Republican Party gained majority status in the 1994 elections.  In the 1960s and 
1970s, newly elected liberal Democrats grew tired of a chamber dominated by 
conservative committees.  Over the next few decades, the textbook committee-run 
Congress slowly began to change; the greatest reforms occurred in the 1970s and 
served to shift power away from entrenched committee chairmen to their 
subcommittees and also to party leadership (Sinclair 2000: 84).  Thus, while the 
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process became more decentralized, the House leaders and the Speaker in particular 
were also given more authority.     
During this time, the Democratic leadership was granted more control over the 
Rules Committee and committee assignments.  The process of multiple referral of bills 
was also introduced, which increased party leadership power by providing more points 
of access to the policy-making process (Young and Cooper 1993: 230).  Sinclair too 
claims that “Majority party leaders in the contemporary [1980s] House are more 
active, more frequently involved in all stages of the legislative process than were their 
predecessors of the 1950, 1960s, and 1970s” (Sinclair 1993: 238).  Thus, the precedent 
of strong House leadership by the majority party had been set.   
Yet the GOP reforms in the 104th Congress still constituted a drastic increase 
in the power of the Speaker and House leadership.  In this section, I describe some of 
these changes, summarize why they occurred, and outline their effects on the 
legislative process.  It is these effects –and the legislative environment they created – 
that had an influence on how interest groups used the Modes of Influence. 
Owens (1997) outlines the many changes introduced by newly-elected Speaker 
Newt Gingrich.  First and foremost among these was the creation of a Steering 
Committee for the party; the Committee was chaired by Gingrich and designed to 
establish legislative priorities, schedule items for consideration in the House, and 
nominate committee members and chairmen.   
The legislative priorities of the new majority had been laid out in detail in the 
Contract with America.  This document was published by the Republican Party shortly 
before the 1994 elections and outlined the party’s principles and legislative goals.  
Gingrich and House Majority Leader Richard Armey had been among the authors of 
the Contract and were anxious to exercise their new authority to implement the 
Contract’s legislative plan.  Doing so required substantial support from all party 
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members and committee chairmen.  To enforce party loyalty and ensure the passage of 
the legislation, Gingrich and Armey provided strong incentives for members to 
support the goals of the party and work towards those ends.  For example, Republican 
members of the Appropriations Committee – through which the GOP leadership 
wanted to implement a number of its policy proposals – were required to sign a “letter 
of fidelity” that, according to Newsweek, committed the signatories to meet 
Gingrich’s budget goals (Rosensteil 1995).  The message was clear: sign or be 
removed from the powerful committee.   
The GOP leadership also engaged in substantial oversight of committee work 
on those issues included in the Contract – on both the procedure and substance 
surrounding the bills.  As the National Journal pointed out,  
 
Under the old regime, Democratic leaders typically operated at the sufferance 
of the chairmen on both the substance and timing of legislation.  Now, aides to 
Gingrich and Armey hold twice-weekly meetings with top committee aides to 
make sure that the panels are complying with the leadership’s master schedule 
and to seek consistent themes in the legislative actions (Cohen 1995). 
Cohen also points out that only Gingrich, Armey, and their leadership staff had regular 
computer access to the complex legislative scheduling system; not only were 
Democrats left out, but Republican committee chairs and their staff lacked access as 
well. 
Aldrich and Rohde (1997-1998) emphasize that Gingrich himself was deeply 
involved in committee activities and decisions. They suggest that he played a more 
active role in this realm than any other Speaker in the previous eighty years.  
Committee chairs needed Gingrich’s approval before consolidating any 
subcommittees, naming new subcommittee chairs, and often holding subcommittee 
hearings. 
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Other prominent changes implemented by Gingrich and the Steering 
Committee concerned the appointment of committee members and chairmen.  In some 
cases, incoming freshmen members were given desirable committee assignments over 
members with more seniority or clout within the chamber.  Owens describes the 
prominent responsibilities given to many new members:  
 
Gingrich…insisted that those in the vanguard of the Republican ‘revolution’ 
who had given the party majority status – the seventy-three new members – 
were involved in assigning members to committees and received plum 
assignments sometimes over the claims of more senior members, and 
sometimes against the wishes of committee chairs… (Owens 1997: 251) 
While it was typically rare for freshmen to be appointed to the Appropriations 
Committees, the eleven new Republican appointees had all been elected during or 
after the 1992 elections; seven of them had gained their House seats in the 1994 
takeover (Aldrich and Rohde 2000a: 12). 
The vote allocation within the Steering Committee regarding committee 
assignment was drastically changed; the total number of votes was decreased from 196 
from the previous Congress to thirty.  According to Aldrich and Rohde (1997-1998), 
only two members of the twenty-five person committee received more than one vote 
for allocation: Armey had two and Gingrich had five, giving each man substantial say 
in which members sat on which committees.   
The changes that received the most attention in the press were those regarding 
committee chairmanships.  As Owens points out, “Before most of the newly elected 
Republicans had arrived in Washington, [Gingrich] assumed the right to name 
committee chairs” (Owens, 1997: 250).  In three specific cases on three prominent 
committees, Gingrich appointed a legislator as chairman over another more senior 
member.  The point of this new practice was to ensure that new chairmen would work 
within the constraints of the majority party’s plan: “All three hand-picked chairs were 
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judged as more assertive and dynamic…and less likely than those they displaced to 
pursue committee-defined over party-defined priorities” (Owens 1997:250).  In the 
most extreme case, Robert Livingston – appointed chairman of the aforementioned 
Appropriations Committee – assumed power over four other committee members with 
greater seniority than his own. 
 Gingrich’s control over committee chairman also extended beyond the 
appointment of chairmen; the threat of removing a chair from his position was a very 
real one.  Owens describes a “universally recognized condition of committee 
leadership” under GOP control:  
 
committee chairs were above all representatives of the majority party – not 
leaders of semi-autonomous units able to recommend legislation which 
conflicted with the Conference’s wishes – and that, should committee chairs 
err any significant distance from the party’s wishes, Gingrich could invoke 
Conference rules at any time, call a meeting of the Steering Committee, and 
recommend removal of a chair (Owens 1997:258). 
The threat is best illustrated by Gingrich’s comments to a chairman who informed the 
Speaker that his committee could not meet a hasty deadline for passing Contract 
legislation; Gingrich replied, “If you can’t do it, I will find someone who will” 
(Rosensteil 1995). 
Under what circumstances would House GOP members be willing to cede so 
much authority to the party’s leadership?  Scholars have developed a number of 
explanations for these changes.  The “conditional party government” model developed 
by Aldrich and Rohde (2000a) suggests that rank-and-file members are willing to 
grant greater power to party leadership as within party preferences converge and 
across party preferences diverge.  They conclude that the circumstances surrounding 
the 1994 elections meet exactly these criteria (Aldrich and Rohde 1997-1998; Aldrich 
and Rohde 2000a).   
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Owens points out that the 104th Congress was highlighted by “high levels of 
party voting and strong party support among Republicans over and above any levels 
achieved by majority Democrats over the previous forty years” (Owens 1997: 264, 
emphasis in original).  Using Congressional Quarterly’s criteria for party line voting, 
Owens determines that 73% of votes in 1995 pitted 50 percent of one party against 50 
percent of the other.  In nearly 32% of the votes, 90 percent of Republicans were 
united against 90 percent of Democrats; Owens points out that these levels were the 
strongest since the days of party government under Speaker Joe Cannon in the late 
1800s.  The uniformity of the Republican Party members’ legislative agendas – and 
their unified opposition to the Democratic platform – offers one possible explanation 
for their willingness to grant so much authority to party leaders.   
 Additionally, the strong personality and leadership style of Gingrich cannot be 
ignored in explaining these changes.  In the minds of many Republicans – both 
incumbents and the newly elected – Gingrich was responsible for orchestrating the 
Republican victories.  After decades in the minority, many party members were happy 
– even obliged – to grant authority to the man responsible for bringing them to the 
forefront.  Gingrich was a strong believer in the party government model and a strong 
centralized leadership.  He was also aggressively partisan and an expert in policy of all 
sorts.  His dynamic personality and knowledge of policy and the political process 
made him a powerful force within the political process. 
 Owens (1997) also points out that many of the new Republicans elected in 
1994 were fiercely anti-government and anti-Washington.  As a result, they had little 
or no ties to the committee system of the past; nearly half, in fact, had not held elective 
office of any kind.  Many of these newcomers were elected – and believed they were 
elected – on the basis of the proposals outlined in the Contract.  They had a strong 
interest in seeing the Contract pass as promised, regardless of the sacrifices that 
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needed to be made.  Strong and controlling leadership was an important precondition 
for moving on this legislation.  In short, Owens argues that, “House Republicans 
developed the habit of trusting and deferring to a leadership which had got them into a 
position that many thought was impossible before the election – even when this 
involved modifying previous policy preferences…” (Owens 1997: 268). 
Regardless of the reasons behind these institutional and procedural reforms, the 
fact remains that they occurred and majority party control was substantially increased.  
Certainly, after the first 100 days of the legislative session and the Contract with 
America had been addressed, the fervor with which the party leadership approached 
legislation abated slightly.  Following Gingrich’s resignation as House Speaker in 
1998, Dennis Hastert took over the position and arguably led with more deference to 
committees and their chairman (Davidson and Oleszek 2002).  Yet, despite the change 
in leadership styles, the relative influence of party leadership and committees was 
permanently altered.13  As Jacobson argues, despite Hastert’s tempered approach, 
party discipline—and loyalty to party leadership—remained high (Jacobson 2001: 
215).  Tom DeLay, who was majority party whip under Gingrich and served as 
majority party leader from 2003 to 2006, is very well-known for his strong party 
control and demands for party loyalty.  Thus, while the heavy-handed tactics 
introduced the GOP in the 104th Congress might have ebbed and flowed over 
subsequent years, they served to substantially change the role of House leadership and 
its control over legislation.  In all, these changes created an environment in which 
majority party control of the chamber was drastically stronger than it had been in 
previous Congresses. 
 Strong majority party control had numerous consequences for the legislative 
process.  First and foremost, the violation of seniority norms and the increased role of 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of the ways in which the GOP tempered its initial demands, see Fenno (1997). 
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leadership in the assignment process sent a clear message that the spoils of majority 
party control would be conferred upon those Republicans most in line with the party 
stance.  Such a scenario sets up an incentive structure that rewarded members who 
toed the party line.  Members who supported the party’s legislative platform would be 
given desirable committee seats, committee chairmanships, and the chance to increase 
their power within the chamber.   
Likewise, legislators who broke party rank did so under the threat of never 
receiving such benefits or, even worse, having these positions taken away.  As 
discussed above, party line voting was at a high point in the 104th Congress after these 
reforms.  While this trend is evidence for House members’ decision to cede control to 
the leadership, this data may also be a side effect of strong leadership control; few 
members were willing to break ranks for fear of retribution from the leadership. 
 In addition to these incentives, the reforms also gave the Republican majority 
more control over the agenda and the content of legislation.  By taking a hands-on 
approach to policy making within the committees, the leadership was able to exert a 
strong influence over which issues came up for discussion and what the viable policy 
options would include.  This greater control over the substance of legislation meant 
there were far fewer opportunities for a surprising legislative outcome.  The political 
process became more predictable and the range of possible outcomes was greatly 
decreased.  Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argue that power extends far beyond who 
exerts influence in the decision-making process.  The powerful also include those who 
have the ability to set that agenda about what decisions will be made in the first place.  
Certainly, the reinvigorated GOP leadership had substantial power in both situations.  
One lobbyist interviewed for this study described the situation: “When the GOP took 
over, the nature of the legislation became far more predictable and lockstep…The 
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potential outcomes were less interesting.”14  A process such as this has important 
consequences for how interest groups approach lobbying and how these groups 
perceive their influence. 
The environment described above – one of strong incentives to support the 
party and a smaller range of legislative outcomes – provides the context in which 
groups work on behalf of their interests.  The increase in party control and its 
subsequent effects had an important impact on the ways in which many groups 
selected among the Modes of Influence.   
 
Weakening the Power of Committees 
The changes discussed in the previous section strengthened majority party 
control, and they did so at the expense of the committee system.  Committee chairmen 
who bucked party authority ran the risk of losing their position.  The constant 
involvement of the leadership staff and the leaders themselves in the day-to-day work 
of committees also limited the degree to which committee chairmen and members 
could pursue agendas beyond those of the majority party.  In addition to this strong 
leadership oversight, other reforms were introduced that weakened the effectiveness of 
the committees; they are outlined here.  Evans and Oleszek (1997b) group the reforms 
into five distinct categories: those affecting 1) committee assignments, 2) the powers 
of the chair, 3) committee jurisdictions, 4) staff resources, and 5) internal committee 
procedures.  This section uses these same categories to assess the reforms. 
As mentioned above, the Republican leadership increased its control over the 
committee assignment process.  Members of Congress were also limited in other 
ways.  No legislator was allowed to serve on more than two full committees and four 
                                                 
14 The direct quotes from lobbyists that are included throughout the text have been slightly edited to 
improve grammar and clarity, to maintain respondent anonymity, and to remove any conversational 
speech that might interfere with the lobbyists’ remarks. 
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subcommittees.  Additionally, the sizes of many committees were altered.  Evans and 
Oleszek (1997b) report that twelve committees saw size reductions, while four were 
increased.  The authors conclude that the trend toward smaller committees was 
designed to facilitate quicker and easier passage of the Contract with America; smaller 
committees mean fewer demands to reconcile and fewer compromises to make (Evans 
and Oleszek 1997b: 198).  With fewer interests to accommodate, the committees – 
under strong leadership control – stood a better chance at passing the promised 
legislation. 
Typically, on issues under their jurisdiction, committee chairmen have power 
rivaling and even exceeding that of party leadership.  As Evans and Oleszek note, 
“The chairs typically have significant discretion over which bills are scheduled for 
committee consideration and therefore which bills are reported to the full chamber.  
Committee chairs also have significant information advantages relative to other 
members because of their control over committee staff resources” (Evans and Oleszek 
1997b: 199).  In the 104th Congress, however, the power of these chairmen was 
arguably limited by many of the changes introduced by the Republican leadership.  
The committee chairman faced substantial oversight from party leaders and had strong 
incentives to carry out their legislative agenda.  The Republicans also imposed a six-
year term limit on committee chairmanships, with the intention of preventing one 
single chair from accumulating power over the course of many years.  The new 
majority party also sought to distribute power across committee members by no longer 
allowing a full committee chairman to serve simultaneously as subcommittee 
chairman without leadership permission.  Legislators were also allowed to chair only 
one full committee or subcommittee at a time, further preventing chairmen from 
becoming too powerful relative to party leadership. 
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The Republican reforms significantly altered the jurisdictional landscape of the 
committee system.  Three committees were abolished and their issues were 
reorganized into the jurisdiction of the remaining committees; those eliminated were 
the District of Columbia, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and Post Office and Civil 
Service committees.  Additionally, a small portion of the issues within the Commerce 
Committee’s jurisdiction were reorganized to become the responsibility of other 
committees; these issues included railroads, food inspection, the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline, inland waterways, national laboratories, and the Glass-Steagall Act regarding 
banking and securities.  The committee retained oversight over the securities industry 
and none of the areas transferred was typically the major issues on which the 
committee worked (Cooper 1994).  No committee, however, is happy to relinquish its 
authority over legislation and the power that such authority brings. 
House Republicans also changed the procedure by which bills were referred to 
committee.  In particular, joint referral – in which bills are sent to more than one 
committee – was abolished.  Sequential referral, which occurs when a bill is sent to 
one or more committees after the initial committee of referral has reported it, and split 
referral, when a bill is split into a separate provisions and sent to more than one 
committee, were not abolished; the Speaker retained the ability to refer bills in this 
manner but was required to appoint a committee of primary jurisdiction.  Oleszek 
(2001) points out that this gave the Speaker greater influence in determining which 
committees had a hand in developing legislation.  Given that committees derive their 
power from their informational and gate-keeping advantages over the issues under 
their jurisdiction, changes such as these had important consequences for the relative 
powers of some committees over others. 
Subcommittees also underwent substantial reforms in the 104th Congress.  The 
reforms of the 1970s sought to weaken the power of strong committee chairmen and 
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bolster the rights of the subcommittees; collectively, these reforms were known as the 
subcommittee bill of rights.  In 1994, the GOP majority enacted a number of reforms 
that essentially repealed this bill of rights.  Instead of having subcommittee chairmen 
selected by members of the majority party, they were appointed by the full committee 
chairman.  These full committee chairmen were thus granted a great deal of control 
over the subcommittees while they too were controlled by the party leadership.  As 
Evans and Oleszek describe, “these reforms largely enabled the Speakers, who could 
hire and fire the chairs, to reach down into the middle management of the committee 
system and ensure that it served the interests of the majority party” (Evans and 
Oleszek 1997b: 201).  Additionally, full committees were limited to a maximum of 
five subcommittees each. 
The staffs of both individual members and the standing committees are an 
overlooked but very important aspect of the political process.  Staff members are an 
incredibly important resource for legislators; typically, these individuals – especially 
committee staffers – have substantial expertise in specific policy areas and the 
consequences of various policy proposals.  The Republican reforms significantly 
changed the committee staff system, which is typically controlled by the majority 
party; historically, committee staff is unevenly allocated between the two parties 
(Evans and Oleszek 1997b: 206).  After years in the minority, the GOP had far fewer 
committee staff; they decided to reduced the absolute numbers of staff and hire their 
own personnel after gaining majority status.  Though the overall size of the committee 
staff was reduced by one-third, the percentage of staff granted to the minority party 
did increase.   
The abolition of separate subcommittee staffs was another important change 
regarding staff.  The subcommittee staffs now worked under the authority of the full 
committee chairmen – not the subcommittee chairman.  This change – in conjunction 
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with the others – served to further weaken the power of subcommittees and their 
chairs.  As Smith and Lawrence point out,  
 
The full committee chairs exercised substantial control over their panels’ 
internal affairs…Subcommittee and their chairs…lost most of the ability to 
independently initiate hearings and legislation, which their Democratic 
predecessors had enjoyed.  So, while the full committee chairs lost much of 
their independence from central party leadership, the subcommittee chairs lost 
most of their independence from full committee chairs (Smith and Lawrence 
1997: 184). 
Giving control of all staff to the full committee chair served as an important 
component of this shift in power. 
The GOP also introduced a number of changes to internal committee 
procedures.  Though these changes had less effect on the relative balance of power 
between party leaders and the committees, they still had the potential to affect group 
behavior and the incentives of individual legislators.  First of all, the practice of proxy 
voting in committees was banned.  Proxy voting is a system in which committee 
members not physically present at a meeting can still participate in proceedings by 
letting other members cast a vote on their behalf.  Republicans had long argued that 
this practice gave too much control to committee chairmen and hurt the committees by 
allowing for absenteeism and less deliberation (Evans and Oleszek 1997b: 204).   
The use of a rolling quorum – in which a chair could report legislation out of 
committee without an actual quorum or members present – was also abolished.  
Republicans mandated that all committee meetings be open to television and radio 
broadcast unless sensitive information was under discussion.  Finally, committee 
reports publicized how individual legislators cast their votes in committee hearings. 
Each of these internal procedural changes had its roots in the Republican 
Party’s experience while in the minority.  During those years, many members of the 
GOP complained about the use of proxy voting and rolling quorums, as well as the 
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exclusion of certain meetings of the Ways and Means and Appropriations Committees 
from public broadcast.  These concerns, as well as increasing public demand to further 
open up congressional proceedings, led to these procedural changes. 
  In addition to these five categories of committee reform, one additional 
change deserves substantial attention.  During the 104th Congress and the years that 
followed, the Republican Party increasingly relied on task forces to bypass the 
committee system entirely.  Scholars have pointed out that narrow party majorities, 
partisan disagreement, and lawmakers seeking to make a name for themselves have 
made it increasingly difficult to get legislation through the committee system (Oleszek 
2001).  Task forces – ad hoc legislative bodies convened on an issue-by-issue basis – 
were often used by the Democratic leadership while they held the majority, but the use 
of such bodies greatly increased once the Republicans took control in 1994.  The 
Democrats – according to congressional scholars – utilized task forces to create 
support for bills headed to the floor but the Republicans saw task forces as an 
opportunity to centralize party power over the legislative agenda (Dodd and 
Oppenheimer 1997b: 43). 
In his time as Speaker, Gingrich created task forces to deal with legislation on 
crime, term limits, welfare reform, and Medicare reform to name a few.  When the 
Patients’ Bill of Rights legislation was under consideration in the House in the late 
1990s, future Speaker Dennis Hastert chaired a task force overseeing the issue.  Many 
of the members and chairs of committees with jurisdiction over the various issues 
were included among the task force members – in part due to their substantial policy 
expertise – but, as Smith and Lawrence (1997) note, having more than one legislative 
body responsible for decision-making on the issue weakened the standing committee’s 
independence.   
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The GOP task forces ran in very different ways from standing committee 
procedure: no public hearings were held and no formal records of the meetings existed 
for review; additionally, minority party members were often excluded and full 
deliberation was not always conducted before decisions were rendered.  In many 
cases, the Democrats created task forces of their own to counter those of the 
Republicans.  Cohen (1999) points out that the use of leadership run Republican task 
forces was yet another example of Gingrich’s “top-down management style” at the 
expense of the committee system. 
 The joint effect of all of the changes detailed above was to weaken the 
autonomy of the committee system and ensure that committees and their chairmen did 
not stray too far from the Republican Party agenda.  By 1999, congressional reporter 
Richard Cohen concluded that the committee system had weakened to its lowest point 
in thirty years (Cohen 1999: 2210).  Though the committee system had diminished 
under the Democratic majority, its final collapse is attributed in large part to the 
reforms introduced by the Republicans in the 104th Congress.  Even after Gingrich 
stepped down as House Speaker amid charges of ethics violations and public 
dissatisfaction, committees and their chairman failed to fully wrest control back from 
the leadership.  Cohen points out that, despite claims that he would return more 
freedom to the committee system, Speaker Hastert failed to fully do so:  
 
[M]embers still complain of an absence of true debate and thoughtfulness in 
most committee actions…In recent years, a growing number of members 
seeking to learn about issues have found committee hearings so stage-managed 
as to be useless, and these members have stopped relying on the committees as 
a source for education and deliberation (Cohen 1999: 2215). 
Thus, members of Congress and congressional observers of many stripes have found 
that the committee system – following the Republican reforms – was greatly 
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weakened from its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s and also from the years leading up 
to the Republican takeover in the House. 
In implementing these reforms, the Republicans accomplished two goals: 
ensuring strong party control over the committee system and addressing their concerns 
from their years in the minority party.  Yet these reforms accomplished far more than 
these two goals.  They also created a new environment in which groups seeking to 
influence legislation would work.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ISSUES OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the decision to focus on House legislation in 
the mid-1990s.  In addition to this preliminary decision, many other aspects of the 
project’s research design require explanation.  This chapter outlines the various 
parameters of the study and describes its methodology.  The discussion begins by 
describing the decision to focus on interest groups with an interest in health policy.  
Next, the chapter outlines the legislation that provided the background for the 
interviews that were conducted.  After explaining the process for selecting the three 
issues of focus, I provide a brief legislative history of each. 
 The discussion also explains the selection of the interest groups chosen for the 
study, as well as the individual lobbyists actually interviewed.  After describing these 
procedures, the chapter offers a brief overview of the sample.  The final section 
provides details about the actual interviews conducted. 
 
Focusing on Health Policy 
The goal of the project is to examine the degree to which interest groups 
structure their behavior around congressional organization, especially in light of where 
power and influence resides.  The term interest group is one which captures a wide 
spectrum of organization types.  An interest group is formally defined as “a voluntary 
membership association that pursues a common cause through political participation” 
(Ginsberg et al, 2003: 417).  The sorts of associations that fall into this category are 
very diverse in size, resources, goals, and ideological orientation.  To fully examine 
how interest groups react to changes in congressional organization, the dissertation 
should explore a wide range of associations.  A study of the entire interest group 
community, however, would likely be superficial and unmanageable.  Instead, the 
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project focuses on a subset of interests: those with a stake in health policy, specifically 
legislation concerned with the provision and regulation of private health insurance.  
Focusing on groups with this interest makes sense for a number of reasons. 
The general consensus among interest group scholars familiar with health 
policy is that the nature and scope of groups associated with the issue changed greatly 
during the latter half of the twentieth century (Peterson 1993; Baumgartner and 
Talbert 1995; Laugesen and Rice 2003).  According to Baumgartner and Leech, the 
number of health and medical association listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations 
grew from 433 in 1959 to 2,426 in 1995.15  In addition to the sheer expansion in 
numbers, the nature of these groups has changed as well:  
 
Health care—once the domain of a relatively small number of powerful actors 
centered in the medical community, hospital administrators, and the largest 
insurance providers—has been transformed into a tremendously conflictual 
interest-group battlefield.  Health-care policy cannot be made without the 
involvement of a great range of powerful interest representing a great diversity 
of views (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998:112).     
 
Peterson (1993) argues that the health policy community underwent an 
important transformation between the efforts to reform the healthcare system in the 
1970s and those in the early 1990s.  In the mid-twentieth century, the power players 
consisted of trade associations like the American Medical Association and the 
American Hospital Association, the health insurance industry, and the business 
community involved in purchasing health insurance.  Until recently, these groups 
typically agreed on an appropriate government policy; challenges to the status quo 
were rare. 
                                                 
15 The growth in groups is part of a larger trend of interest group proliferation.  For a review of this 
topic, see Baumgartner and Leech (1998). 
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These organizations are still certainly among the most powerful working on 
health issues.  In time, however, the environment has become polarized with the 
emergence of reform-oriented groups, such as labor, nonprofit organizations, and 
citizen groups.  Additionally, disagreements within some sectors also helped to alter 
the policy arena.  As Peterson notes, splits between for-profit and non-profit hospitals, 
healthcare providers and business consumers of insurance, and even physician groups 
have weakened the dominance of the entrenched special interests. 
Hafferty and Light (1995) describe five groups that are actively involved in 
health care as it relates to government action: the medical community, corporate 
purchasers of healthcare for their employees, corporate sellers that provide services or 
manufacture medical products and pharmaceuticals, other providers such as nurses and 
physical therapists, and consumer organizations like the AARP and various patient 
advocacy groups (Hafferty and Light, 1995: 137).  These conclusions are also 
supported by Laugesen and Rice (2003) who argue, “Think tanks and foundations 
provide research and analysis on the uninsured and advance the interests of those 
without coverage.  Private payers have become more organized over time and better 
represented in Washington as the market has become more competitive.  Consumers 
are now “empowered” in the healthcare system…and patients are more willing to 
organize themselves politically” (Laugesen and Rice, 2003:297). 
 In short, changes within the group environment created an entirely new – and 
more expansive – landscape of groups with interests in health policy.  Explaining the 
reasons behind these changes is beyond the scope of this study.16  The changes, 
though, demonstrate why health policy is a fruitful area in which to consider the 
research question proposed here.   Rather than fitting the “iron triangle” criteria, the 
new health policy community is, in Heclo’s (1978) words, an “issue network.”  As 
                                                 
16 For a brief overview, see Peterson (1993). 
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Peterson writes, “iron triangles had to give way to looser, less stable, less predictable, 
and more diverse patterns of interaction and decision…” (Peterson, 1993:419). 
 These conclusions suggest that health-related interests have, in recent years, 
begun to mirror the range of groups within the broader interest group community.  
Each of the different types of interest groups –trade associations, corporate, labor, 
citizen-based, small, large, and so on – have a representative in the health policy 
community.  It is reasonable to imagine that groups with varying interests and 
resources may react differently to internal changes in Congress.  Organizations with a 
large staff and expansive budget may deal with institutional changes in a different way 
than a smaller staffed and less well-funded group.  Likewise, groups who are 
ideologically similar to one party may have a different response than those groups 
informally aligned with the other party.  Capturing these sorts of variations is an 
important part of my analysis.  Thus, by focusing on health policy, the project 
simultaneously looks at important dynamics while maintaining a reasonable scope. 
 Additionally, the sustained attention given to health policy throughout the time 
period under study makes it a useful topic on which to focus.  The initial years of the 
Clinton administration, as described in greater detail below, were highlighted by a 
substantial push for healthcare reform.  Despite the failure of these reform efforts – or 
perhaps because of them – health policy remained an important part of the legislative 
agenda throughout the decade.  The summer of 1996 saw the passage of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act which, among other provisions, instituted 
smaller-scale reforms to the private insurance market.  The following year, the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 implemented some of the most significant changes to 
Medicare since its inception in 1965.  The final years of the decade also saw a large-
scale focus – both in Congress and the news media – on HMOs and the reform of 
managed care. 
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 Presumably, groups with an interest in health policy and private health 
insurance were highly mobilized in response to these various initiatives.  It is therefore 
likely that groups with a stake in health care were active players in the process and 
also highly informed about the legislative agenda and process.  Thus, the lobbying and 
campaign finance activity captured will be that of groups at their most politically 
attentive, an ideal situation to determine how various groups – and group types – 
respond to changes in congressional institutions.  The project focuses on three key 
issues undertaken by the House of Representatives: one prior to Republican reforms 
and two after these changes were implemented.  The following section chronicles the 
legislative development of these issues and demonstrates why they are useful avenues 
of study.  
 
The Legislation 
Selection methods 
The publications of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
nonpartisan public policy research division of the U.S. Congress, were used to select 
the legislation on which to focus.  The CRS, which is designed to provide the 
legislative branch with policy analysis and information, regularly publishes documents 
that summarize major issues before Congress.  Many of these documents review the 
content and status of House and Senate bills associated with these issues.  Using Lexis 
Nexis Congressional Universe as an online search engine, I collected those synopses 
with a connection to health policy and legislation regarding private health insurance in 
the 102nd to 105th Congresses (1991-1998).  In addition to the CRS Reports, I also 
conducted an online database search of CQ Weekly, a Congressional Quarterly 
publication that highlights and reviews the major work in Congress each week.  Here, 
I searched for articles about health insurance legislation in the House. 
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Based on my readings of these two publications, I identified three issues on 
which to focus the project: the efforts to overhaul the healthcare system during the 
Clinton administration, the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and efforts to create a Patients’ Bill of Rights in 
the 105th Congress.17  These three were the most prominent issues dealing with private 
health insurance legislation among those addressed in the CQ reports and the CRS 
publications.  The first issue serves as a benchmark of group activity before the 1995 
House reforms, while the latter two serve as examples of group behavior after the 
changes.  By comparing group activity on these three issues, I can assess the impact of 
congressional change on group behavior. 
 Rather than focus on group behavior regarding individual bills, I chose to 
present the issues as groups of bills.  Each of the issues selected for the study was 
associated with more than one House bill.  In these cases, most groups do not work 
exclusively on one bill or another, though an organization may register opposition or 
support for a single proposal.  As such, it is less meaningful to talk with groups about 
their work on a single piece of legislation.  Additionally, asking questions about a 
group’s work on 10 bills, for example, is much more time-consuming than asking 
about their work on three issues.  Likewise, some bills are more viable than others and 
therefore receive more attention from legislators and groups.  Soliciting information 
about a group’s work on each bill was deemed unnecessary.  While the interview 
                                                 
17 Originally, I also planned to include a series of proposals in the 102nd Congress to amend the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  ERISA was originally passed to protect 
worker pensions and provide uniformity in regulation for those employers with employees in more than 
one state.  Health benefits were a last-minute addition to those plans regulated and protected under the 
law (See Rovner, 2000: 49 for further discussion).  Upon completing my first round of interviews, 
however, I realized that the various proposals to amend ERISA in the 102nd Congress were not an issue 
of great concern to most groups selected for the study.  Though I did find coverage of the issue in 
various news articles by Congressional Quarterly, virtually none of the groups I interviewed had 
worked on the issue.  For this reason – and to narrow the focus of the lengthy interview questionnaire – 
I decided to drop this issue from subsequent interviews and from the study as a whole.   
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participants were shown a document highlighting various bills associated with an 
issue, they were not asked about their work on each individual piece of legislation. 
 
Overview of legislation 
 Though the focus of the project is on interest group activity regarding these 
issues – and not the substance of the legislation – it is worthwhile to provide a brief 
legislative history about each of the issues selected for the study.  The following 
section provides a brief overview of the three selected issues.18
 
Clinton Health Reform:  Shortly after his election to the presidency in 1992, Bill 
Clinton made it clear that health care reform would be a top priority of his 
administration.  The number of uninsured individuals was a major cause for concern.  
Additionally, the cost of health care services and the amount spent on health care were 
growing to unprecedented levels.  Those responsible for paying health care costs – 
including the federal government, state governments, and employers – were seeking a 
way to lower these costs and reduce spending, as were others within the health care 
community. 
 Clinton formed a health care task force, headed up by his wife Hillary Clinton 
and longtime friend Ira Magaziner, to develop a comprehensive policy plan to reform 
the health care system.  Hundreds of policy experts came together to work on the task 
force and the resulting proposal, known as the Health Security Act (HSA), was 
released in September 1993. 
 The new system proposed in the Act was one of managed competition, which 
is defined as “a health system in which health plans compete with each other 
according to ground rules set by the government or other third party” (Rovner, 2000: 
                                                 
18 The majority of the information presented in these summaries was taken from Rovner (2000). 
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108).  The competition between health plans was one of the mechanisms designed to 
reduce health care costs and keep them at a lower level.  In another more controversial 
effort to reign in costs and spending, the plan proposed placing limits on the amount 
that insurance premiums could increase each year.  In addition to the cost control 
mechanisms, the Act included a few other key components.  To begin, the plan 
required employers to provide employees with health insurance and to cover a 
majority of health costs.  Small employers that would have a difficult time providing 
these benefits would be provided subsidies.   
Health purchasing alliances were also an important component; under the 
Clinton plan, they provided the “competition” aspect of a managed competition 
system.  In these alliances, consumers of health insurance would be pooled into large 
purchasing groups that would bargain with local plans made up of doctors, hospitals, 
and other facilities.  Described as a “quasi-governmental entity,” these alliances would 
collect the premium payments from employers and employees and then pass the 
money to the health plans, the role currently held by insurance companies and 
employee benefit administrators (Wong and Moore, 1993; Rubin et al, 1994).  
Alliances could be set up as nonprofit corporations or state agencies.  “Corporate 
alliances” would be allowed for companies with more than 5,000 employees so that 
businesses with employees in more than one state could avoid complicated regulatory 
schemes; labor unions would also be afforded this opportunity (Rubin et al, 1994). 
The cost of the program would fall, in large part, to the employers that were 
now required to provide coverage for their workers.  Additional funding was proposed 
with a tax on cigarettes as well as a tax on large corporations who elected not to join 
one of the purchasing alliances.  Reductions in Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal 
health programs would also fund the plan, along with the extra revenue generated 
through the reduction in health care costs. 
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 Even before its release, the plan sparked a great deal of controversy and 
received a large amount of negative attention.  The “Harry and Louise” ads, sponsored 
by the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), garnered substantial news 
coverage for its attacks on the Clinton plan.  The ads depicted a middle-aged couple 
puzzling over the complexity of the Clinton plan and worrying what it might cost 
them.  The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), staunchly opposed to 
any employer mandate, also lead the opponents’ charge. 
Despite all of the attention paid to it, the HSA was not, however, the only 
proposal regarding health care reform.  While the Act was supported by the White 
House and the Democratic leadership in the House, some Democrats supported a 
single-payer plan mirrored after the Canadian healthcare system.  Under these plans, 
all bills are paid by a single body, the government in most cases, while care and 
services are still provided by the private sector.  James McDermott (D-WA) and 
George Miller (D-CA) both sponsored single-payer reform bills in the House during 
the debate. 
Additionally, there were alternative managed competition plans that did not 
include all the elements in the Clinton plan.  The mandates that employers provide 
coverage were not included; nor were the caps on premium increases or the guarantees 
that all individuals would be covered.  Perhaps the most prominent of these bills was 
the Cooper-Breaux bill – sponsored in the House by James Cooper (D-TN) – which 
proposed a plan under which health care providers would form networks and compete 
for consumers.  The bill did not include an employer mandate nor did it require 
individuals to purchase insurance.   
 Despite – or perhaps because of – the varying options for reform, none of the 
legislation ever made it to the House floor for debate.  The Senate did discuss a bill on 
the floor of the chamber, but plans were eventually abandoned prior to the summer 
 
 
62
recess.  In short, though five bills were reported out of committee between the two 
chambers, the legislation did not progress any further.  Then, the November elections 
brought the change in party control.  
 A number of scholars have analyzed the failure of the Clinton reform efforts 
and a great deal has been written about the politics of the debate.19  These issues, 
however, are somewhat beyond the scope of this project.  What matters most for this 
study is that the various interest groups with a stake in health policy – small and large 
employers, health care providers, and consumers, among others – were mobilized in 
response to the reform efforts and actively lobbying Congress on the issue.  Their 
work on Clinton health reform took place within the framework of a particular set of 
rules, norms, and practices in the House of Representatives.  By examining how 
groups conducted their day-to-day lobbying activities under this framework and 
comparing this work to other issues, we can assess how changes in this framework 
affect group behavior.  The following two issues provide our points of comparison. 
 
HIPAA:  In the wake of the failure to pass comprehensive health care reform, many 
policymakers believed the most appropriate way to enact legislation was to start with a 
smaller scale of change.    That smaller legislation was signed into law with bipartisan 
support in August of 1996; it was called the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, or HIPAA.   
Unlike the Clinton plan, HIPAA did not control the cost of health care.  The 
legislation did, however, introduce a dramatic regulation of the private insurance 
industry.  It also increased the availability of health insurance to the public, but it only 
impacted a very small portion of the population.  The proposal was designed to protect 
those individuals who were already insured and wanted to move from one group plan 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Skocpol (1996) and Broder (1996). 
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to another or move from an individual plan to a group plan.  Though this portability 
provision did not allow workers to take an insurance plan with them when leaving a 
job, it did ensure that they could change jobs without the risk of being unable to get 
insurance or having to wait for coverage due to preexisting conditions.  The federal 
legislation simply codified what many states had already made into law in the years 
leading up to its passage.  A law making these guarantees at the federal level, 
however, reached those insurance plans exempted from state regulations by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 
Many analysts have pointed out how few individuals the legislation actually 
affected.  Others have suggested that – despite its small scope – HIPAA has set a 
precedent for greater federal regulation of the private health insurance market.  As 
Ladenheim (1997) points out, “The passage of HIPAA ends almost a century of 
federal deference to the states in the matter of insurance regulation, and places them 
on notice that, even without comprehensive health reform, the federal government 
may take a more active role in regulating private insurance and health care delivery…” 
(Ladenheim, 1997: 34-35).  Thus, while the results of the legislation may have been 
less than sweeping, the framework now exists for future federal action. 
 A large portion of the work on the bill took place in the Senate side of the U.S. 
Congress in a bipartisan effort spearheaded by Senators Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and 
Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS).  The House offered multiple versions of the legislation, 
many of which included a series of provisions supported by in large part by just the 
Republican Party.  Among these provisions was a pilot program for Medical Savings 
Accounts (MSAs), which are tax-preferred accounts out of which individuals pay for 
their own health care.  Typically, these accounts are supplemented by a catastrophic 
illness insurance policy that can be relied upon in cases of severe health problems that 
get costly.  MSAs are a controversial aspect of health care reform, and the pilot 
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program implemented through HIPAA called for a four-year experiment with 750,000 
policies available to the self-employed, small employers, and the uninsured.  HIPAA 
also increased the tax deductibility of health insurance premiums for the self-
employed and created a program designed to limit insurance fraud.  Three prominent 
players on the issue in the House were Harris Fawell (R-IL), Mike Bilirakis (R-FL), 
and Bill Archer (R-TX), each a sponsor of various versions of the bill in that chamber. 
 Finally, a portion of the final legislation included provisions mandating 
standards for the electronic transmission of health records.  The law also called for 
Congress to pass legislation to protect the privacy of medical records by August 1999.  
Should Congress not pass such legislation, the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services would be able to impose its own standards.  Though this privacy 
provision was not a major issue at the time of the debate over the bills, it is the most 
immediate and far-reaching consequence of HIPAA.  Beginning in April 2003, health 
care providers were required to make a concerted effort to keep patient information 
private; the law indicates that sharing information for the purposes of treatment and 
payment is within reason, but that patients control their personal information in most 
other cases.  Many health providers have had to spend substantial time and money 
updating information systems and procedures in order to meet the HIPAA 
requirements.  This element of the legislation, then, is perhaps its biggest legacy 
(Dworkin, 2006). 
 
Patients’ Bill of Rights:  In the late 1990s, a great deal of attention was paid to the 
impact of managed care organizations on the health care system.  Managed care 
organizations, including health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other 
arrangements like preferred-provider organizations (PPOs) grew in great numbers in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  By 1996, more than 75% of Americans holding health 
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coverage provided by their employers were covered by managed care plans (Rovner, 
2000: 105).   
These plans differ from the traditional fee-for-service arrangements in which 
patients are billed for each service given by a health care provider.  Typically, in a fee-
for-service plan, patients are able to be seen or treated by any health care provider of 
their choice.  Alternatively, a managed care system is one “that integrates the 
financing and delivery of health care services” (Rovner, 2000: 105).  In some managed 
care arrangements, the organization owns all of the health care facilities and directly 
employs the workers of these facilities; in other, looser arrangements, the managed 
care organization has a standing arrangement with certain physicians and facilities to 
serve patients for a set discounted price.  The biggest difference between a managed 
care plan and a fee-for-service arrangement is the degree to which consumers have a 
choice in doctors and hospitals.  A participant in a managed care plan typically has 
limited choices in which doctors they may see and which hospitals they may visit to 
maintain coverage. 
Despite their rise to prominence – or perhaps because of it – these 
organizations received substantial negative media coverage in the latter half of the 
1990s.  Many news programs detailed cases where patients were delayed or denied 
care, where mothers and their newborns were required to leave the hospital within 24 
hours of delivery, and where doctors were prevented by a managed care organization 
from discussing all available treatment options with a patient.   
In light of this negative attention, and the corresponding decline in the public’s 
opinion of managed care, lawmakers at both the state and federal levels of government 
introduced a wide range of proposals to protect consumers.  In 1996, President Clinton 
created a commission on the topic and charged them with the task of evaluating the 
quality of the care provided.  In November of the following year, the commission – 
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officially named the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the 
Health Care Industry – released its report and a proposal for a Consumer Bill of Rights 
and Responsibilities. 
Shortly afterwards, legislators in both chambers of Congress introduced 
legislation to enact patient protection measures.  The bills, known in the Senate as the 
competing partisan versions of the Patients’ Bill of Rights, sought to regulate the 
managed care industry in an effort to prevent the “horror stories” reported in the news.  
In the House, the Republican leadership created a task force, led by Dennis Hastert (R-
IL) to study the issue and propose legislation.  This legislation, called the Patient 
Protection Act of 1998, was one of many bills introduced in the House during the 
105th Congress.  In addition to the GOP leadership bill, John Dingell (D-MI) and 
Charles Norwood (R-GA) introduced competing versions.   
The bills in both chambers contained a number of similar provisions.  These 
included 1) amending ERISA to allow patients denied appropriate care to sue their 
health plans in state courts; 2) giving physicians final say over health care decisions 
and preventing health plans from limiting communication between doctors and 
patients; 3) covering the cost of a trip to the ER if a “prudent layman” would consider 
the circumstances worthy of emergency care; and 4) requiring that health plans 
provide internal grievance procedures for patients as well as access to an independent 
external body for deciding disputes.  Like the other bills, the GOP leadership version 
included provisions for broader access to emergency room care.  While their bill 
would expand patients’ rights to appeal coverage decisions and denials of care, it 
would not allow those patients enrolled in managed care plans exempt from state 
regulation to sue these plans under state laws.  The bill also included provisions to cap 
non-economic damages in medical malpractice suits at a certain level and establish 
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purchasing cooperatives for smaller business to obtain coverage at more affordable 
rates. 
Though the House passed a version of the legislation, the issue eventually 
stalled in conference committee, only to resurface again in the early 2000s.  Two bills 
were at issue in this second iteration of the debate: one cosponsored in the House 
again by Dingell and Norwood and a more limited version of reform endorsed by 
House GOP leaders and the Bush White House (Broder, 2001a).  After a number of 
pressure-packed meetings with the President and White House staff, Norwood agreed 
to scale back his demands and the two men cut a deal without the consultation of 
Norwood’s House allies (Milbank and Eilperin, 2001).   On August 3, 2001, the House 
accepted the deal presented by Norwood and the president by a narrow vote of 218 to 
213.  The issue and further progress on the legislation, however, were later 
overshadowed by the events of September 11th, 2001 (Broder, 2001b). 
 
Discussion of the Legislation 
 It is worth mentioning the degree to which the legislation selected for the 
project may affect the conclusions I draw.  As made obvious by the above discussion, 
the selected issues vary on a number of dimensions.  First of all, the scope of proposed 
reforms differs across issues.  The Clinton plan sought to completely overhaul the 
health care system, while HIPAA dealt with the coverage of a very select group of 
already-insured individuals.  Similarly, the patient protection legislation sought to 
reform the managed care system, but did nothing to provide coverage for the 
uninsured population; the Clinton plan did. 
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 In addition to the scope and content of the legislation, each issue differed in the 
attention it received from the public and the mass media.20  The Clinton reform efforts 
had a constant news presence for the months leading up to the introduction of 
legislation and afterwards.  The Patients’ Bill of Rights proposals were also highly 
profiled, unlike HIPAA.  HIPPA, much more technical in nature, was too laden with 
policy details and specifics; it lacked the mass appeal – and mass consequences – 
required of a high profile issue.  It is quite possible that the varied characteristics just 
discussed may have as profound an influence on group behavior as congressional 
organization or a change in House practices and procedures.  This fact certainly 
weighs in on the analysis presented in subsequent chapters.   
Lowi (1972) argues that policy causes politics.  He asserts that, instead of 
examining public policies by their substantive characteristics—agricultural policy or 
fiscal policy, for example—they should be looked at through the lens of state power: 
what type of action is the government taking, and how does it relate to the citizen 
affected by the policy?  Is the government directly coercing individual behavior, or is 
it reallocating resources among classes of people, for example?   
Lowi’s typology identifies four distinct forms of public policy: distributive, 
regulatory, redistributive, and constituent.  His conclusions are straightforward: the 
politics surrounding a policy will depend on the type of policy that it is (Lowi, 1985).  
The nature of conflict and debate over a policy will be consistent with the manner in 
which the state’s power is applied, regardless of the issue area.   
Thus, it is useful to consider how the state planned to apply its power in the 
cases selected for this study.  Most of the provisions in HIPAA and the patient 
protection legislation were clearly regulatory; in both cases, the federal government 
                                                 
20 It is worth pointing out, however, that the attention an issue receives is often a direct function of 
interest group activity.  Groups who may benefit from national attention to an issue often seek to 
increase media coverage and promote public awareness. 
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sought to control the behavior of insurers and managed care plans.  Given its multiple 
goals and provisions, the Clinton plan is harder to categorize.  Some of the elements, 
such as the cigarette tax designed to fund parts of the plan, are redistributive in nature; 
the money collected from these individuals would be going to subsidize the health care 
plans of others.  By setting standards for benefit provision, the plan was regulatory, 
seeking to impose standards on employer plans.  Also, the creation of health 
purchasing alliances was constituent in nature, creating a new governing body through 
which health care is organized.  Depending on the specific aspect of the legislation, 
the Clinton plan could fall into a number of categories.   
According to Lowi’s framework, these uses of state power should have an 
influence on how the politics – including interest group activity – develop.  Since each 
selected topic has regulatory components, I assume that the politics surrounding them 
would be somewhat similar.  As such, the comparisons of group behavior in the pre- 
and post-reform periods should be worthwhile and indicative of how varied 
institutional arrangements – instead of varied uses of state power – in the House of 
Representatives can affect organizational activity. 
Despite a few drawbacks, the issues selected for study offer a ripe opportunity 
for analyzing group behavior.  No two issues are ever the same in content, nature, or 
politics; thus the potential pitfalls outlined above would exist with any selected issues.  
Additionally, the legislation described above are among major health initiatives of the 
1990s – a time period which has been selected for reasons already described in detail.  
Given the prominence of each of the three issues, it is reasonable to assume that many 
types of interest groups were mobilized to lobby the House.  Since the study requires 
comparison of group work across legislation over time, it is important that most 
groups have worked on each of the selected topics.  The prominence of these issues 
helps to ensure that this is the case.   
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The Interest Groups 
Selection methods 
An important first task of the research was to identify a distinct set of groups 
suitable to discuss their work on the legislation described above.  In order to identify 
these groups, I relied on Washington Representatives, an extensive annual directory of 
interest groups and lobbyists.21  Each edition of the directory provides an index in 
which companies and organizations are arranged by their industry or area of 
legislative interest.  To identify the relevant universe of groups, I generated a list of 
each group included under the following subject headings: Aging, Dental, Employees 
& Employment, Government, Health Care and Medicine, Hospitals & Nursing 
Homes, Insurance Industry, Labor, Mental Health, Nursing, Small Business, and 
Social Welfare.  These categories encompass a wide range of groups, each with 
potential interests in legislation on private health insurance.22
I generated a list of all groups in these categories in the editions of Washington 
Representatives published four years prior to the Republican reforms and four years 
afterwards; that is, 1991-1998.  Washington Representatives outlines the following 
criteria for inclusion in the directory: “persons working to influence government 
policies and actions to advance their own or their client’s interests” (Washington 
                                                 
21 Washington Representatives is published every May and the yearly updates are conducted in the first 
few months of each year.  The editors of the book describe it as a “snapshot” of who represents a group 
at the time the updating is done.  The directory’s publisher, Columbia Books, confirmed that each 
year’s entries in the directory were those individuals who worked on behalf of the group during that 
year and not the previous one.   Since updates are made during the early months of each year, the 
representatives listed are most likely the lobbyists who worked for a group that calendar year.  While 
there is substantial employee turnover at these organizations, it is reasonable to assume that these 
annual directories give a full list of the individuals who worked for each group, each year.  Over the 
course of scheduling the interviews, I never got the sense that gaps in this directory had undermined my 
efforts to generate a list of the relevant group representatives.  
22 I chose to include the Government section of the Index in my search for relevant groups because the 
health care debate is closely linked to issues of federalism and the division of responsibility for citizen 
health care between the state and federal level.  The Government section of groups, however, included 
local cities, municipalities, and villages, as well as foreign governments.  These groups are less 
involved in debates over health care and were subsequently removed from the final list of groups. 
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Representatives, 1991, 3).  The authors note that, “[The directory’s] scope was 
deliberately made broad in the belief that the forces at work are more diverse and 
extensive than those engaged in lobbying as such.  It is intentionally a book about all 
advocates on the Washington scene” (Washington Representatives, 1991, 8).23  Given 
these criteria, the list of groups obtained using this method is a comprehensive one.  A 
total of 3,571 groups were listed in Washington Representatives in the relevant 
categories at some point from 1991-1998.  Of these, 613 groups appeared in the 
directory every year.24
 This study is based on qualitative interviews with lobbyists working on behalf 
of advocacy groups concerned with health policy.  Given this research design, the list 
of 613 groups was narrowed down to 46, a more realistic number for interviewing 
purposes.  I selected these groups for a number of reasons.   
First, they represent a realistic cross-section of organizations with an interest in 
health policy, specifically private health insurance.  The 46 groups can be divided into 
ten categories based on their stake in health legislation: medical professionals (3 
groups), the insurance industry and independent insurers (6), large employers (3), 
small businesses (4), labor (2), the elderly (2), hospitals and healthcare facilities (6), 
public interest and social welfare organizations (3), groups concerned with federalism 
(3), and finally, a miscellaneous category (2).25  Of the 46 groups targeted for the 
study, I was able to gain access to 34, giving me an organizational response rate of 
                                                 
23 For individual organizations like those that are the focus of this study, Washington Representatives 
sends an annual survey asking each group for the names, positions, and contact information of its 
employees. 
24 Over the course of eight years, many groups may have changed their names or undergone mergers 
with similar organizations.  A list of groups potentially subject to this problem was generated and 
checked in detail using the Washington Representative addresses, descriptions, and staff listings, thus 
limiting the number of groups erroneously eliminated for not appearing in each of the eight years under 
study. 
25 See Wright (1996), pages 22-30, for a discussion of various interest groups categories: trade and 
professional associations, corporations, labor unions, citizen groups, intergovernmental groups, and 
charitable and religious organizations.  With the possible exception of the latter category, each of these 
group types is included in this study. 
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73.9%.26  In the case of six groups, I was only able to speak with a lobbyist who 
worked at the organization during part of the eight years included in the study; 
excluding these groups drops the organizational response rate to 60.8%.  The partial 
groups, however, were not excluded from the analysis presented in subsequent 
chapters.27
Appendix I provides a list of the final 34 groups included in the study.  Taken 
together, they constitute a microcosm of the groups working on health policy: those 
who provide health care and expect payment in return, those who offer insurance to 
employees, those who sell insurance to individuals and employers, and those who 
represent specific populations like consumers, the elderly, and even the uninsured.  All 
of these actors are represented in the project, helping to provide an accurate picture of 
the groups working on health policy.28
The selected groups also demonstrate substantial variation on a number of 
important characteristics, including those traits that may influence lobbying behavior.  
The sample includes very large groups with substantial budgets and staff support.  
Smaller groups with fewer financial and personnel resources are also represented.  
Additionally, the groups are diverse ideologically and vary on the strength of their 
                                                 
26 Please note that I have calculated the rate of response from organizations, not from individual 
lobbyists.  I contacted a large number of lobbyists who I did not hear back from.  In many cases, 
though, I had a number of names associated with an organization; if a person did not return my repeated 
calls or emails, I tried the others from my list. 
27 The following groups are not represented on all three issues: AFL-CIO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Health Insurance Association of America, National Association of Health Underwriters, National 
Governor’s Association, and the National Health Council.  In most cases, I was simply unable to get a 
response or appointment from the lobbyist(s) identified with an issue. 
28 An important omission from this list is the group known as America’s Health Insurance Plans 
(AHIP), which is the largest trade association representing the health insurance and managed care 
industries.  This group formed in the mid-1990s after the merger that created the American Association 
of Health Plans (AAHP) from the Group Health Association and the American Managed Care and 
Review Association.  Despite repeated emails and phone calls to current and former employees, I was 
unable to schedule an interview with this group.  The managed care industry is not completely left out 
of this analysis, however.  Lobbyists for the Health Insurance Association of America – which 
represented a large number of health insurers and later merged with AAHP to form AHIP – were 
interviewed and their comments are included here. 
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alignment with the two political parties.  These group characteristics are discussed in 
greater detail in the following section. 
Finally, the selected groups include those identified by the author as key 
players in health legislation.  Based on my knowledge of the interest group community 
and health care policy more generally, I selected these groups to ensure that the most 
important players would be included.  A random sample of groups from the 613 
identified using Washington Representatives may have omitted the most prominent of 
these organizations. 
 An important final note is that the groups selected for the study are just that: 
groups.  While the final Washington Representatives list of 613 groups included a 
large number of corporations, especially large insurance companies, they were left out 
of this study.  Instead, the project focuses exclusively on associations that work 
independently to represent their members’ interests.  While the lobbyists employed by 
large corporations were not interviewed, groups that these companies belong to, such 
as the American Association of Health Plans or the National Association of 
Manufacturers were included.29  Private lobbying firms – admittedly a powerful 
segment of the lobbying community – are also excluded from this study.  This project 
examines how the work of independent advocacy groups is subject to institutional 
changes in the House of Representatives.  It is reasonable to expect that the work of 
these groups would be qualitatively different from the work of private lobbying firms 
and the in-house lobbyists for large corporations.  For the purpose of providing a 
comprehensive analysis, this project focuses only on independent advocacy groups, at 
the expense of other lobbying operations.  Certainly, institutional change in the House 
could affect the behavior of these other actors, but they are not examined here. 
                                                 
29 See Hart (2004), however, for an argument to look at individual firms. 
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The goal of the study is to illuminate how various groups approached health 
policy before and after the Republican Party made substantial changes in the House of 
Representatives.  The conclusions presented in the pages that follow simply provide 
one possible description of how groups can react to institutional changes in the House; 
no broad theoretical assertions are made.  While the analysis presented below may 
provide insight into similar cases, the project does not make any claims that its results 
are entirely transferable to other historical eras of institutional change in the House or 
to other segments of the interest group community.  Thus, the sampling procedures 
outlined above are well-suited to the limited scope and ambition of the study.30
 
Overview of groups 
What follows is a brief overview of the important characteristics of the 
selected organizations.  The data was obtained in two ways.  First, I relied on the 
information presented in two interest group directories: the Associations Yellow Book 
and the Encyclopedia of Associations.31  The data on group partisanship was taken 
from the interviews with each group’s lobbyists. 
As discussed above, the groups selected for the study represent a wide range of 
interests regarding health policy.  In addition to the diversity of interests represented, 
the groups also vary across a wide range of other traits.  All of the groups here – with 
                                                 
30 One possible criticism of this sampling procedure is that it leaves out the ad hoc coalitions that may 
have formed around an issue, but dissolved shortly thereafter.  Admittedly, many of these groups may 
have been influential in the legislative process.  The goal of the project, however, is to see how groups 
reacted to changes in congressional procedures and practices.  Since ad hoc coalitions are not active 
over time on more than one issue, including them would do little to answer the research question at 
hand.  Also, many of the groups that would likely join these coalitions are represented. 
31 While Washington Representatives was very useful in identifying who worked on behalf of the 
organizations, it did not provide comprehensive data on the groups included in the directory.  In order to 
obtain this information, I had to rely on these other directories.  I obtained data for each group for each 
year under study, 1991-1998, and generated an average value across these years on a number of 
characteristics for each group.  In some cases, no data was provided in one of the categories or years.  
They are simply treated as missing data here.  The Physician Insurers Association of America was not 
listed in either directory; the data used here is current information taken from the group’s website. 
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one exception – are membership groups.  While some groups represent individuals, 
the membership of others is comprised of companies, small businesses, or healthcare 
facilities.  Only Families U.S.A., a healthcare consumer advocacy group, does not 
have any sort of membership.   
Groups with individual memberships exhibit a wide range of sizes.  The 
National Governors’ Association – which consists of the governors of all 50 states and 
the American territories – has only 55 members, while the American Association of 
Retired Persons boasts over 31 million.  The median group size is 65,000 members.  
Those groups with organizational memberships vary in size as well.  In this category, 
the median group size is just over thirteen hundred.  The National Assembly of 
National Voluntary Health and Social Welfare Organizations, now known as the 
National Human Services Assembly, has only 36 member organizations, while the 
National Federation of Independent Business has just under six hundred thousand. 
The average number of years the groups have been in existence is sixty-six.  
The youngest groups – the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association and the National 
Association for Home Care – have been around for 25 years, while the longest – the 
American Medical Association – has been organized for one hundred and sixty. 
Groups were also categorized according to two measures of their resources: 
staff size and annual operating budget.  The smallest staff belongs to the ERISA 
Industry Committee, which has an average of 7 employees a year.  The Chamber of 
Commerce, alternatively, employs just under 1,240 people.  The average staff size is 
about 260 and the median is 92 employees. 
A group’s budget is an important measurement of resources as well.  Groups 
with significant funds can pursue a wide range of strategies and may have greater 
clout than small, less well-funded organizations.  A more detailed discussion of these 
consequences is pursued in subsequent chapters.  The groups selected for this study 
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vary a great deal on this characteristic.  The average annual operating budget across all 
34 groups is just over $24 million, while the median is $12 million.  The American 
Medical Association has the most resources with over $176 million, while the 
National Association of Public Hospitals operates on $500,000 a year. 
The groups also represent a diversity of party orientations.  Lobbyists were 
asked whether or not their organization tended to align itself with one party more than 
the other.  According to these respondents, 14 of the groups claimed to be strictly 
nonpartisan.  Seven tend to find themselves in alignment with the Democrats more 
often, while 12 gravitate toward the Republican Party.  It is worth noting, though, that 
many of the respondents stressed the importance of working with both parties.   
Of the 47 lobbyists asked about partisanship, twenty-seven elaborated on their 
responses by pointing out that the group tries to avoid appearing partisan or works 
hard to achieve bipartisanship for a number of reasons.  Some groups have a 
politically diverse membership that spans both parties, while others tend to focus their 
work on certain geographic areas instead.  Many lobbyists stressed that the issues on 
which their group works cannot be neatly divided into party lines.  Still others pointed 
out that legislative votes are always needed to accomplish their goals, irrespective of 
party.  Along similar lines, some respondents highlighted the importance of working 
with moderate members of the opposing party or educating undecided legislators.  The 
lobbyists also stressed that majority control of the House has a more profound effect 
on their legislative work than partisanship.  This concept is fleshed out in detail in 
later chapters.  All in all, despite the propensity of some groups to align themselves 
with one party or another, the lobbyists’ responses highlighted the importance they 
placed on pragmatism and practicality in dealing with legislators on Capitol Hill.   
The data presented above demonstrates that the groups included in the study 
represent a diverse set of interests as well as a great deal of variation on other 
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important characteristics.  The following section describes the lobbyists interviewed as 
representatives of each of these groups.  
 
The Lobbyists 
Selection and contact methods 
For each of the groups selected, I identified the person or persons most 
responsible for legislative affairs work from 1991 to 1998, using the Washington 
Representatives directory for each year.32  Since the study spans eight years of 
legislation, for many groups it was necessary to speak with more than one individual 
to cover the entire time period.  Given that there is substantial job turnover within the 
lobbying industry and many years have passed, I also located where these individuals 
were currently employed.  While many still worked for the same office, others had 
moved on to other organizations.   
For my first step in this process, I looked through the most recent edition of 
Washington Representatives for the names I had collected.33  I also utilized the 
Leadership Library, a cumulative online database of the various Yellow Book 
publications, including the Government Affairs and Federal Employees directories.  If 
I could not locate an individual in either of these sources, I relied on the online search 
engine Google.  By typing in a lobbyist’s name, and sometimes the name of the 
organization for whom they formerly worked, I was able to locate up-to-date contact 
information for the majority of names on the list. 
In some cases, I was only able to identify an individual’s place of employment 
during the intervening years.  I then placed a call to this organization to request the 
                                                 
32 These decisions were based on each individual’s job title as listed in Washington Representatives. 
33 At the time, the most recent edition was the 29th (2005) edition. 
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current contact information for that lobbyist.  In those cases where I was unable to find 
the information, I called the original employer and asked for contact information.   
In addition to relying on the Washington Representatives directory, I also 
interviewed a few lobbyists who had been referred to me by earlier participants.  This 
method, called snowball sampling, helped to supplement my own research as well as 
fill in gaps for those organizations for which I could find no contact information for 
lobbyists.  Using all of these methods together, I was able to locate virtually all the 
lobbyists I had identified and who could together provide a complete picture of the 
lobbying behavior of each group selected for the study. 
The first contacts, via email and phone, were made in August 2006, with 
follow-up contacts made throughout the fall.  Overall, I included 34 groups in the 
study and interviewed 47 lobbyists.  The interviews were conducted between August 
2006 and January 2007.  I conducted face-to-face interviews with 32 lobbyists during 
three trips to Washington, D.C. in the fall of 2006.  In those cases where the lobbyist 
was no longer living in Washington, D.C. or its surrounding communities, a phone 
interview was conducted in lieu of an in-person meeting.  Additionally, some 
Washington-based lobbyists were interviewed over the phone.  All in all, phone 
interviews were conducted with 15 lobbyists; these took place between October 2006 
and January 2007. 
 The interview subjects were guaranteed confidentiality in their responses and 
assured that their comments would not be directly traceable back to them or their 
organizations.  They were, however, aware that the name of the organization for which 
they worked would be included in any manuscript or publication of this study.  All 
face-to-face interviews were audio taped and notes were taken as well.  Each of these 
interviews was conducted one-on-one with the exception of three.  In these cases, I 
interviewed two people at once about their work at the same organization.  The phone 
 
 
79
interviews were not taped, but extensive notes were taken.  The following section 
provides a brief picture of the interview subjects. 
 
Overview of lobbyists 
At the beginning of each interview, the lobbyist was asked a brief set of 
questions about their work with their organization.  The first of these questions asked 
how long they had worked with the group.  The mean response was 13.9 years and the 
median was thirteen.  The shortest number of years worked for a group was just two, 
while the longest was thirty-three.   
Respondents were also asked to describe the various job titles they held at the 
group as well as their responsibilities.  At their highest position, forty-two respondents 
held jobs at the level of Director or Vice President of Government Affairs (or 
similarly-named departments); ten held positions as department lobbyists.34  Finally, 
lobbyists were asked about their participation in planning the group’s legislative 
strategy.  Respondents ranked their involvement on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 indicating 
no involvement and 4 indicating extensive participation.  The mean level of 
involvement was 3.8, with a median of four.  Only one respondent gave an answer of 
two; the rest were three or higher. 
Taken together, this data indicates that the respondents interviewed for the 
study were actively involved in the lobbying decisions of their organization.  
Additionally, many had worked on their group’s behalf for a number of years.  These 
characteristics suggest that their assessments of their group’s behavior and its response 
to changes on the Hill should be well-informed and accurate, adding validity to the 
results presented in subsequent chapters. 
                                                 
34 Four of the lobbyists interviewed had worked for two or more of the groups included in the study.  In 
these cases, the respondent’s answers for each group were entered into the dataset as if they were 
unique individuals.  Thus, the numbers presented here add up to 52, not 47. 
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The Interview  
Appendix II provides the final version of the questionnaire used in the 
interview.35  The interview began with a brief series of question about each lobbyists 
work with his or her organization.  The interview proceeded with set of questions 
about the group’s general approach to lobbying.  After these introductory items – 
designed to provide a point of comparison across different groups – I broached the 
subject of the group’s work on the legislative issues selected for the study.   
 In order to understand how interest groups responded to the changes in House 
practices and procedures, I took two approaches in the interview.  First, I asked a 
series of questions on how each lobbyist and their group worked on the three issues 
described above.36  For each topic, I asked the same series of questions.  The goal was 
to uncover a number of facts: 1) how each group viewed key players in the legislative 
process – such as party leaders and committee or subcommittee chairmen; 2) how 
much the group valued certain institutional characteristics of legislators; 3) whether 
and how much groups valued its work with the committee system relative to party 
leadership; and 4) how the group decided among various approaches to lobbying, both 
inside the Beltway and out. 
                                                 
35 Over the course of my trips to Washington, D.C., I made minor changes to the interview 
questionnaire.  During the first trip, I went through a detailed survey with each respondent, asking them 
to rank-order various answers to my questions.  This approach created a few problems, however.  First, 
I found it very difficult to get the lobbyists to stick to the survey.  When respondents deviated from the 
instrument, it meant that I ran out of time to complete it in its entirety.  Many lobbyists wanted to 
clarify their answers by modifying or changing the options I had provided on the survey.  I also realized 
that many of my questions were redundant and therefore unnecessary.  Finally, and most importantly, I 
found that I got the most interesting and insightful comments from lobbyists when they deviated from 
the detailed survey I had given them.  Based on these initial experiences, I decided to use a less rigorous 
interview document during subsequent interviews.  The remaining 25 face-to-face interviews and all of 
the phone interviews were conducted with the version provided in Appendix II. 
36 Not every person I interviewed was asked about all three issues.  Some of the lobbyists with whom I 
met only worked at an organization for one or two issues.  Thus, each lobbyist spoke only about their 
personal experience with an issue.  In some cases, it was necessary to talk to more than one lobbyist to 
assess a group’s strategy on all three issues. 
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By comparing how groups approached the Clinton plan prior to the House reforms 
with their approach to HIPAA and the patient protection initiatives after the changes, I 
was able to get an objective sense of how they modified their lobbying behavior.   
Secondly, I directly asked each lobbyist how the changes implemented by the 
GOP in the 104th Congress affected their approach to lobbying, if at all.  After asking 
how closely the group followed House procedure and the work of the Rules 
Committee, I showed each respondent a list of the reforms introduced in the House.  I 
asked how the group responded to the changes, either individually – such as how 
committee term limits affected the group’s work – or when taken together – such as 
the general shift in power away from committees to party leadership. 
 In addition to the questions described above, I also asked how the group made 
campaign finance decisions.  The answers to these questions are assessed in Chapter 
Five, which covers how the House reforms affected campaign finance donation 
behavior. 
One concern that arises from focusing on the legislation described above is that 
a number of years have transpired since the events under study.  The passage of time – 
and the political events that have taken place in the meantime – may have influenced 
respondents’ answers.  This is admittedly a weakness of the research design, but an 
unavoidable one.  There are substantively important reasons for selecting this time 
period and these issues; this research design is best suited to answering the questions 
posed in the project.  The concern that the lobbyists offered retrospective evaluations 
was not sufficient to alter the design of the project.   
In order to alleviate possible memory problems, the interview instrument 
included a brief overview of the key bills associated with each issue.  Respondents 
were given a moment to briefly review the legislation; they were also encouraged to 
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refer back to these documents during the course of the interview if any questions or 
memory problems arose.  (See Appendix II for these legislative summaries). 
All respondents – whether interviewed face-to-face or over the phone – were 
presented with a copy of the questionnaire during the interview.  For those conducted 
in person, I provided each respondent with a version of the document to refer to during 
our conversation.  Phone interview respondents were sent a copy of the questionnaire 
electronically and asked to have it with them during the interview. 
In being shown the questionnaire, each interview respondent was also provided 
with a list of possible responses to the questions asked.  Critics of this approach may 
suggest that presenting these options could influence how respondents answered the 
questions, leading them to leave out any potential responses not included.  Though 
presenting these lists may have had a small influence, the value of including these 
options outweighs the minor drawbacks.  As mentioned above, the fact that the time 
period under study was over ten years ago is a cause for some concern.  This potential 
problem, however, provides a strong justification for providing the lists of possible 
answers.  By providing each interview subject with a list of the key members of party 
leadership and the chairman of relevant committees and subcommittees, I was able to 
refresh their memory of which legislators held these key positions.  Without this sort 
of prompting, some respondents may have left out possible outcomes. 
The lists provided were rather comprehensive.  The leadership of both parties 
and the chairmen of the House committee and subcommittee with jurisdiction over 
health insurance policy were provided for the question about which legislators the 
group viewed as important.  A wide range of strategies were listed under the question 
designed to elicit how a group planned its overall approach to each issue.  Were 
respondents required to answer the questions without these options in front of them, 
many of them may have left out important characteristics simply because there are so 
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many to consider.  Providing a list of possible responses helped to guide the 
discussion and ensure that respondents were considering all possible answers.  Thus, 
the benefits of including these lists in the interview instrument made doing so 
worthwhile. 
 The interviews were typically conducted in the workplace offices of each 
respondent, though one took place in a restaurant.  The length of the interviews varied 
from 20 minutes to one hour and forty-five minutes.  This wide range exists for a few 
reasons: first, some respondents had worked at an organization for all three issues 
under study.  This meant I had to cover the entire interview questionnaire with one 
person.  Interviews with lobbyists who had only worked for a group on one or two 
issues were much shorter for obvious reasons.  Second, some respondents were far 
more willing to elaborate on their answers and also on topics not entirely germane to 
the project.  Thus, the variation in interview length is also attributed to the different 
personalities of those interviewed, the various willingness of a lobbyist to talk about 
their work, or their interest and reflection on the topic under investigation. 
 
 This chapter has been devoted to a detailed discussion of research design and 
the interview instrument.  The remarks presented above help to frame the results 
presented in the following chapters.  What follows is a detailed analysis of how 
interest groups responded to the changes in House norms, practices, and procedures. 
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PART I:  
CHANGES ACROSS THE MODES OF INFLUENCE 
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 Table 4.1 briefly summarizes the results presented in Part I of the dissertation, 
which deals specifically with the consequences of strong majority party control.  In 
particular, the strengthening of majority party leadership changed the ways in which 
groups selected across the three Modes of Influence.   
 
Table 4.1, Changes across Modes of Influence 
Groups Adjustments in General 
• Groups sought to bolster their organization with GOP connections and increase 
overall access to the new majority party leadership 
• Groups with an interest in bipartisanship and groups at odds with the House 
majority leadership spent more time working with the Senate 
• Campaign contributions to committee chairmen slightly decreased when the 
committee system lost its autonomy 
Effects of Group Partisanship 
• Groups lacking ready access to majority party leadership renewed their 
emphasis on Indirect Influences 
• Nonpartisan groups and Republican-leaning groups increased their 
contributions to majority leaders when these individuals became more 
powerful 
Effects of Group Resources Effects of the Nature of the Issue 
• Smaller groups are more likely to 
go along with larger groups in 
coalitional-type work, regardless 
of institutional context 
• Indirect influences are less 
essential on technical issues or 
those without mass public appeal, 
regardless of institutional context 
 
The effects of the reforms were filtered through three other important 
influences on group activity: group partisanship, group resources, and the unique 
nature of each issue.  The specific changes outlined above are addressed in detail in 
Chapters Four and Five.  They have been provided here for readers to use as a 
roadmap of the analysis to come. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INDIRECT INFLUENCES AND OTHER BRANCHES 
 
Earlier chapters described the ways in which the new Republican majority 
altered the institutional arrangements to strengthen the majority party’s control over 
the House agenda and its individual members.  In this chapter, I discuss the ways in 
which stronger majority party control influenced interest groups within the health 
policy community.   
For many groups, these reforms affected their choices among the Modes of 
Influence.  Groups with policy goals at odds with the new Republican majority found 
that the direct lobbying Mode of Influence was no longer a viable option in the House.  
To counter their lack of access and their ineffectiveness in this chamber, groups 
renewed their emphasis on methods of Indirect Influence by drawing more regularly 
on their membership, working in coalition, and using the press as a resource.  
Additionally, groups of all partisan persuasions increasingly valued their work with 
the more moderate and decentralized Senate; many organizations concentrated their 
efforts on this chamber instead. 
 
Renewed Emphasis on Indirect Influences 
 Certain groups responded to the reforms of the 104th Congress by renewing 
their emphasis on the use of Indirect Influences.  As described in Chapter One, this 
Mode of Influence includes generating grassroots support by contacting group 
members; advertising in the mass media and local Washington, D.C. outlets; and 
working as part of a coalition with other interest groups.  One of these tactics, 
grassroots mobilization, is discussed at length below.  Other indirect influences – 
including coalition work and the use of the press – are also addressed.   
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Grassroots and Grasstops Mobilization 
 Grassroots work is an important part of any interest group’s strategy to 
influence legislation.  Goldstein writes, “Although there is no real formal definition of 
the tactic, popular and scholarly accounts alike consider grass roots or outside 
lobbying to be any type of action that attempts to influence inside-the-beltway 
inhabitants by influencing the attitudes or behavior of outside-the-beltway inhabitants” 
(Goldstein 1999: 3).  Attempts to influence members of Congress can include a wide 
range of activities.   
Schlozman and Tierney (1986) suggest that a group’s grassroots efforts can be 
used to influence public opinion in its favor on a given issue; they can also be used to 
mobilize the group’s supporters to demonstrate their support for a policy position.  
The authors point out that, in many cases, grassroots work is not intended to appeal to 
the public at large but instead to a group’s membership who is most likely to be 
affected by a particular piece of legislation.  They write, “when politicians regard the 
public’s preferences, what often matters to them is not an amorphous perception of the 
views of the general public but, rather, that there is a narrower group of citizens who 
care intensely about a policy matter and are likely to act on their views” (Schlozman 
and Tierney 1986: 184).   
Though there are many organizations in Washington, D.C. that protect the 
public interest writ large or serve as a watchdog for consumers, the vast majority of 
organizations are designed to represent a small segment of the population with well-
defined interests.  Trade associations are an excellent example of this sort of group.    
Wright (1996) provides a few examples of these groups: in the early 1990s, the 
American Bankers Association lobbied to allow banks to open branches in more than 
one state while the Association of Trial Lawyers fought to protect the status quo 
provisions of product liability laws.   
 
 
88
Interest groups concerned with health policy are no different.  During the 
Clinton health care debate, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) 
was one of the legislation’s major opponents due to its staunch opposition to the plan’s 
mandate that employers – including the small business owners represented by the 
NFIB – provide health insurance for their employees.  To capitalize on their large 
membership, as one respondent reported, the NFIB sent out a four-page document to 
its 600,000 members outlining the Clinton plan.  The mass mailing included a section 
in which NFIB members could calculate the costs they would incur under the Clinton 
plan if it were passed; members were encouraged to mail this document to their 
Congressman.  Certainly, 600,000 constituents contacting Congress with their 
opposition to the plan – and its exact cost to their businesses – sends a clear message 
to legislators.   
Understandably, these sorts of activities have a powerful influence on 
legislators; thus, groups tend to regard grassroots strategies among their most valuable 
tools.  As one lobbyist interviewed for this study said: “Grassroots is a key lobbying 
strategy on most of the issues we work.  The group works for our members and they 
are the ones who can make the best connections [with legislators in Congress].” 
 An important distinction worth noting is the difference between grassroots and 
grasstops mobilization.  Grasstops mobilization differs slightly from grassroots 
mobilization based on the type of constituent targeted.  While grassroots can include 
any citizen or member of an organized group, grasstops typically refers to community 
leaders or those individuals who are among the most prominent of a legislator’s 
constituency.  This can include local elected officials, community business leaders, 
prominent doctors or lawyers in the district, local hospital administrators, and so on.  
Often, these local leaders have professional and personal relationships with their 
member of Congress.  Interest groups that count these local leaders among their 
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membership rely on such connections as a means of both access and influence to 
Congress.  For example, one group interviewed for this project had a “Key Contact 
Program” that the group used in its grassroots efforts.  The program consisted of a list 
of group members who were local leaders on a first-name basis with their 
representative in Congress.  On those issues that the group sought grassroots support, 
the group would provide these key contacts with sample letters to send to the 
Congressman and important talking points regarding the issue.  
Groups tend to find these sorts of indirect contacts especially effective and 
often prefer them over direct lobbying.  As one lobbyist said about his group’s work 
on Clinton health care reform, “There were many different parts of the Clinton plan, 
so we used lots of strategies.  Our grassroots efforts focused on getting [our members] 
mobilized around certain issues in the plan – this was a more effective strategy than 
using just our [on-staff] lobbyists.”  Another lobbyist remarked, “The group’s 
members are always our best lobbyists.”  In short, groups do their best to leverage 
their members’ relationships with members of Congress into legislative success. 
Overall, grassroots and grasstops mobilization work is an important part of the 
any group’s strategy.  Of the 34 groups interviewed for this project, 33 were asked a 
battery of questions regarding the group’s overall use of the various Modes of 
Influence.37  Respondents were asked the following: On a scale of 1 to 5 – with 1 
meaning “never” and 5 meaning “very often” – how often does your organization 
contact constituents in an effort to generate grassroots support?  The mean response 
was 4.4 indicating that, on average, the groups tend to rely on this strategy often or 
very often. 
                                                 
37 Due to time constraints, the interview with the Small Business Council of America was cut short and 
this series of questions was omitted. 
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For many groups interviewed for this project, though, the reforms introduced 
by the Republican Party in the 104th Congress had an effect on the relative importance 
of grassroots mobilization as a strategy.  Stronger majority party control meant 
stronger party discipline and a narrower legislative agenda.  It also meant that many 
groups with legislative goals at odds with the new majority had limited access to the 
GOP leadership in the House that – as noted – exercised substantial control over the 
agenda and the content of legislation.   
As one lobbyist for a trade association and union noted, “The group’s 
partisanship made a difference.  We were never going to be an inside part of the 
Republican leadership.”  Another pointed out that the increased animosity between the 
political parties influenced the amount of access groups could have to their political 
opponents.  He remarked, “People were more shutout from the process because it was 
so partisan.  [The mentality was] you’re with me, or you’re the enemy.” 
  Under the Democratic majority, certainly, it was also true that some groups 
had easier access to the agenda setters than others.  One lobbyist for a Republican-
leaning group noted the contrast when discussing her preparation for testifying on the 
Hill after the Republican takeover: 
  
[Prior to 1995] we were being called to testify by the Democrats, so we were 
prepared for adversarial testimony.  After the change [in party control], though, 
testifying was different.  My initial thought was who to send [to Capitol Hill] 
as a sacrificial lamb, but a [Hill] staffer reminded me: ‘You forget.  We’re in 
charge now.  We’re your friends and we’re not out to get you.’    
Naturally, the leadership of any party is more likely to meet and work with those 
groups with which it agrees.  Yet, for the reasons described above, the post-1994 
Republican majority exercised a control that was not typical of other recent majority 
leaders.  Under these circumstances, and the increasingly partisan climate, opposition 
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groups had even less access or opportunity to influence legislation through traditional 
direct lobbying methods. 
 One lobbyist for a nonpartisan group pointed to the strict party discipline as a 
challenge for the legislators themselves:  “Members [in the post-1994 Congress] are in 
a harder spot, having to decide between party discipline and what works for their 
particular jurisdiction.  But party discipline is important in terms of a members' 
standing, their ability to move up in the committee process, their funds for 
reelection...”  Statements such as this indicate that lobbyists recognized the constraints 
placed on legislators, especially Republican ones, under the new institutional 
arrangement.  As a result, this respondent pointed out, “Our ability to impact 
[legislation] changes.” 
 Democratic-leaning groups in particular – or those simply perceived to be 
Democratic-leaning – found their direct lobbying efforts to be less influential.  Under 
these circumstances, groups were forced to rely more on their grassroots resources.  
Since these organizations were not granted access to majority party leaders – who, in 
the post-1994 Congress, were the most powerful shapers of legislation – they had to 
rely on other means of influence, especially grassroots and grasstops mobilization.  
One lobbyist who worked for a group he identified as bipartisan said the following, 
“On the Patients’ Bill of Rights issue, we ran into a lot of opposition from the GOP 
leadership, so we had to put a lot of our resources into grassroots participation.”  The 
head of a small Democratic-leaning group offered similar remarks about her group’s 
work on the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: “On HIPAA, we had 
limited ability to work with the majority.  Grassroots efforts started taking on more 
significance at this time period.”   
This trend was not entirely unique to those groups typically aligned with the 
Democrats, however.  A common theme across the interviews was that an interest 
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groups’ work on Capitol Hill extends far beyond the bounds of partisanship.  Many 
groups, particularly those concerned with a wide range of issues, may align 
themselves with either of the political parties, depending on the issue under 
consideration.  For example, the Catholic Health Association represents Catholic 
health care systems and facilities.  On issues of poverty and social justice, the group 
tends to find itself in agreement with the Democratic Party; on matters concerning 
abortion practices and procedures, however, the group finds a home with many 
Republicans.  Though this is just one example, the trend to cross party lines on an 
issue-by-issue basis was evident in many of the interviews.  Thus, though the problem 
of limited access was most prevalent among groups with a tendency to align with 
Democratic priorities, other less partisan groups were similarly affected; many stepped 
up their grassroots efforts as a result. 
Understandably, the opposite was also true.  Republican-leaning groups found 
natural allies and easier access in the post-reform House.  A representative from a 
small organization – one that focuses almost exclusively on a party-line issue and 
aligns itself with the GOP – said,  
 
The party control [after the 1994 elections] mattered a great deal.  It was much 
harder to lobby our issues when the Democrats were in control…When the 
GOP took over, the group got a lot more access and could get legislation 
through now that the majority party – who controls the agenda – was on our 
side.  [Favorable] legislation has passed the House ten times since 1995. 
Thus, as a result of the Republicans being in the majority, many groups who lacked 
access to the leadership in previous Congresses were now among those favored by 
party leaders.   
 Each lobbyist interviewed for this project was asked to discuss the range of 
strategies used by their organization on the three issues under consideration: Clinton 
health reform, HIPAA, and the Patients’ Bill of Rights debate.  For the specific 
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question, see Appendix II.  Respondents spoke freely about the tactics their group 
pursued on each issue.  Based on my understanding of their response, each lobbyists' 
answer was coded on a scale of 0 to 2 representing the degree to which the group 
engaged in grassroots mobilization on each issue.  A value of zero indicates that the 
respondent made no specific mention of grassroots work on an issue, a score of 1 
suggests that grassroots tactics were somewhat important to the group, and a 2 
indicates that grassroots mobilization played a prominent role in an organization’s 
overall strategy on an issue. 
Table 4.2 presents the average grassroots score across the three categories of 
group partisanship.  The second column lists the average value before the House 
reforms – and thus before the stronger party control – while the third column provides 
the post-reform means.   
 
Table 4.2, Mean Grassroots Scores Pre- and Post-Reform, by Party 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Partisanship Pre-reform Post-reform Difference 
Democratic-leaning1
0.86 (0.90) 
N=7 
1.4 (0.89) 
N=5 
+0.54 
Nonpartisan or 
Bipartisan 
1.5 (0.65) 
N=14 
1.5 (0.71) 
N=18 
0 
Republican-leaning 
1.45 (0.82) 
N=11 
0.81 (0.68) 
N=21 
-0.64 
1The smaller number of Democratic groups does not necessarily reflect a smaller number of Democratic 
groups within the health policy community.  The sample sizes are simply a function of those lobbyists 
who were willing to meet with me and with whom I could schedule an interview. 
 
Though the standard deviations are rather large, the values presented below 
indicate that after the 1995 reforms Democratic-leaning groups stepped up their 
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reliance on grassroots mobilization.  The average value increases by roughly half a 
point.  Likewise, groups with a tendency to align themselves with the Republicans – 
which, after the reforms, had more ready access to House power players – decreased 
their reliance on grassroots work from an average of 1.45 to 0.81, a difference of 0.64.   
Similar results appear when the data is examined issue-by-issue.  Table 4.3 
provides the mean lobbyist responses for each of the three issues about which they 
were asked.  The results here provide an opportunity to discuss how the nature of an 
issue can influence grassroots strategy as well.  Issues vary on a wide range of 
characteristics, including the scope of the changes proposed by the legislation and how 
much attention it receives from the mass media.  Similarly, the amount of attention the 
public pays to an issue varies over time.  Whether an issue is driven by policy details 
or ideological arguments is important as well.  Each of these issue-specific 
characteristics can mitigate the effects of the House reforms described above.   
In Table 4.3, we see how the circumstances surrounding HIPAA made a 
difference in grassroots mobilization strategy.  To begin, far fewer groups worked on 
this issue.  The scope of the legislation was much smaller than the other two issues and 
had the potential to affect far fewer individuals and businesses.  As a result, fewer 
organizations were actively involved in the debate.  While 96.9 percent of the groups 
lobbied on Clinton health reform and roughly 82 percent worked on the Patients’ Bill 
of Rights, seventy percent lobbied on HIPAA.  Along similar lines, fewer groups 
viewed HIPAA as crucial to their work.  Respondents were asked to indicate the 
importance of each issue using a scale of 1 to 4, with 4 indicating an issue was 
“extremely important” to their organization.  Eighty-nine percent of respondents 
indicated that Clinton health reform was extremely important.  For Patients’ Bill of 
Rights, roughly 53 percent provided this answer.  Far fewer respondents, 37 percent, 
ranked HIPAA at this level of importance.   
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In general, the lower importance levels and the more technical nature of 
HIPAA made grassroots work less important.  Under these circumstances, groups are 
less likely to mobilize their members around an issue.  As one lobbyist for a 
Republican-leaning group said, “We did not do as much grassroots…because our 
members didn’t care as much…[Our members] ability to be persuasive [to Congress] 
is much less when it’s not a ‘bread-and-butter’ issue for them.”  Another lobbyist for a 
bipartisan organization echoed his sentiments: “We always do some grassroots…but 
[we do] less of it on minor issues.” 
In addition to the weaker impact of grassroots contacts on these issues, groups 
must also consider over-using their members as a resource.  Many organizations are 
reluctant to call on their members too often; doing so might overburden members.  
Also, the group’s impact on Congress may not be as strong if members are always 
contacting their representatives.  As one lobbyist said, “We communicate [with our 
members] a lot, but we don’t want to wear out our welcome.” 
As reported in Table 4.3, Democratic-leaning groups increased their grassroots 
work from the first issue to the last by 0.81.  The Republican groups did the opposite, 
with a smaller decrease of 0.34.  The middle column – with the HIPAA results – 
presents a slightly different picture; to a large degree, this can be attributed to the 
varied nature of this issue.  As noted in Chapter Three, HIPAA was a bill that received 
bipartisan support and proposed far less comprehensive change to the health insurance 
market than the other bills selected for the study.  Many lobbyists described HIPAA as 
an “inside-the-Beltway” job with little use of grassroots.  In these cases, groups are 
less likely to develop a grassroots strategy, regardless of the institutional context 
surrounding the legislation.  An environment of strong party control – and therefore of 
limited access for some group to majority leadership – has less of an impact under 
these circumstances. 
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 Table 4.3, Mean Grassroots Scores, by Issue and Party 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Partisanship Clinton Health Reform HIPAA 
Patients’ Bill of 
Rights 
Democratic-leaning 
0.86 (0.90) 
N=7 
1 (1.41) 
N=2 
1.67 (0.57) 
N=3 
Nonpartisan or 
Bipartisan 
1.5 (0.65) 
N=14 
1.14 (0.69) 
N=7 
1.73 (0.65) 
N=11 
Republican-leaning 
1.45 (0.82) 
N=11 
0.58 (0.67) 
N=12 
1.11 (0.60) 
N=9 
 
It is certainly worth noting that the nature of an issue can depend, to some 
degree, on interest group strategy.  Groups often have incentives to keep the 
negotiations out of the spotlight or, alternatively, to publicize an issue by attracting 
media coverage.  The latter was certainly the case for the Health Insurance 
Association of America during the debate over health care reform during the Clinton 
administration.  The HIAA was staunchly opposed to the plan; their “Harry and 
Louise” advertising campaign received substantial attention in the news media and 
from analysts following the debate.   The National Federation of Independent 
Business, similarly opposed to the Clinton plan, opened up its doors to media 
coverage of the group’s work to defeat the Clinton bills.  While the nature of an issue 
can influence a group’s use of grassroots strategy, it is not entirely independent of 
group behavior.  It can often be manipulated by groups seeking to create a favorable 
political climate. 
 In general, though, the data coupled with the interview comments indicate that 
Democratic-leaning groups were affected by the new Republican majority’s strong 
control over their party and, consequently, the House agenda and content of House 
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legislation.  The impact of these reforms, however, were mitigated by the nature of 
each issue under consideration.  When an issue had a lower profile or the debate is one 
based largely on complex policy details, all groups – regardless of partisanship – 
tended to rely less on grassroots mobilization.   
 In an attempt to isolate the effects of a group’s partisanship on its preference 
for grassroots mobilization, the lobbyist responses from above were regressed against 
three potentially influential variables.  The dependent variable is the zero-to-two scale 
measuring the degree to which an organization pursued grassroots work on each issue.  
As noted above, a zero indicates no grassroots work, a score of one suggests that 
grassroots tactics were somewhat important to the group, and a value of two indicates 
substantial grassroots work on an issue.  Since the dependent variable is a scale, an 
ordered logit model is the most appropriate to use (Kennedy 2003:263).38
The independent variables are as follows: the importance of the issue to the 
organization, the size of its budget, and a dummy variable for whether or not the group 
identifies itself as Republican-leaning.  Two separate regressions were performed: one 
for the issue prior the House reforms and another for the latter two.  Table 4.4 presents 
the coefficients and standard errors for the model.  The party dummy variable is of 
particular interest to this discussion.  Republican-leaning groups were given a value of 
zero for this variable; nonpartisan and Democratic-leaning groups – those groups not 
directly aligned with the GOP – were coded with a value of one. 
In the first regression, the party dummy variable was not statistically 
significant (p-value: 0.419).39  This result suggests that partisanship had few 
                                                 
38 Within the dataset, each group was listed three times – once for each issue.  This arrangement violates 
the assumption of independent observations.  To adjust for this violation, the model called for robust 
estimation of the coefficients, which assumes independent observations across groups, but not 
necessarily within groups. 
39 A p-value is defined as the probability of observing a test statistic as extreme as the one observed, 
under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true (Utts and Heckard 2002: 318).   In this case, the 
null hypothesis is that the partisanship variable has no effect on the degree of grassroots work.  Since 
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consequences on grassroots activity before the reforms.  Given that the variable is not 
statistically significant, I cannot make any conclusions about the regression coefficient 
itself.  Following the Republican reforms, though, the effect of party on grassroots 
mobilization does seem to matter.  The coefficient is positive which indicates that 
those groups not aligned with the Republican Party exhibited a higher likelihood of 
relying on grassroots as a tactic; the coefficient is also statistically significant (p-value: 
0.011).  Thus, after the reforms, the use of grassroots increases among those groups 
with limited access to the House majority leadership, even when controlling for other 
influential variables. 
 
Table 4.4, Robust Ordered Logit Coefficients,  
Importance of Grassroots Strategy 1 
(p-values in parentheses) 
 
Independent Variables Pre-reform (N=29) 
Post-reform 
(N=38) 
Issue Importance 
-0.55 
(0.42) 
0.75 
(0.04) 
Budget 2 0.00 (0.24) 
-0.00 
(0.92) 
Party Dummy Variable -0.68 (0.42) 
2.13 
(0.01) 
1 For certain organizations, the past editions of group directories used to gather this data did not 
include the membership, staff size, or annual budget.  To prevent these observations from 
being treated as missing data and subsequently dropped from the statistical models, current 
information for these variables was taken from more recent directories or from the group’s 
websites. 
2 Coefficients were rounded to two decimal points.  In the case of the budget variable, the 
coefficients are statistically significant but have a very small effect on grassroots work.  While 
one is positive and the other is negative, the coefficients, when rounded, are virtually equal to 
zero. 
 The other two independent variables had mixed effects on groups’ use of 
grassroots.  In the case of the budget variable, the coefficients are not statistically 
                                                                                                                                            
the p-value is statistically significant, we can reject this hypothesis is favor of the one claiming that 
party does have an impact after the House reforms. 
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significant and, therefore, no substantive conclusions can be drawn beyond the fact 
that budget seemed to have little impact.   
The importance of each issue to each group was measured on a scale of one to 
four.  Lobbyists ranked each issue according to this scale.  A score of one indicates 
that an issue was not important to an organization, while an issue that received a four 
was extremely important.  The pre-reform coefficient for this variable was not 
statistically significant; as such, we can make no strong conclusions about the effects 
of this variable on grassroots work before the reforms.  After institutional change, 
however, it seems that an increase in issue importance is associated with an increase 
likelihood of grassroots work; the coefficient is both positive and statistically 
significant.  It is worth noting, however, that this variable did not have substantial 
variation across the groups.  These issues were selected in part because of their overall 
importance to the health community.  As such, most groups gave the issues are score 
of three or four.  This likely had some impact on the coefficients. 
The results of the model do, however, confirm my expectations that 
Democratic-leaning groups increasingly pursued grassroots work once they found a 
more hostile and controlled environment in the House.  Yet partisanship – and its 
impact on a group’s access to majority party leaders – is just one component of a 
group’s use of grassroots mobilization.  Another very important factor is the resources 
available to an organization.  The resources available to a group can also influence the 
degree to which they rely on grassroots strategy.  The anecdotal evidence from the 
interviews indicates that groups with fewer resources often rely heavily on their 
grasstops connections as a means of getting access to members of Congress. 
Some small groups select their targets for lobbying by identifying those 
members with whom they have already had a grassroots connection.  One lobbyist 
who formerly worked for a small organization of healthcare facilities said that the 
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group “targeted [the legislators with districts] where their membership was strong and 
where they had strong relationships.”  She continued, “We would have liked to have 
had access to the Republicans on Clinton health reform, but these people were not 
from places where we had members that could get to them.”  Grassroots connections 
can be especially important for smaller groups; this resource enables them to get their 
foot in the door of certain legislators despite their lack of money or a large 
membership. 
Groups – both large and small in size – without a political action committee 
also found grassroots the most effective way to get the attention of House members.  
One lobbyist interviewed had worked for a large membership organization and a 
smaller group representing health facilities; neither group had a political action 
committee and both were barred from making campaign contributions due to their tax-
exempt status.  He noted, “Grassroots are especially important because [neither group] 
could give money.  In general, you get [access] to [members of Congress] first by 
giving them money and then grassroots and grasstops.” 
Taken together, the above results indicate that a group’s partisanship and their 
access to majority party leadership following the reforms seemed to matter.  Those 
lacking access tended to increase their reliance on grassroots mobilization.  To a lesser 
degree, groups with access to House leadership relied less on this sort of work.  These 
effects, however, were sometimes mitigated by the group’s resources and the nature of 
the issue.   
 
Other Indirect Influences 
 In addition to increasing their grassroots work following the reforms, many 
groups lacking access to Republican leaders also engaged in more coalition work.  
Hojnacki (1997) argues that groups’ willingness to participate in a coalition will be 
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affected by the following factors: whether a group’s interest in an issue is broad or 
narrow; the perceived strength of the opposition; a group’s prior experience with 
coalition work; and the presence or absence of “pivotal players” in the coalition.  
Hojnakci argues, among other things, that groups “may perceive from the presence of 
‘key players’ in a coalition that allied advocacy is more likely to bring them success” 
(Hojnacki 1997: 85). 
 Her basic point is that who a group partners with in a coalition can have 
important implications for whether or not that group is willing to participate.  Many of 
the lobbyists interviewed pointed out that partnering with other groups, particularly 
those often at odds with their own agenda, can give their organization and its position 
more legitimacy with members of Congress.  A representative from the business 
community said the following: “Our organization worked a lot and convened a lot of 
coalitions.  We often tried to bring in unnatural partners to help bolster our 
legitimacy.”   
As one lobbyist for a trade association and labor union pointed out, “[On the 
Patients’ Bill of Rights], [a Republican-leaning group] was the 500 lb. gorilla.  The 
coalition was the ‘usual left’ plus [this other organization]; they made the coalition 
work because they had access to the Republicans.”  Another lobbyist who headed up a 
public interest group pointed out that, after the House reforms, they had less access to 
the majority party and had to call on other groups: “Our organization had a large 
network of other advocacy groups [with similar interests], so it was important to get 
these groups involved in speaking up when our access to the majority party was 
limited.” 
 It is clear from these quotes that many groups without access to key decision-
makers in the House found it beneficial to partner with groups that did have access to 
these legislators.  In the post-1994 House, left-leaning groups had limited access to the 
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House majority party and limited influence over the legislative agenda and policy 
substance.  Under these circumstances, it is expected that groups not closely aligned 
with the GOP would increase their participation in coalition work, much like they 
increased their grassroots mobilization.   
Using the transcripts from the lobbyist interviews, each group’s work on the 
each issue was coded with a dummy variable indicating whether or not the lobbyist 
mentioned the group’s coalition work on that issue.  Table 4.5 lists the mean values of 
this dummy variable across the three partisan categories, both before and after the 
reforms.   
 
Table 4.5, Mean Coalition Work Pre- and Post-Reform, by Party 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Partisanship Pre-reform Post-reform Difference 
Democratic-leaning 
0.29 (0.49) 
N=7 
0.80 (0.45) 
N=5 
+0.51 
Nonpartisan or 
bipartisan 
0.36 (0.48) 
N=14 
0.11 (0.32) 
N=19 
-0.25 
Republican-leaning 
0.18 (0.40) 
N=11 
0.38 (0.50) 
N=21 
+0.20 
 
While the standard deviations are rather high, we do see a more drastic 
increase in the mean values for Democratic-leaning groups over those groups that 
affiliate themselves with the Republican Party; a change of 0.51 versus 0.20.  The 
average for non- or bi-partisan group decreases somewhat by 0.25.  A difference of 
means test comparing the mean values of each party pre- and post-reform suggests that 
the increase in Democratic coalition work is statistically significant.  The one-sided p-
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value for these groups is 0.05.  The p-values for the other two partisan categories, 
however, are not significant. 
 As with grassroots work, resources can mitigate the effects of the reforms 
described above.  Over the course of the interviews conducted for this project, it 
became clear that smaller groups and those organizations with limited resources tend 
to let their larger, better-financed political allies take the lead on many issues.  For 
example, one respondent said, “[On some issues], you have to figure out where to 
align and then say ‘me too’ – you show up at the same events, send a letter to the Hill, 
have grassroots participate.”  He continued, “You lobby things differently based on 
who is involved in the issue.  [On the Patients’ Bill of Rights], there were a lot of 
heavily moneyed [groups] who were on our side, so we did a lot of ‘me too.’ ”    
 In addition to this sort of piggyback lobbying, some groups let their “parent” 
organization take the lead.  A parent organization is one that represents all of a certain 
type of business, for example, while other smaller organizations represent the various 
businesses within that larger group.  For example, the American Hospital Association 
represents all hospitals nationwide, while the Federation of American Hospitals 
represents private for-profit hospitals and the Catholic Health Association looks after 
the interests of not-for-profit facilities and systems offering Catholic health care.  One 
lobbyist who worked for a constituent-specific group said the following about its work 
on HIPAA: “We didn’t do much work on HIPAA.  We tended to follow [two larger 
organizations representing the same demographic]; they’d take the lead on technical 
issues and we would just sign on [with our support].” 
Though not coalition work in a formal sense, this sort of behavior does tell us a 
good deal about the relationships between different types of organizations and how the 
resources available to a group can influence their activity.  For those groups with 
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limited resources, it makes the most sense to free ride off the work of those groups 
with similar policy preferences and more resources to devote in pursuit of those goals. 
 In addition to coalition work, a few lobbyists indicated that the stronger party 
control by the new GOP leadership meant a renewed emphasis on using the media to 
their advantage.  As one lobbyist from a small Democratic-leaning organization said,  
 
[After the House reforms], the majority leadership was just telling members [of 
Congress] what to do so talking to members and their staff was much less 
effective.  We’d have to come up with more press somehow to break though.  
It became clear to the group that the press was important now, that we had to 
learn how to “message” everything…We had always done quick reports with 
good materials, but we realized we needed to do more of that because the 
group couldn’t get through [to legislators] directly since everyone was in such 
lock step.   
This lobbyist also surmised that, while her organization did not poll as a result of this 
situation, “This is probably when polling by advocacy groups increased as a way to 
get through to the public.” 
 In general, reliance on the media and advertising appears to be an important 
strategy for groups on the defensive.  During the fight over Clinton health reform, the 
lobbyists for two groups that strongly opposed the plan – and were therefore working 
at odds with the Democratic House majority at the time – spoke at great length about 
their work with the media and on advertising.  One representative discussed how her 
organization targeted ads towards specific media markets with members of Congress 
they hoped to persuade or who were particularly influential within the House.  
Another lobbyist said that he and his group encouraged the media’s coverage of their 
work on the issue, going so far as to allow journalists to attend strategy meetings; this 
served to raise the profile of the organization and provide substantial attention to its 
opposition to the Clinton plan.  Thus, such indirect strategies seem to be of particular 
importance to groups working to defeat legislation that the majority party supports. 
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 Taken together, the above commentary highlights how strong majority party 
control over party members, the legislative agenda, and the substance of bills strongly 
affected those groups lacking access to the new key players in the House.  As a result, 
these groups drew upon various means of indirect influence to make up for their 
inability to get what they wanted in the House.  These methods of indirect influence 
ranged from increased grassroots mobilization and reliance on group members’ 
participation to working in coalitions and broadcasting the group’s message through 
the mass media; each method, though, has a similar goal: to influence House 
legislation and votes despite an inability to effectively lobby its members directly.  
Certainly, as pointed out in the observations presented above, these effects can be 
mitigated by both the nature of an issue and the resources available to an organization.  
In general, though, groups that lacked access to the House and saw their effectiveness 
in this chamber diminish reemphasized their reliance on indirect influences. 
 
Working with the Senate and other branches of government 
 In addition to relying on the indirect influences outlined above, many groups 
also focused more of their lobbying efforts on the Senate side of Capitol Hill.  The 
Senate at this time – and historically – was a far more moderate and decentralized 
body.  This institutional context increased groups’ sense of efficacy within that 
chamber; they felt they had better access and a better chance of influencing legislation. 
 The Senate, from a historical perspective as well as through its rule structure, 
has always been a far more deliberative body and one less controlled by party 
discipline than the House.  As Davidson and Oleszek write, “Today’s Senate, far more 
than the House, is an institution that tolerates and even promotes 
individualism…Unlike House leaders, Senate leaders lack the buttress of rules 
designed to expedite business and so must rely heavily on personal skills and 
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negotiation with their colleagues” (Davidson and Oleszek 2000: 173).  Evans and 
Oleszek (1997a) point out that the Senate is much less formal than the House and, as 
such, members have fewer incentives to change the chamber’s rules and structure 
(Evans and Oleszek 1997a: 156). 
Due to allowances for much more open debate, a strong adherence to seniority 
norms, the ability to filibuster, and the two-thirds majority necessary to end debate, 
scholars note that it is much harder to enact reform in this chamber (Evans and 
Oleszek 1997a: 156).  As a result, there were far fewer reforms in the Senate when the 
Republicans gained majority status in that chamber after the 1994 election.  Though 
some similar changes were adopted by the Republican Conference in the Senate, they 
were not nearly as sweeping or consequential as in the House. 
The same procedural rules and norms that made institutional reform less likely 
in the Senate also made it a more suitable chamber for groups with goals different 
from those of the majority party.  Because Senators have much greater individual 
power than members of the House – and because there is much less opportunity and 
incentive for party discipline within the chamber – many groups may feel that their 
chances for access and effectiveness are greater in the Senate.  This notion was a 
common theme across the interviews.  Two types of groups in particular expressed 
this sentiment: those with a tendency to align themselves with the Democrats and 
those with a vested interest in promoting bipartisanship. 
 A number of the lobbyists described their inability to get much accomplished 
in the House following the reforms of the 104th Congress.  Under these circumstances, 
they found working with the Senate to be a better use of their resources.  A lobbyist 
for a trade association and union said, “The nature of the House is so majoritarian and, 
with the 104th Congress, it was beginning to be so polarized.  We had no real ties to 
the House leadership that was making the decisions.”  She pointed out that the group’s 
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work on HIPAA focused on the Senate legislation: “If there was something to be 
gained by going up to meet with the House, we might have [done that]…I don’t recall 
having done this much, though.  Most of what was being fought over [in the House] 
was stuff we adamantly opposed and not much was going to change, so we didn’t 
spend much time there at all.”   
Another lobbyist for a mid-sized nonpartisan group described the situation in 
the House: “It is a more closed process all the way around; markups are pro forma, the 
chairman holds all the votes.  Our group just has to plow the field [we are given] but it 
is much harder to have influence.  This makes the Senate more important because their 
process is more open and they have different rules.”  A representative for a public 
interest group remarked, “The House had become so…dictatorially run it was hard to 
impact legislation…We put our resources into the Senate to get a more moderate 
version [of a bill] or to use the Senate to stop the excesses of the House.”  She 
continued, “On HIPAA, we spent much more time in the Senate because we thought 
we had a better chance [there] because there were more moderate Republicans and we 
had a better chance of getting a more moderate bill.”   
Many other respondents echoed this lobbyist’s point that more moderate 
legislation was easier to get in the Senate.  The Legislative Director for a large 
nonpartisan group said the following about the House after the 1995 reforms: “There 
was unprecedented party discipline due to [new] tools to keep people in line.  Our 
usual strategy of working with moderates and putting together a bipartisan coalition 
was not effective, at least in the first few years.  This made it more important to work 
with the Senate and the [House] Speaker’s Office.”  He continued, “Most of my 
memories [about the Patients’ Bill of Rights] are on the Senate side.  Our group wants 
to support bipartisanship so it tends towards the Senate whose structures support 
bipartisan outcomes.  We often end up more comfortable with Senate legislation.” 
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 The interview transcripts were coded for whether or not a lobbyist indicated 
that the group worked a great deal with the Senate on either HIPAA or the Patients’ 
Bill of Rights legislation.  This information was represented with a dummy variable.  
A zero indicates no mention of Senate work and a value of 1 indicates that the lobbyist 
emphasized the group’s work in that chamber. 
Again, partisanship was an important indicator of a group’s inclination to 
devote their resources to working with the Senate.  Table 4.6 presents the average 
value of this dummy variable for the two post-reform issues.  The mean value for 
Democratic-leaning groups is a good deal higher than that for both the non- or bi-
partisan groups and for Republican-leaning groups as well.   
 
Table 4.6, Mean Senate Work Post-Reform, by Party 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Partisanship Senate Work 
Democratic-leaning 
0.60 (0.58) 
N=5 
Nonpartisan or 
Bipartisan 
0.39 (0.50) 
N=18 
Republican-leaning 
0.26 (0.46) 
N=21 
 
A difference of means tests between the values for Democratic and Republican groups 
demonstrates that this difference is somewhat significant at the 0.1 level; the p-value is 
0.099.  In addition to the anecdotal evidence presented above, the data seems to 
similarly demonstrate a strong emphasis on work in the Senate, especially among 
those groups at odds with the Republican majority. 
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 A small number of groups facing difficulty in the House also pursued their 
goals by working with other branches of the government.  Again, these groups 
believed that their likelihood of success was higher by working with these executive 
agencies or with the White House.  One lobbyist for a small nonpartisan group said the 
following,  
 
[After the reforms], we didn’t have any more access to majority leaders, so we 
worked very closely with the [Clinton] Administration and Assistant Secretary 
[of a relevant executive agency].  We had much better access and relationships 
with these people.  It was more likely that we would have a chance to talk to 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services than to Gingrich. 
Additionally, a representative of a small Democratic-leaning group noted that their 
ineffectiveness at the federal level led them to increase their work on health policy at 
the state-level.  
 
Discussion of Results 
 The above discussion has provided evidence in support of the argument that 
the House reforms led many groups – particularly those lacking access to the GOP 
majority – to place a greater emphasis on grassroots efforts, their work in the Senate 
and, to a lesser extent, other branches of the government.  As with the previous 
commentary on grassroots strategy and other indirect influences, the renewed 
emphasis on working outside the House stems from the strong majority party control 
in that chamber.  This control decreased the ability of many organizations to, first, 
gain access to important decision-makers and, second, to be influential if access was 
available.  As a result, avenues of influence beyond the House became more attractive 
to these interest groups. 
 The results presented in this chapter highlight the importance that interest 
groups place on access to members of Congress and their staffs.  The reforms 
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introduced by the Republican Party increased its control over the legislative process 
and over the committee system.  Groups that did not find natural allies in the 
Republican Party found themselves increasingly shut out of the legislative process.  
Naturally, this finding has important implications for the ability of these groups to 
effectively represent their members’ interests before Congress, and therefore on the 
responsiveness of the House of Representatives to popular will.  Certainly, those 
groups that pursued external indirect means of influence still had the opportunity to 
put pressure on legislators.  What they lacked, however, was the opportunity to fully 
pursue all means of influence typically available to the interest group community.  As 
such, their effectiveness was limited.  They were unable to gain entry to meetings with 
the true decision-makers and agenda-setters in the House.   
These groups, thus, were dissatisfied with the nature of the congressional 
reforms and the partisan environment they promoted in the House.  Speaker Gingrich 
and his supporters in the new Republican majority had very specific goals in mind 
after winning control of the House.  In order to pursue these goals and deliver the 
results they believed the electorate had given them power to implement, they 
streamlined the legislative process to minimize potential obstacles.  They also closed 
their doors to certain outside interests with an agenda contrary to their own.  Certainly, 
shutting out political opponents can increase a party’s legislative effectiveness, but 
doing so also limits the inclusion of all voices in the political process – an outcome 
with important normative implications regarding the quality of American democracy.  
Such a result is arguably a blow to the ability of the House to respond to all segments 
of society.   
Yet, by promoting grassroots work among those interest groups lacking access, 
these reforms also promoted an important quality of a healthy democracy: widespread 
political participation.  Since some lobbyists could no longer directly meet with key 
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legislators, they instead leaned on their membership to voice their opinions and make 
their voice heard in Congress.  This increase in mass participation is likely a positive 
benefit of the reforms.  Increased popular involvement in the legislative process – with 
more constituents weighing in on policy positions with their members of Congress – is 
a positive, counterintuitive consequence of limited group access to the House. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHANGES IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND HIRING PRACTICES 
 
 Another important mode of interest group influence is through the campaign 
finance system.  This chapter examines the effects of the House reforms on group 
contributions using two sources of evidence: first, campaign finance data for those 
groups selected for this study – which is made available to the public by the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) – and, second, anecdotal evidence from the interviews 
conducted with the lobbyists interviewed for this project.  Two topics in particular are 
addressed. 
 First, the chapter highlights group contributions to legislators in key 
institutional positions before and after the reforms.  The data analysis supports the 
argument that contributions to the chairmen of relevant health policy committees 
declined; contributions to members of the majority party leadership rose but the 
patterns depended on group partisanship.  While the data demonstrates the expected 
trends, the evidence is not overwhelming that the reforms altered donation behavior.  
The anecdotal evidence from the interviews helps to illuminate why this may be the 
case.  The discussion in these interviews provides evidence that groups view the 
campaign contribution process as an ongoing one, not directly tied to legislation.  
 Second, this chapter covers the influence of the House reforms on group hiring 
practices.  While not directly a campaign finance issue, this topic has important 
connections to money in politics. The K Street Project – as the efforts by certain 
members of the Republican majority leadership to influence the hiring practices of 
lobbying firms and trade organizations were called – was closely tied to campaign 
finance practices.  A number of the lobbyists interviewed for the study commented on 
this issue; their comments are addressed and analyzed below.  One group in particular 
was directly affected by the K Street project; others made an internal strategic decision 
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to bolster their staff with Republican lobbyists in an effort to ensure access to the new 
Republican power players.  The latter point highlights the importance of access to 
policymakers; it is an essential component of any interest group’s influence strategy. 
 
Changing Donation Patterns  
Substantial work has been conducted on the role of organized interests in 
elections.  Two descriptions of contributors have dominated this research.40  The first 
depicts PACs as “position-oriented”; that is, they care most about which party holds 
majority status.  In these models of donation behavior, contributors assume that the 
legislative outcome associated with each candidate is a given; that is, the legislator is 
already for or against the donor’s interest – no amount of contribution will change his 
mind.  What is subject to change, however, is the probability that the group’s favored 
candidate will be elected.  Groups donate to those electoral races in which their money 
will have the most influence; presumably those races with an uncertain outcome.  
Essentially, “position-oriented” donors hope to influence the overall composition of 
the legislature. 
A separate picture presented in the literature depicts PACs as “service-
oriented,” actively seeking to establish a relationship with a legislator who is in the 
position to provide direct favors to the group or to work on its behalf.  These favors 
can come in the form of an immediate response to legislation facing action in the 
House, but they also describe a longer-term relationship in which a legislator provides 
access and consideration to the donor group on a consistent basis.   
Many scholarly articles in this second line of research test for contribution 
strategies based on legislative characteristics like committee membership, seniority, 
                                                 
40 See Austen-Smith (1997), Morton and Cameron (1992), or Mitchell and Munger (1991) for a 
comprehensive review.  
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majority party status, and party leadership.41  If these sorts of institutional traits are in 
fact important to interest groups, then a shift in the relative power of these traits 
should be reflected by a change in campaign finance contributions.  The House 
reforms of the 104th Congress served to strengthen the power of majority party 
leadership at the expense of committee and subcommittee chairmen.  If groups 
recognized this change in the chamber’s power dynamics, they should also donate 
more to majority party leadership and give less money to prominent committee 
figures. 
What follows is an analysis of the campaign contributions of the political 
action committees of those groups included in the study.42  I hypothesize that majority 
party leaders’ individual campaign committees would see an increase in the size of 
contributions from these health groups after the centralization of party power.  
Presumably, these organizations would recognize that the agenda-setting power had 
shifted hands within the chamber; they should adjust their contributions accordingly.  
Likewise, we would expect that contributions to the leaders of key health committees 
and subcommittees, such as the Commerce and Ways & Means committees and their 
respective subcommittees on Health, would decline following the reforms because 
these committees had lost a good deal of their autonomy.   
In order to test these hypotheses, I relied on FEC campaign finance data from 
four election cycles: two prior to the House reforms, 1992 and 1994, and two 
immediately following these changes, the 1996 and 1998 elections.  The data was 
cleaned to include only donations to House incumbents from those groups included in 
this study.  Certainly, the partisanship of a candidate for office plays an important role 
                                                 
41 See Grier and Munger (1986, 1991); Munger (1989); Endersby and Munger (1992); Grier et al 
(1994); and Mebane et al (2001).  
42 Of the 34 groups included in this study, nineteen have a political action committee.  Many of the 
groups without a PAC are 501(c)(3) organizations barred by law and their tax-exempt status from 
making political contributions.  Other organizations simply choose not to have a PAC. 
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in an interest group’s decision to make a contribution to that candidate; it also affects 
how much the group will give.  Partisanship is especially important for those groups 
seeking to change the makeup of the legislature and those that are most interested in 
which party controls the majority.  It is therefore reasonable to categorize 
contributions to party leadership under the “position-oriented” model of PAC 
behavior. 
Partisanship was also an important component of the House reforms.  Chapter 
Two detailed how the House reforms strengthened the majority leadership by 
increasing party discipline.  This trend was strongest among the Republican Party in 
the House; the Democratic Party and the minority leadership did not exercise such 
strong discipline over its rank-and-file members.  The balance of power within the 
Democratic caucus was much more up in the air; as a result, groups would not have a 
clear reason to contribute more to minority leaders.  Thus, we would not expect 
contributions to Democratic leadership to increase as drastically as those to 
Republican leaders. 
Table 5.1 presents evidence of group contributions in light of group 
partisanship.  Specifically, the table reports the average contribution from each 
category of group partisanship to the leadership of both parties.  The first three rows of 
the table are of particular interest.  The Republican majority had unusually strong 
control over the House agenda, its rules, and rank-and-file Republican legislators.  Not 
surprisingly, this control coincided with an increase in their contribution levels, but 
only from nonpartisan and Republican-leaning groups.  Nonpartisan groups increased 
their contributions by about 27 percent from roughly $3000 to just under $3800, while 
Republican-leaning group contributions increased from about $3700 to $4500, a 21 
percent change.   
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The two Democratic-leaning organizations included in the dataset gave no 
money to the Republican leadership before or after the reforms, despite the fact that 
the balance of power in the House shifted strongly in favor of the new Republican 
majority.  Like the results presented in Chapter Four, we see the mitigating role that 
partisanship can play.  Those organizations with a working relationship with the 
leadership of the now-strong Republican Party responded as expected.  Organizations 
at odds with the leadership, however, were unaffected. 
The next three rows of the table outline the average contributions of each 
category of group partisanship to Democratic leaders.  During the pre-reform era, 
these individuals were in the majority leadership, and following the Republican 1994 
victories, obviously, they became minority leaders.  Additionally, the Democratic 
leadership at this time was not as highly centralized and powerful as their majority 
counterparts.  Yet we still see an increase in contributions to these groups across the 
board.  While it is not unexpected to see the substantial 46 percent increase from 
Democratic-leaning organizations, nonpartisan and Republican-leaning groups also 
increased their donations by 16 and 17 percent respectively. 
The bottom two rows of Table 5.1 present evidence about the committee 
system.  Here, an interest group’s concerns are more “service-oriented.”  Powerful 
committee figures are in a position to provide groups with the specific favors and the 
legislative language they seek in bills.  Partisanship is presumably less consequential 
in these contribution decisions.  This trend was evident across the interviews.  The 
table below presents the average contributions from all groups to the chairman of 
relevant health policy committees and subcommittees.  Given that the committee 
system was much weaker under the new House arrangements, it is reasonable to 
expect a decline in contributions to these key committee players.  The data confirms 
this expectation.  The average contribution to committee chairmen decreased by about 
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$400, while contributions to subcommittee chairs dropped by roughly $200.  The 
results indicate a 10.5 percent and 5.1 percent decline respectively.  That this occurred 
during a time when the amount of money donated during elections was increasing 
across the board is especially surprising.  In fact, this trend is the subject of the 
following discussion. 
 
Table 5.1, Mean Contributions, Pre- and Post-Reform 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
 Pre-Reform 
Post-
Reform Difference 
Dem groups to GOP leadership $0 $0 0 
Nonpartisan groups to GOP leadership 2972.69 (2172.28) 
3787.73 
(2895.80) + 815.039 
GOP groups to GOP leadership 3704.75 (3708.99) 
4493.61 
(3371.76) + 788.863 
Dem groups to Dem leadership 5100 (3717.83) 
7442.13 
(2001.41) + 2342.125 
Nonpartisan groups to Dem leadership 4069.25 (3078.42) 
4710.53 
(3501.25) + 641.276 
GOP groups to Dem leadership 3352.94 (3040.17) 
3928.57 
(3823.49) + 575.63 
All groups to Committee Chairmen1 3814.06 (2919.74) 
3410.57 
(2924.877) - 403.492 
All groups to Subcommittee Chairmen1 4008.07 (3350.67) 
3803.85 
(2816.88) - 204.211 
1 The committees included here are those with jurisdiction over health policy: the Ways & Means, 
Education & Labor, and Energy & Commerce committees. 
 
The results above, though telling, are mitigated by the fact that there was an 
overall increase of money in politics throughout the 1990s.  Such a trend makes it 
difficult to rule out the possibility that the observed increases in contributions to 
leadership are simply due to increases across the board – from all groups to all 
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candidates.  In fact, the size of donations to House incumbents from the groups 
included in this study did substantially increase during the mid to late 1990s.  The 
average contribution from these groups for the 1992 and 1994 election cycles was 
$2328; the average value for the post-reform period was roughly $2634, over three 
hundred dollars more per donation.43   
In order to account for this increase, the data was standardized against the 
overall average contributions pre- and post-reform.  The results of these comparisons 
are presented in Table 5.2.  In the case of party leadership, the results are again 
calculated with an eye toward partisanship.  For the first six rows of the table, the 
average contributions used to standardize the results were the average contributions of 
each party.  The results are largely consistent with the discussion above.  Prior to the 
reforms, a member of the Republican leadership received, on average, 1.63 times the 
average size of nonpartisan groups’ contributions.  Following the changes, and the 
subsequent increase in power of these legislators, the donations increased to 1.82 
times the average.  We see a similar, though smaller, increase in contributions from 
Republican-leaning groups, from 1.33 to 1.42 times the average donation.  Quite 
possibly, nonpartisan groups thought giving the newly powerful leadership more 
financial support would increase their chance of access.  The smaller increase in 
Republican groups’ donations may be attributed to their lesser concerns over gaining 
access to the leadership, with whom they tended to align themselves on policy matters. 
Again, though the Democratic minority leadership was not as powerful or as 
organized as the GOP following the reforms, their contributions still increased relative 
to the average.  Naturally, the largest increase came from Democratic-leaning groups, 
                                                 
43 The actual number of contributions, however, was virtually unchanged after the House reforms.  The 
average member received an average of 18.9 contributions from these groups before the reforms; that 
number dropped slightly to 18.6 for the post-reform election cycles.  Most likely, this is due to the 
limited number of groups included in the study.  If all possible organizations were included, we might 
see that more groups gave to these legislators. 
 
 
119
who increased their contributions from 1.89 to 2.31 times their average donation.  The 
increases among nonpartisan and Republican groups, however, were much smaller – 
and less than these groups’ increases to majority leaders.  Nonpartisan groups 
increased their donations by 0.02 times the average, while GOP groups increased their 
donations by 0.04 times the average. 
 
Table 5.2, Contributions Relative to Average, Pre- and Post-Reform 
 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
Democratic groups to Republican leadership None given None given 
Nonpartisan groups to Republican leadership 1.63 1.82 
Republican groups to Republican leadership 1.33 1.42 
Democratic groups to Democratic leadership 1.89 2.31 
Nonpartisan groups to Democratic leadership 2.24 2.26 
Republican groups to Democratic leadership 1.20 1.24 
All groups to Committee Chairmen1 1.64 1.29 
All groups to Subcommittee Chairmen1 1.72 1.44 
1 The committees included here are those with jurisdiction over health policy: the Ways & 
Means, Education & Labor, and Energy & Commerce committees. 
 
Consistent with the earlier results, we see another marked decline in the money 
given to prominent legislators within the weakened committee system.  Before the 
House reforms, the chairmen of relevant committees received 1.64 times the average 
contributions from all of the groups included in this analysis.  Once the Republican 
majority had usurped much of the committee autonomy, these members received less 
– 1.29 times the average donation.  The same is true for subcommittee chairmen; their 
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contributions declined by approximately 0.3, from 1.72 to 1.44 times the average.  
Thus, while these legislators still received more than the average member, their post-
reform contributions fell closer to average levels. 
 Generally speaking, the data analysis shows a decline in contribution to 
committee and subcommittee chairmen after the House reforms weakened the 
autonomy of these legislators.  They also demonstrate that contributions to Republican 
leaders increased once they gained majority status; these contributions were also 
greater, on average, than those contributions given to the Democratic leadership when 
they controlled the majority.  Naturally, a group’s partisanship played an important 
role in these trends.   
While the analysis of changing contribution trends is consistent with my 
expectations, the evidence does not overwhelmingly suggest that campaign finance 
activity was strongly and uniformly affected by the House reforms.  In a number of the 
interviews, lobbyists spoke of their group’s campaign contributions work as an 
ongoing process not tied directly to specific legislation or to the organization’s more 
general lobbying strategy in the House.  This overall approach to the organizations’ 
campaign finance activity is the topic of the following section; it should provide a 
more nuanced view of the context in which the previously discussed contribution 
decisions took place.   
  The campaign finance research reviewed in the first chapter does not offer any 
definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of campaign contributions.  Nor does it 
fully explain how groups view the campaign contribution process.  Because this 
quantitative research relies only on publicly available campaign finance data, it fails to 
examine just how the decision to contribute is orchestrated.  The FEC data provides a 
picture of which groups gave to which candidates but it tells us little about how these 
decisions to contribute are made and – most relevant for this project – how involved 
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legislative lobbyists are in this process.  To gain insight into this aspect of group 
decision-making, the interview also included a brief series of questions on this topic. 
The lobbyists were asked the following question: “How involved are the 
legislative affairs representatives at the organization with the group’s campaign 
contributions and political action committee?”  In nearly all cases, lobbyists were 
closely connected to the PAC’s decision-making.  Of the 19 organizations with 
political action committees, only one indicated that there was no substantial 
coordination between the staff responsible for the lobbying and campaign finance 
work; this organization, however, had a very small and newly formed PAC during the 
1990s, which offers some explanation for the lack of coordination.  Twelve of the 
groups expressed that their group’s lobbyists were very involved in the PAC’s 
contribution decisions; four other groups indicated that the lobbying and electoral 
work of the group was somewhat organized.44
 In the majority of cases in which coordination existed, the political action 
committee was run by a separate board of PAC officers.  Often these boards were 
comprised of the interest group’s individual membership or representatives of member 
companies or organizations.  While these boards were responsible for the final 
contribution decisions, each organization’s lobbyists typically weighed in with 
recommendations; in most cases, these recommendations were accepted by the board.  
The lobbyist for one large Democratic-leaning group described the role of the 
lobbyists as follows: “The staff made [contribution] recommendations, but they 
weren’t the ones carrying them out…The political [also known as campaign finance] 
and the legislative people’s offices were intertwined around one hallway and there 
were constant discussions [among these two sets of employees].” 
                                                 
44 Of the 19 groups with PACs, two were not asked about the group’s campaign finance activities due to 
time constraints. 
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 The head of a small Republican-leaning group described a similar 
arrangement.  According to him, “The lobbyists staff the political action committee.  
The government affairs people make recommendations to the PAC board about who to 
give to and when.  Decisions are fairly heavily driven by the group’s legislative 
strategy.  The PAC board hears the legislative strategy as a rationale for the decisions 
about distributing the money.”  Similar scenarios were described by the majority of 
groups.  Whether an organization was small or large and fully-staffed, there existed an 
opportunity for lobbyists to make strong recommendations regarding those legislators 
who should received money from the group.   
The comments of the respondents also indicated that the campaign finance 
process was viewed by many groups as ongoing and not directly tied to legislation.  
While some lobbyists indicated that a legislator’s vote on a specific issue played some 
role in the group’s decision to contribute to that member, more often than not 
respondents suggested that contributions were tied to a member’s overall support of 
their organization’s goals and that member’s ability to affect legislation of interest to 
the group. 
 The representative of a large nonpartisan group, for example, said that her 
organization would design a “roadmap” for its contribution strategy at the beginning 
of each year.  Each of the group’s lobbyists would sit down with the Executive 
Director of the PAC and list their priorities of which legislator to target and how much 
that member should receive.  These meetings would continue throughout the year to 
monitor the organization’s progress in making these donations.  Similarly, a large 
Republican-leaning group met every January in election years to budget for the 
upcoming races and make recommendations for that election cycle.  Many other 
groups shared these organizations’ routinized, ongoing process to discuss campaign 
finance strategy. 
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 The lobbyists also mention institutional positions as an important factor in 
deciding to whom the group would donate.  A lobbyist one organization stressed that 
the group’s “main concerns were those members who had institutional positions 
important for a say in healthcare issues, though they never put members [with a track 
record of going against the group’s interests] on the list of recipients.”  The lobbyist 
for a mid-sized Republican-leaning group provided the following assessment of his 
group’s strategy: “[The lobbyists and the PAC board] worked together to identify 
members [of Congress] who would support the overall position of the organization.  
Are they important to our issues?  On a key committee?  Do they support our overall 
position?”  He also pointed out that – in the interest of maintaining relationships – the 
group also gave to members not entirely in agreement with the group’s goals: “[The 
group] would still support members who disagreed with its policy position because 
you have to respect where they’re coming from.”   
The importance of institutional positions and the routine manner in which 
many of the organizations approached their contribution decisions lend support to the 
argument that these groups tended to view their campaign work as a supplement to 
their work in Congress, but not a process directly tied to specific legislative issues.  
Instead, groups targeted those members supporting their overall goals and – most 
importantly – those legislators to whom access is essential for any lobbying success. 
 In addition to being viewed as an ongoing process not directly tied to 
legislation, one lobbyist in particular described the campaign finance system as a 
necessary evil that both members of Congress and the lobbying community have to 
endure.  He described the importance of the current system for getting access to 
Congress: “You need PAC support to get access to the system now...Money is totally 
essential...”  Yet, he continued, most legislators and lobbyists find the work of 
fundraising tedious: “There are so many fundraisers to go to….No members of 
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Congress like it.”  He described an instance when a legislator held a non-reception 
fundraiser.  If this member managed to raise enough money, he wouldn’t hold an 
event for lobbyists and other donors to attend.  People were apparently willing to pay 
not to go to a fundraiser.  While certainly an extreme example, these comments 
suggest that, while the world of electoral politics is inescapably driven by money, 
some Washington insiders view the system as something to be put up with rather than 
an ideal arrangement.   
 The evidence that fundraising is a long-term and sometimes tedious process 
offers some insight into why campaign finance contributions may not be quite as 
strongly affected by a shift in the power dynamics of the House of Representatives.  
The need for access to key players is paramount for an interest group to succeed.  
Campaign finance research has highlighted the fact that money buys access (Langbein 
1986).  In order to maintain this access to key players in the House, groups must 
continue to support their reelection campaigns.   
The importance of money in the political system is well documented in the 
press, scholarly literature, and the anecdotal evidence from lobbyists themselves.  It is 
reasonable to conclude that groups continue giving to all of the potentially key players 
in both chambers of Congress in an effort to maintain their valuable access to these 
legislators, despite a shift in their relative influence over the legislative process. 
 
Hiring Practices 
The House reforms also had an important effect on the hiring practices of 
various lobbying firms and trade associations in Washington, D.C.  In particular, the K 
Street Project received substantial press coverage after initial reports in The 
Washington Post indicated that certain members of the Republican Party leadership 
had pressured various lobbying firms and organizations to hire only Republican 
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lobbyists.  This section of the chapter describes the K Street project based on various 
accounts presented in the newspapers that covered the story.  It also addresses how the 
GOP efforts to shape the lobbying community affected the groups interviewed for this 
project.  While some groups felt direct pressure regarding their staffs, others adjusted 
their hiring policies on their own in an effort to develop or maintain strong 
relationships with the powerful new leadership. 
While not directly tied to campaign activity, the K Street project is closely 
connected to the contribution behavior of individual lobbyists.  The reporter who 
broke the story in the summer of 2002 opened his article with the following: 
“Republicans are researching the party affiliation and political contributions of 
hundreds of lobbyists in Washington, part of a campaign that could deny government 
access and prime lobbying jobs to Democrats, according to people familiar with the 
project” (VandeHei 2002).  The K Street project also has important implications for 
the future fundraising potential of both parties.  Lobbyists are among the most active 
donors to candidates’ reelection campaigns and, as that journalist noted, “by placing 
Republicans in these high-paying jobs, a whole new class of wealthy donors has been 
created” (VandeHei 2003).  Given its attention to lobbyist contribution behavior and 
the potential wealth that plum lobbying jobs offer, the K Street project is closely 
connected to any discussion of campaign finance and the partisan competition for 
financing. 
In June 2002, Republican leaders confirmed the existence of the 
aforementioned report, which was put together by Republican lobbyists and 
conservative activist Grover Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform.  Then-
chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee Representative 
Thomas Davis was quoted as saying he knew about the report and suggested that the 
chairmen of various House committees would be interested in the findings.  Norquist 
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himself indicated that “the report’s chief aim [was] to prod trade associations, 
lobbying firms, and corporations to hire more Republicans to represent them in 
Washington” (VandeHei 2002).   
The project, according to reports, had been in the works for a number of years 
and was “expedited and expanded” once George W. Bush was elected president in 
2000, giving Republicans control of both the executive branch and the legislature.  
Though it was presumably better coordinated in later years when the GOP expanded 
its control to the presidency, VandeHei points out that the pressure to hire Republicans 
was not unique to the late 1990s. He writes, “Ever since they won control of the House 
in the 1994 elections, some key Republicans such as Majority Whip [at that time] Tom 
DeLay (R-TX) have advocated aggressively tracking the political proclivities of 
lobbyists” (VandeHei 2002). 
One newspaper article points out two specific examples of such pressure.  In 
1998, DeLay sought to prevent Dave McCurdy, a former Democratic member of the 
House, from heading up the Electronics Industry Association; in 2002, Senator Rick 
Santorum (R-PA) and J.C. Watts (R-OK), then chair of the House Republican 
Conference, expressed their distaste for Boeing’s decision to hire a former Democratic 
legislative aide as the head of the company’s D.C. office.  An article in The 
Washington Monthly chronicled the GOP’s attempts to exert control over the lobbying 
community, highlighting the efforts immediately following the Republican takeover of 
the House in 1995.  In particular, the account describes DeLay’s compilation of 
campaign finance records of the 400 largest PACs detailing the amount of money 
given to each of the parties in recent elections.  According to the article, “Lobbyists 
were invited into DeLay’s office and shown their place in the ‘friendly’ and 
‘unfriendly’ columns” (Confessore 2003).  This example highlights the efforts of some 
GOP leaders to reshape the lobbying community to better serve its policy goals. 
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It is worth noting, though, that the recent Democratic victories in the 2006 
elections have improved the job market for lobbyists with Democratic connections and 
pedigree.  Even prior to the elections, Confessore noted that, “With thin Republican 
majorities in the House and Senate, a market for Democratic lobbyists remains and 
traditional bipartisan lobbying firms still thrive” (Confessore 2003).  The pragmatism 
of many lobbying firms and trade associations can sometimes serve to mitigate the 
pressure they feel to meet the demands of the Republican leadership; as one lobbyist 
pointed out, “The Republican lobbyists under the new regime realize that there is a 
giant pendulum that swings as far back in one direction as it swings in the other.  The 
most powerful and long-standing lobbyists understand that [the political process] is a 
long term game…and they don’t want to be hit by the pendulum [as it swings back].”  
The desire not to burn any bridges is a strong one for those lobbyists seeking a long-
term career in politics. 
A number of lobbyists interviewed for this project addressed the K Street 
Project; one in particular was directly affected by the changes.  The president of one 
organization left his position after the election of President Bush in 2000, possibly 
given his strong personal ties to the Democratic Party.  He was replaced by a 
colleague who had connections to the Republican Party and had cultivated these ties in 
his work for the group.  When asked about the group’s work on HIPAA in 1996, this 
lobbyist said that the organization made an internal decision to have the group’s 
staffers with GOP ties meet with the majority party leadership.  After the Republican 
success in winning the presidency, he said, the group experienced much more external 
pressure regarding the partisan affiliations of its lobbyists.  Pragmatic strategy 
decisions, it seems, had been replaced by external politics.   
After being publicly identified as a top Democratic fundraiser and 
subsequently criticized in some conservative news media outlets, this lobbyist stepped 
 
 
128
down from his position at the head of the group, indicating that his personal political 
activism and the demands of his job were increasingly in conflict.45  He described his 
organization as “bipartisan for a long period of time” but noted that “over time [the 
group] got pressure from the Republicans and growing encroachment into the 
organization.”  The organization was subject to “very heavy-handed pressure to hire 
Republicans” which was one of his reasons for stepping down. 
Other respondents, though not directly affected by the K Street Project, 
highlighted the effect it had on the hiring practices of various D.C.-based groups.  One 
lobbyist remarked on groups’ conflicting desires for a bipartisan staff and the need for 
access to power players,  
 
[The GOP leadership] had a list of every job opening in Washington ranked by 
importance and would intervene in the interview process…[This influence] 
affected groups [and who they felt] they could hire.  [Ideally, groups] want to 
have a partisan balance in their staffing and have a strategy to be able to meet 
with both sides [of the aisle].  You don’t want to have bomb throwers working 
for you.  You want people to go into a meeting and make their point in a 
nonpartisan way.  Now, [for example], [groups] are holding off on hiring 
people until they know how the majority will go [in the 2006 midterm 
elections]. 
She continued, pointing out that Democratic lobbyists were often not hired because of 
their lack of access to key Republicans: “It has been a long cold winter for some 
Democrats.  No one was hiring them up until recently because they are not viewed as 
useful because the Democrats [in Congress to whom they have connections] have 
become increasingly separated from the legislative process…Groups fear retribution 
[for hiring Democrats].” 
In addition to feeling external pressure from Republican leaders regarding 
hiring choices, many groups viewed Republican staffers as an important component of 
                                                 
45 In the interest of protecting the anonymity of the respondent, I have not directly cited the news article 
from which this background information is taken as the news article directly identifies the lobbyist by 
name. 
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the organization’s adjustment to the new partisan balance in the House; these groups 
hired Republicans on their own accord.  As pointed out in earlier chapters, access to 
legislators is an invaluable resource for interest groups and the lobbyists who work on 
their behalf.  Groups with ready access to key players have a greater chance of shaping 
legislation; partisan ties are one avenue through which access can be granted and on 
which a long-term relationship with a legislator can be built. 
The aforementioned lobbyist who was directly affected by the K Street project 
also pointed out that his group saw fit to let its Republican staff take the lead on 
certain issues.  When asked about the organization’s work on HIPAA in 1996, the 
lobbyist pointed out that his involvement in this issue was different than during 
previous Congresses; his work focused more on strategy planning and less on the day-
to-day activities of lobbying like meeting with members of Congress and their staffs.  
One reasons for this role, he said, was the fact that the Republicans were in control.  
This scenario meant that his Republican lobbyists took a much more active role and 
handled many of the political contacts on the issue.  Presumably, these lobbyists 
would be more effective in working with the Republican leadership and committee 
chairmen and would also have greater access to these individuals. 
Another organization also sought to beef up its ties to the Republican Party 
through staff hiring.  A lobbyist for this small self-described bipartisan organization 
said that, historically, the group was “typically seen as more Democratic in its 
orientation.”  In an effort to counter that reputation, the group brought on a few 
Republican individuals to work with the organization.  Another lobbyist who sat in on 
the interview, in fact, was a former Hill staffer for a Republican member; he was hired 
by the group in 1999 as part of these efforts. 
Certain groups included in this project were directly affected by the K Street 
project, particularly when these efforts to influence hiring were increased after 
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President Bush’s election.  Other groups, however, sought out Republican staff 
without any such pressure in an effort to bolster their connections with the new power 
players in the House.  Given the importance of access to legislators, such a step seems 
a natural choice for many groups, particularly those with bipartisan agendas and policy 
positions that are not constrained by partisanship. 
 
Discussion of Results 
This chapter reviewed the changing patterns of campaign contributions 
following the House reforms; it also outlined the effects of the K Street Project on a 
few of the groups in the health policy community.  The campaign finance data 
demonstrates that increases to party leadership occurred after the reforms but they 
depended on group partisanship; it also provides evidence for small decreases in 
contributions for committee chairmen.  Yet, the analysis does not overwhelmingly 
confirm the expected effects on contribution activity in all examined cases; only some 
results met my expectations.  The pragmatic, long-term access approach to campaign 
finance is offered as an explanation for the lack of anticipated changes evident in this 
particular mode of interest group influence.  The bipartisan hiring practices of many 
groups also came under fire following the GOP success in the 1994 elections.  Again, 
the pragmatic concerns of some groups spurred them to proactively hire Republicans 
to leverage their access to the new power players in the House.  Other groups felt 
direct pressure from Republican legislators regarding their hiring decisions; this 
pressure increased when the Republicans gained control of the executive branch. 
The results presented in this chapter again highlight the importance of group 
access to legislators.  The general consensus across the interviews was that donating 
money is an essential part of participating in the political process and gaining access to 
members of Congress.  In particular, the lobbyists emphasized their focus on donating 
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to legislators in key institutional positions relating to their group’s policy concerns; 
these legislators included members and chairmen of the health committees and 
subcommittees.  Given the importance of money in the political system, it was 
reasonable to suspect that institutional change in the House would coincide with 
changes in group donation behavior; my expectations were correct in many cases.  The 
decline of contributions to committee and subcommittee chairmen following the 
reforms was particularly compelling.  Once these members of Congress had lost a 
substantial degree of autonomy from the majority party’s control and were more 
beholden to the majority party’s agenda, they also received fewer campaign donations 
from interested groups.  This result, along with the other findings presented in my 
discussion, confirm that donations tend to follow power, wherever it may lie within 
the institution. 
The importance of access became even more apparent in the discussion of 
group hiring practices.  In order to shore up their access to prominent and newly 
powerful Republicans, many groups sought to hire lobbyists who could bolster these 
important relationships.  One might be tempted to argue that this change in group 
behavior is more closely connected to partisan and not institutional change.  Certainly, 
these changes would not have happened if the Republicans had not gained majority 
status in the chamber.  Under these circumstances, the interest group community 
would have felt little pressure to increase their ties to Republican legislators.  Yet the 
simple switch in party control does not offer as compelling an explanation as one that 
assesses institutional change as well. 
In particular, the strong majority party control that the Republicans sought to 
exert over the committee system made Republican connections incredibly important.  
Had the GOP simply taken over control of the chamber, without implementing any 
major reforms, many interest groups might have continued work with Democratic 
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legislators and not sought to improve their relationships with the GOP leadership and 
committee chairmen.  Strong Republican Party control and strong party discipline, 
however, indicated to the interest group community that progress was made through 
Republicans; these legislators had the power to get things done.  Groups working only 
with Democrats would likely meet serious opposition.  As a result, many organizations 
sought to increase their ties to Republican legislators.  Institutional change created this 
unique environment – in addition to the change in party control.  Thus, institutional 
change played an important part in explaining group behavior.
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PART I:  
CHANGES WITHIN THE HOUSE DIRECT LOBBYING  
MODE OF INFLUENCE 
 
 
 
134
 Many reforms in the 104th Congress seriously weakened the autonomy of 
House committees.  Table 6.1 outlines the effects of these changes, as presented in 
Part II of the dissertation.  The focus here is specifically on changes in direct lobbying 
activity.    
 
Table 6.1, Changes within the House Direct Lobbying Mode of Influence 
Groups Adjustments in General 
• Despite its weakened autonomy, groups continued to work within the 
committee system for pragmatic reasons and due to dominant legislative 
personalities with the health policy community 
• Groups paid more attention to moderate House members 
• Term limits meant groups devoted more resources to the policy education of 
incoming committee chairmen and staffs 
• Term limits jeopardized interest groups’ long-term relationships with 
legislators working on health policy 
Effects of Group Partisanship 
• Working with majority party leaders became more important for Republican-
leaning groups 
• Groups with access to the new House leadership sought to develop and 
maintain working relationships with these powerful legislators 
Effects of Group Resources Effects of the Nature of the Issue 
• Working with majority party 
leaders is most important for those 
groups with resources that grant 
them access to these legislators 
• Groups with more resources at 
their disposal pay more attention 
to House rules and procedure 
• The distinction between full and 
subcommittees matters less for 
groups with greater resources 
• Long-standing relationships are an 
especially important way for 
groups with limited resources to 
gain access to legislators  
• For issues with extra-committee 
processes like task forces, 
committee chairmen and members 
were less important to groups than 
the leadership who oversaw each 
party’s task force 
• Leadership involvement is greater 
on high profile, politically 
motivated issues 
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Like the changes presented in Part I, the reforms described here varied in the 
extent to which they affected interest groups.  In some cases, groups uniformly 
reacted; in others, those with greater resources or different partisan affiliations had to 
adjust differently than those groups with different characteristics.  Issue-specific 
concerns also had an impact of how groups lobbied the House.  Evidence in support of 
each of these changes is discussed in detail in Chapters Six and Seven.  The table is 
provided here as a summary of the reforms in total. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WORK WITH PARTY LEADERS AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
 
This chapter assesses the nature of group relationships with party leaders and 
prominent members of the committee system.  I argue that the decrease in committee 
autonomy affected groups in two ways.  First, following the reforms, legislators in the 
Republican Party leadership became increasingly important to those groups who had a 
tendency to align with the GOP.  Democratic and nonpartisan groups did not value 
these legislators as strongly.  Second, the relative importance of committee and 
subcommittee chairmen declined after the reforms, but this was mitigated by three 
important factors: the pragmatic approach of many lobbyists to the legislative process, 
the long-term working relationships developed between interest groups and the 
committee system, and the unique personalities of many leaders within the health 
policy committees. 
 
Relationships with House Leadership relative to Committee and Subcommittees 
Relative Importance of Leadership and Committees 
 The reforms outlined in Chapter Two collectively weakened the ability of the 
committees to independently influence legislation.  Such circumstances alter our 
expectations for how interest groups may approach their direct lobbying of the House 
of Representatives.  Given the strong control that majority party leaders had over the 
agenda and the content of bills coming out of committee, one expectation is that 
groups should view members of the majority party leadership as particularly 
important.  Lobbyists should identify the members of the majority party leadership as 
key players in the legislative debate; as a result, groups would want access to these 
members.  Likewise, given the decreased ability of committee chairmen and 
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subcommittee chairmen to effectively shape legislation, groups should slightly 
devalue these legislators.   
Certainly, caveats to these hypotheses exist.  Regardless of how strong 
majority party leaders may become, committee chairmen will always be involved in 
the issues that pass through their committees.  These members very often demonstrate 
more policy expertise in matters under their jurisdiction than party leaders, making 
groups seek them out despite strong party control.  Committee chairmen may also 
differ in the relationships they have with subcommittee chairmen.  These varied 
arrangements tend to affect how interest groups will approach each committee.   
Also, as many lobbyists interviewed for this study pointed out, leaders tend to 
get most involved in issues that are characterized by their high profiles and political 
maneuvering; alternatively, party leaders may not get deeply involved in issues that 
are dominated by arcane policy language and details.  A lobbyist for a bipartisan group 
said her group did not work with party leadership much on the HIPAA legislation 
because “it was detail-oriented and leadership doesn’t do this sort of thing.”  Each of 
these circumstances is addressed below; their existence, however, does not change the 
fact that – under the post-1994 House structure – committee and subcommittee 
chairmen had substantially less autonomy than in previous Congresses.  As such, we 
would expect groups to place less importance on these legislators, especially relative 
to party leadership. 
 In each interview, lobbyists were asked a series of questions to elicit how 
much the group valued a given legislator or a specific institutional position in the 
House.  Respondents were asked these questions for each of the issues included in the 
study.  Each lobbyist was shown a list of the committee and subcommittee chairmen 
of the three committees most relevant to health policy: the Ways & Means Committee 
and its Subcommittee on Health; the Education & Labor Committee and its 
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Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations; and the Energy & Commerce 
Committee and its Subcommittee on Health.  The list also included the Speaker of the 
House and the chairman of the House Rules Committee.  Party leaders, whips, and 
party caucus chairmen of both the majority and minority parties were listed as well.  
Respondents were asked the following question: “Which of these legislators – or any 
others you might remember – were viewed as most important to your office’s success 
on this issue?  Why?” 
Lobbyists were also shown a list of traits a legislator can possess that may 
make them attractive to an interest group.  The list included a member’s committee 
positions: holding a seat on a key House health committee or subcommittee; serving as 
chairmen or ranking member on one of these committees; or having high seniority on 
these committees.  The document also listed serving on the leadership team of the 
majority or minority party.  In addition to these institutional positions, the list included 
individual characteristics: substantial health policy expertise; strong influence over 
other legislators in the House; a long-standing relationship with an organization; and, 
finally, a constituency with strong connections to a group’s membership.  When 
presented with this full list, each lobbyist was asked, “Which of these traits mattered 
most to your office’s decision to contact a legislator on this issue?” 
The lobbyists’ responses were later coded into a dataset.  For the first question, 
each group was given a score of one or zero, indicating whether or not they mentioned 
a specific member of the House as particularly important for their group’s work on 
each issue.  The following categories were used: Majority Leadership; Minority 
Leadership; Committee Chairman or Ranking Member; Subcommittee Chairman or 
Ranking Member.  For the characteristic question, a similar dummy variable was 
given for each of the following categories: serving in any capacity on a committee; 
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serving in any capacity on a subcommittee; serving within the majority party 
leadership; and, finally, having expertise or experience in health policy. 
 An initial analysis of the frequency of these responses indicates that our 
expectations are partially confirmed.  Table 6.2 presents the percentage of responses in 
which a lobbyist identified a specific individual, holding the position in the left-hand 
column, as a key player on each issue under study.  Given the powerful role of the 
majority party, it is expected that groups would increasingly identify these men as key 
players after the House reforms.  The percentages below demonstrate this was not, in 
fact, the case: while nearly 69 percent indentified majority party leaders as key players 
prior to the reforms, only about 60 percent did so afterwards.  The same is true for 
minority party leaders, 47 compared to 38 percent.   
 
Table 6.2, Percentage of Positive Responses, Specific Legislators 
 
Position Held Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
Majority Leadership 68.8% 59.5% 
Minority Leadership 46.9 38.1 
Committee Chairman or 
Ranking Member 90.6 76.2 
Subcommittee Chairman 
or Ranking Member 87.5 64.3 
 
Because the scale of responses is one to zero, the percentages – when divided by 100 – 
also represent the mean responses for each category.  A difference of means test 
comparing the average responses for each of the leadership categories confirms that 
there is not a statistically significant difference – in either direction – before and after 
the reforms; the p-value for majority leadership is roughly 0.8 for majority leadership 
and 0.7 for the minority party. 
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 My expectations for the committee and subcommittee positions are, however, 
confirmed.  Legislators in these categories exhibited a dramatic decline for the post-
reform issues.  Given the decreased influence of committee subcommittee chairmen, it 
is reasonable that fewer lobbyists would identify them as key players.  Prior to the 
reforms in the 104th Congress, committee heads were identified as key players in 
nearly 91 percent of the responses.  That number fell to approximately 76 percent after 
the House restructuring.  Subcommittee chairmen and ranking members saw a decline 
of over 20 percent, from 87.5 to about 65 percent.  A difference of means test for the 
committee categories confirms that these differences are statistically significant.  The 
p-values for these tests indicate a low probability of finding these results under the 
null hypothesis; the p-value is 0.05 in the case of committees and 0.01 in the case of 
subcommittees. 
 The results for the second question – about a legislator’s traits – yielded less 
promising initial results.  As shown in Table 6.3, the responses highlighting party 
leadership as an important trait again declined after the reforms, from 53 to about 48 
percent.  While the responses for the committee and subcommittee categories 
decreased as hypothesized, the difference of means tests do not demonstrate any 
statistical significance. 
 
Table 6.3, Percentage of Positive Responses, Legislator Characteristics 
 
Trait Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
House Majority Leadership 53.3% 44.7% 
Committee Position 90.0 84.2 
Subcommittee Position 56.7 50.0 
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 Though the results above offer some support for the hypothesized responses to 
the House reforms, a more nuanced analysis will better illuminate how groups reacted 
to the weakened ability of committees and their chairmen.  The next section focuses 
entirely on interest groups and majority party leadership.  Following that discussion, 
the focus turns to committee and subcommittee chairmen. 
 
Majority Party Leadership 
In the aggregate, the lobbyist responses do not indicate that the majority party 
leadership was deemed more important following the reforms.  The percentage of 
lobbyists identifying the leadership of either party actually declined for the post-
reform issues.  The relative value of majority party leadership to a group, however, 
may vary across the group’s partisan alignment.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 
Four, many Democratic-leaning groups felt shut out of the House legislative process 
following the Republican takeover.  Thus, while the majority party leadership may 
have been the key to legislative success, certain groups had little access to these 
individuals.  As a result, the lobbyists may have discounted them as “key players” on 
an issue simply because they had no opportunity to influence them.   
 To further test these hypotheses, while simultaneously accounting for group 
partisanship, a logit regression was performed to estimate the probability of this 
response from each lobbyist.  The model was estimated separately for each category of 
partisan alignment.  Two independent variables were used.  The first among these is 
the variable of particular interest to this study: a dummy variable for whether the issue 
under consideration was before or after the House reforms. 
 Many lobbyists interviewed for this project indicated that smaller groups with 
fewer resources had less access to party leaders.  In order to account for this tendency, 
the second independent variable measures the degree to which an organization’s 
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available resources influence a group’s work with party leaders.  The dataset created 
for this analysis included three variables that could potentially serve as a proxy 
measurement for a group’s resources: staff size, budget, and the size of a group’s 
membership.  Staff was selected for this regression because it is the most accurately 
measured of the three and is strong positively correlated with the variables measuring 
budget and membership size; the p-values for each of these correlations are roughly 
0.00.   
The results are presented in Table 6.4.  The dichotomous dependent variable is 
based on the results for the interview question about specific legislators.  If a group 
mentioned an individual in the majority leadership, it was given a value of one.  If 
they did not, it was coded with a zero.  The same method was used for the minority 
party.  Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, a logit regression was estimated.  
Because logit coefficients cannot be interpreted linearly, the actual numeric value 
gives little indication of the strength of a variable.  The most important element of the 
coefficient is its sign, indicating whether an increase in the independent variable is 
associated with an increase or decrease in the probability of a lobbyist identifying a 
member of party leadership as an important point of contact for an issue.   
A number of important results become clear regarding the connection between 
the House reforms and the likelihood of a group valuing party leadership.  First and 
foremost, the results are statistically significant for each reform variable, except in the 
case of nonpartisan groups and minority leadership.  Democratic-leaning groups 
significantly decreased the likelihood of identifying majority leadership as key players 
after the reforms; the coefficient for the reform variable is negative, which indicates a 
decline after the changes were made to the House.  Additionally, the reform 
coefficient for the minority leadership is positive and significant.  This result suggests 
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that Democratic-leaning groups increasingly valued their work with the minority side 
once the Democratic Party was in that position.   
 
Table 6.4, Robust Logit Coefficients by Partisan Alignment,  
Importance of Party Leadership  
(p-values in parentheses) 
 Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable Reform Staff 
Democratic-leaning                                                                                               (N=12)
Majority Leader -2.54 (0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Minority Leader 4.39 (0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
Nonpartisan or Bipartisan                                                                                    (N=31) 
Majority Leader -1.54 (0.04) 
0.00 
(0.36) 
Minority Leader 0.65 (0.35) 
-0.00 
(0.32) 
Republican-leaning                                                                                               (N=31) 
Majority Leader 1.28 (0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.99) 
Minority Leader -2.45 (0.01) 
0.00 
(0.62) 
 
Nearly the same results apply to the lobbyists of nonpartisan or bipartisan 
groups.  The reform coefficient for majority party leadership is negative and 
statistically significant.  This indicates a decreased probability of identifying the GOP 
leadership as key players compared to the Democratic leadership prior to the 104th 
Congress.  Since the reform coefficient for the minority party leadership model is not 
significant, no conclusions can be drawn.   
These results are strongly confirmed by the anecdotal evidence presented in 
earlier chapters which suggested that Democratic-leaning groups found themselves 
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unable to gain access to the new GOP leadership.  As a lobbyist for a large well-
respected nonpartisan group said, “We had a symbiotic working relationship [with 
Gingrich], but we did not meet with Armey or DeLay in the leadership because they 
were extremely ideological and considered our group the enemy.”  The results are not, 
however, consistent with our expectation that the majority party leadership would gain 
importance in the eyes of interest groups.  Instead, the majority party leadership 
gained this importance only in the eyes of the groups inclined to align themselves with 
the GOP in the first place. 
As the table shows, the reform coefficient for the Republican-leaning model is 
positive for majority party leadership, which suggests a higher probability of 
identifying majority leaders as key players after the GOP took over.  The coefficient 
for minority party leadership shows the opposite, as expected.  These groups were less 
likely to work with the minority side once that was the Democrats. 
The above discussion demonstrates the mitigating effect that a group’s partisan 
alignment had on the effects of the House reforms.  Strong majority party control 
implied that groups would find greater value in working with the party leaders 
exercising that control in the House.  This was only the case, however, among 
Republican groups who had ready access to the new leaders.  Despite the increased 
importance of the GOP leadership, Democratic-leaning groups did not grow to value 
these legislators more.  Instead, perhaps because they lacked access to these 
individuals, they increasingly valued the minority party leadership with whom they 
shared policy goals.   
Given this evidence, it is worthwhile to investigate how much more the 
Republican-leaning groups valued the Republican Party leadership once it had such 
strong control over its members.  Comparing the predicted probabilities from the 
estimated models is one way to examine this relationship.  The average predicted 
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probability that a Republican-leaning group’s lobbyist would highlight the GOP 
leadership for its work before the reforms is 0.429; after the reforms the probability 
increases to 0.594.  A difference of mean test between these two values strongly 
suggests that the means of the two groups are not equal and that the pre-reform values 
are significantly lower; the p-value is 0.00.   
While not as overwhelmingly supportive as the predicted probabilities from the 
model might suggest, the actual interview data indicate a similar trend.  For the issue 
prior to the reforms, seventy-two percent of the lobbyists for Republican-leaning 
groups identified GOP leadership as key players.  That number increased by three 
percentage points to seventy-five percent for the two issues after the reforms.   Thus, 
we can conclude that the Republican-leaning groups did increasingly identify GOP 
leaders as key players in the legislative process after the House reforms and the 
subsequent strong party control.  Similar policy preference is not the only explanation; 
institutional control over the chamber also mattered.   
To summarize, majority leaders garnered more attention and respect from 
interest groups once they exerted more control over the chamber.  This change in 
attention and respect was not, however, uniform across all interest groups; it was most 
profound among Republican-leaning groups who could more easily work with the new 
majority.  Those groups without ready access to the stronger leadership did not 
demonstrate increased attention to the majority.  In the case of Democratic-leaning 
groups, they strengthened their work with the minority party. 
 The results in Table 6.3 do not overwhelmingly support my expectation that a 
group’s resources influence their likelihood of identifying either party’s leadership as 
key players.  As the table indicates, the only statistically significant results for the staff 
variable are those for Democratic-leaning groups; those coefficients are opposite of 
the anticipated direction.  The fact that an organization’s resources have little effect 
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how that group views party leadership, however, does not mean that resources have no 
effect on whether or not that group can effectively work with party leaders. 
The following comments demonstrate how the resources available to a group 
can also mitigate the effect of the House reforms.  The increased power of majority 
party leaders matters most for those groups that possess the resources that enable them 
to work with party leaders.  In some cases, the smaller size of an organization can 
mean that easy access to the leadership is unavailable.  One lobbyist for a small GOP-
leaning group described his group’s meeting with party leaders as “infrequent” and 
pointed out that his group is “a small organization and access to the leadership is 
tough.”  In part, this access is not granted because smaller groups are unable to offer 
the leadership what it wants on an issue: enough votes in Congress to get a favorable 
outcome.  Another lobbyist for a small Republican-leaning organization said, “As an 
organization, [our group] is not big enough to really deliver on votes, so we didn’t 
meet too much with leadership.”   
The opposite can be said for those groups with substantial resources.  The 
director of lobbying for a nonpartisan organization known for its clout among 
politicians said, “Generally, if [our group] wants to get together with people, 
[members of Congress] will meet with us.”  Thus, the resources available to an 
organization can shape their relationship with party leadership as well, regardless of 
the institutional balance of power.   
Overall, the regression results demonstrate a distinct difference in group 
perceptions of party leadership before and after the reforms.  Attributing these changes 
causally to the institutional reforms, however, is not something that the model clearly 
accomplishes.  Instead, we turn to the anecdotal evidence from the interviews for 
clarification.  Here, the lobbyist comments indicate that the changes can, in fact, be 
partially attributed to the effects of the new rules and norms in the House. 
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In support of my hypotheses, many lobbyists commented that the majority 
party’s control over legislation, especially relative to the committee system, influenced 
the way they lobbied in the House.  Certain respondents indicated that the standard 
process by which they approached lobbying had changed under the new Republican 
House arrangements.  Rather than beginning their work at the subcommittee level, 
where the legislative process traditionally begins after a bill has been introduced and 
referred to committee, many groups went straight to leadership.  The lobbyist for a 
mid-sized nonpartisan group said, “Now, you have to go to leadership to say what you 
want to do and get their backing.  Then you have to go to convince the House 
chairman and then subcommittee chairs.  It used to work bottom up….[now] it’s like 
you even have to go to Rules before the committees.”   
Another lobbyist for a small Republican-leaning organization said, “At the 
macro level, [after the reforms] the group’s attention was focused at the leadership, 
chairmen, and subcommittees in that order.  There [were] more players involved.  
Before [the reforms], the subcommittee level came first, then the committees, then 
maybe leadership” (emphasis added by author).  Taken together, these comments 
imply two things:  first, that majority party leadership took a far more active role in the 
details of legislation.  As a result, groups had to touch base with them more than 
during previous Congresses.  Second, many groups found themselves seeking out the 
advice and influence of party leadership much earlier in the legislative process than 
was typically the case when the Democrats controlled the chamber. 
The more powerful House leadership also gave lobbyists an additional outlet to 
change legislation should they not get what they wanted out of a committee.  For 
example, a lobbyist for a large Republican-leaning group pointed out that prior to the 
House reforms, the “subcommittee was the primary crafter of legislation.  This is less 
the case now.”  He continued, “Now, there is…an appeal process to the leadership...If 
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you don’t like a committee chair’s actions, you can appeal to the leadership and 
perhaps the leadership can push the Rules Committee [to get an outcome more 
preferable to the group].”  Certainly, relying on the majority party leadership to step in 
and block or change legislation is a luxury afforded only to those groups with similar 
policy goals to that of the Republican Party.  Having such an outlet though, as this 
lobbyist pointed out, was an important change for how these interest groups worked 
with – or against – the committee system and its leaders. 
Finally, some respondents indicated that, once the majority party had strong 
control over the committees, they proactively sought to strengthen their relationships 
with majority party leaders.    A lobbyist for a mid-sized trade association said the 
following: “After 1994…the [committee] chairs had less power and leadership had 
lots more control over the agenda…In light of those changes, [our group] wanted to 
make sure we had access to the Speaker and majority leader.  You do that through 
your PAC, but you also get some outside lobbyists to help you open some doors and 
plan strategy.”   
He continued, “Typically, these are ex-Hill members or ex-Senators on a first 
name basis with the folks in power.  They will get their phone calls returned or will 
get the phone call from the decision-makers [seeking the group’s input] before the 
decision is made.”  Much like the hiring practices and the K Street project discussed in 
earlier chapters, it appears some groups sought to bolster their relationship with the 
powerful majority leaders by seeking external help from those individuals with the 
“right” characteristics – those that could get the organization access to powerful 
policy-makers. 
A prominent theme across all of the interviews conducted was the powerful 
and dominant personality of the new Republican Speaker of the House.  As noted 
previously, Republicans attributed the success of the 1994 elections to Gingrich and, 
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as a result, were willing to give him strong control over the party agenda and the 
content of legislation.  The unique dominance of Gingrich also had an important effect 
on how interest groups approached the new Republican majority leadership.  The 
Speaker’s strong interest in health policy and his knowledge of the issue was 
particularly important for organizations with similar concerns.   
 Organizations of all ideologies and sizes went out of their way to become 
familiar with Gingrich and his staff.  A lobbyist for a large nonpartisan group pointed 
out his organization’s response to Gingrich’s control: “The authority of the Speaker 
changed the dynamics in the caucus and made members more responsible to the 
leadership – for funding or otherwise.  [Our organization] went straight to Gingrich to 
develop a relationship with him after the election.”  Another large organization with 
state affiliates pointed out “[the group’s] Georgia people [from Gingrich’s home state] 
became very important to our national organization and came to D.C. a lot.”   
Certainly, most groups would seek out a strong working relationship with the 
incoming leaders of a new majority party.  Yet Gingrich’s dominant personality, 
personal interest in health policy, and strong control of the GOP caucus and committee 
system made cultivating relationships with the Speaker, his staff, and the rest of the 
majority leadership especially important for groups hoping to be effective.  The 
lobbyist for a small nonpartisan group pointed out that they sought to develop a 
relationship with Gingrich through their membership.  He said, “Mr. Gingrich was a 
very important player as Speaker.  We had access to him through local constituents so 
we took advantage of that…Our relationship with Gingrich helped stop a [bill with 
adverse consequences for our membership].” 
 The influence of each Speaker’s unique personality and leadership style is 
echoed in the lobbyists’ comments about the new environment after Dennis Hastert 
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took over as Speaker.  A lobbyist for a large Republican-leaning organization pointed 
out,  
 
The Contract with America was a catalyst for taking power away from 
committee and leadership became much more important.  In the last couple of 
years, even though Hastert still rules with a heavy hand, he does pay more 
attention to committee chairs and only injects himself in the process when 
party principles are at stake. 
Another lobbyist noted that because of Gingrich’s interest in health issues, “the 
leadership played a much larger role [after the Republicans gained majority status].  
[Gingrich] was a much more active participant, brokering many deals….This was 
much less so after Hastert took over.”  A lobbyist for a small trade association 
summarized the situation as follows: “In recent years…the current speaker [Hastert] is 
much more behind the scenes.  The role of the leadership varies according to the 
personality of the Speaker and his tendency to exert his power.”  Thus, the reforms 
introduced in the House were closely tied to the unique strength of Gingrich in his role 
as House Speaker. 
The data analysis presented above implies that majority party leadership 
became increasingly important under the reformed 104th Congress and beyond.  This 
is due in part to the reforms themselves and the increased importance of party 
leadership.  It was also due to the dominant leadership style of Speaker Gingrich – a 
leadership style which also partially explains the reforms in the first place.  There is no 
doubt that the interest group community recognized the increased power of the 
majority party leadership and responded in kind.  Groups of all size and partisan 
persuasions sought to further develop their relationships with majority party leaders 
and Gingrich in particular. 
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Committee and Subcommittee Chairmen 
 Table 6.2 earlier in this chapter presented data on the lobbyists’ responses to a 
series of questions about the key players on the issues selected for this study.  As 
shown there, prior to the reforms, 90.6% of the groups identified the committee 
chairman or ranking member of a relevant committee when asked “Which of [the 
legislators on this list] were viewed as most important to your office’s success on this 
issue?”  When asked about those issues after the reforms, that number dropped to 76.2 
percent.  Since the data was coded as a dummy variable of zero or one, these 
percentages are also the mean responses for the pre- and post-reform eras.  A 
difference of means tests indicates that this decline is statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.05.   
The same can be said of the responses mentioning a subcommittee chairman or 
ranking member.  Eighty-seven percent of the groups identified these individuals as 
key players prior to the reforms; on the post-reform issues, roughly 64 percent did so.  
Again the decline is statistically significant; the p-value is 0.01. 
Table 6.5 presents the results of two logit regressions designed to model the 
probability that a group’s lobbyist would mention a committee or subcommittee 
chairmen when asked the aforementioned question.  Again, a logit model was used 
because the dependent variable is dichotomous.  Three independent variables were 
used in the regression: a dummy variable for House reform and two control variables: 
an organization’s staff size and a group’s partisan alignment.  Partisan alignment is 
based on the lobbyist’s own classification; it is measured on a scale of -1 to 1.  A score 
of -1 indicates a tendency to align with the Democrats, a zero indicates that the 
lobbyist described the group as nonpartisan or bipartisan, and a value of 1 was given 
to those groups aligning with the GOP.   
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Unlike the majority and minority leadership results, this model was not 
estimated individually for each category of partisanship.  Because the lobbyist 
responses were coded for mentions of both committee chairmen and ranking members, 
concern over policy agreement or access is less of an issue.  As noted before, the sign 
of the coefficients is most important.  Logit coefficients are not linear, so I cannot get 
a sense of these variables’ impact based solely on their value.  The sign of these 
coefficients, however, does indicate whether an increase in the independent variables 
is associated with an increase or decrease in the dependent variables.  In the model for 
committee chairmen and ranking members, the reform coefficient is, as expected, 
negative.  The result suggests a decline in the lobbyists’ mentions of legislators 
holding this position after the House reforms.  The coefficient is also statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level; the reported p-value is 0.09.  The same results appear in 
the subcommittee model; again, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant.  
These findings suggest that, following the reforms, groups were less likely to identify 
committee chairmen and ranking members as key players on an issue.  This is 
consistent with my expectations for group reactions to a committee system in decline.  
 
Table 6.5, Robust Logit Coefficients,  
Importance of Committee and Subcommittee Chairmen 
(p-values in parentheses) 
 Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable Reform Staff Partisanship 
Committee Chairman or 
Ranking Member 
-1.18 
(0.09) 
0.00  
(0.12) 
-0.72 
(0.08) 
Subcommittee Chairman 
or Ranking Member 
-1.46 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.79) 
0.27 
(0.53) 
(N=74) 
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 While the above statistical analysis offers support of the expectation that 
committee and subcommittee chairmen declined in importance following the House 
reforms, the anecdotal evidence and comments from the lobbyist interviews provide a 
more complicated picture.  While, overall, the lobbyists may have highlighted 
committee and subcommittee leaders less frequently as key players in the legislative 
process, three factors serve to mitigate the effects of these reforms.  The first of these 
factors is, simply put, pragmatism.  Despite the fact that majority party leadership had 
tight control over committee chairmen, who in turn had tight control over 
subcommittee chairmen, the details of legislation were still largely worked out at the 
committee level.  Thus, groups continued their work with these members of Congress.   
Second, groups have an investment in the long-term relationships they have 
developed with individual members of Congress, especially those on committees with 
jurisdiction over health policy.  Lobbyists have good working relationships with the 
staff of these committees as well.  Given the importance of simply having access, 
interest groups have a strong incentive to continue to rely on these relationships 
despite a change in House norms and organization.   
The third mitigating factor – like the above discussion of Speaker Gingrich – 
concerns the importance of personality.  Despite the weakened autonomy of the House 
committee system, certain chairmen of the House committees and subcommittees on 
Health retained their reputation among lobbyists as dominant personalities with 
substantial power over the legislation in their jurisdiction.  Thus, interest groups 
continued to value their access to and work with these men.  Each of these three topics 
are addressed in the remainder of this chapter. 
As described above, the new majority party leadership increased its control 
over the legislative process and subsequently weakened the autonomy and power of 
the committee system.  Despite this new institutional arrangement, however, a large 
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number of the lobbyists interviewed for this project indicated that their organization 
still worked extensively at the subcommittee and committee level.  Though the new 
majority leaders may have exerted strong control over the legislative agenda – and at 
times even the content of legislation – the details of each bill were still mostly worked 
out in subcommittee and committee.  One lobbyist for a large nonpartisan organization 
said the following about her group’s work with the committee system on most any 
issue:  “Meeting with committee and subcommittee members and their staff was 
absolutely key.  This was something the group did all the time as part of a routinized 
process of maintaining constant contact [with these legislators].”  The lobbyist for a 
mid-sized nonpartisan group said, “[For each issue] we contact everybody on the 
committees and let them know our position.  We deal with the key staff of the people 
on the majority and minority parties on the committees.”  While they might have had 
less influence over the outcomes in committee, many lobbyists still valued their work 
at this level. 
Despite the fact that the reforms reigned in the subcommittees and 
consolidated control under the chairman of the full committee, many lobbyists 
indicated that their subcommittee work was still very important.  As one lobbyist for a 
small Republican-leaning group said, “We want to get the language of the bill right as 
soon in the process as possible.”  Each respondent was asked if his organization 
concentrated its work at the subcommittee or full committee level for each of the three 
issues.  The results are presented in Table 6.5; they indicate little difference before and 
after the House reforms.  
For the direct lobbying prior to the changes, about 45 percent of the lobbyists 
indicated that their work concentrated on the subcommittee level.  For issues in the 
104th Congress and beyond, that number dropped only slightly to 41 percent.  The 
percentage of respondents indicating their work was focused on the full committee 
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was roughly 17 percent both before and after the reforms.  Thus, while the 
subcommittee chairmen may have had less freedom from the committee chairs, 
lobbyists still viewed them as important components of the legislative process. 
 
Table 6.6, Relative Importance of Subcommittees versus Committees 1
 Subcommittee Committee No Distinction 
Pre-Reform 44.8% 17.2% 31.0% 
Post-Reform            41.2            17.7            32.4 
1The numbers in each row do not sum to 100.00% because some lobbyists indicated that this distinction 
varied across committees.  This topic is addressed later in this section. 
 
The distinction between full and subcommittees also mattered less for groups 
with substantial resources that give them the ability to fan out and cover many 
members of Congress for each issue.  At two of the largest organizations, one 
Republican-leaning and another nonpartisan, lobbyists were assigned specifically to a 
House or Senate committee.  In the case of one group, two lobbyists were assigned; 
one was responsible for the majority side and the other worked with the minority 
party.  The lobbyist for this organization indicated that the staff was organized in this 
way in order to foster strong relationships between its lobbyists and the committees 
with jurisdiction over their issues of concern.   
The lobbyist for the other organization commented, “The distinction between 
subcommittee and committee or just holding a seat doesn’t really matter all that much.  
[Our organization] is big enough that we can cover everyone, all 535 offices.  We have 
the luxury of not having to pick and choose.”  These comments indicate that those 
groups with sufficient resources are less subject to the changing power dynamics in 
the House.  If an interest group has the organizational capacity to contact all of the key 
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players on an issue, changes in the balance of power across these key players is not 
especially relevant. 
The members of a given committee, and especially a subcommittee, tend to 
have a level of issue and policy expertise that is far greater than those of other House 
members.  As one lobbyist pointed out, “Knowledge and positions of power on health 
issues tend to coincide.”  That is, powerful legislators – those with the greatest ability 
to change legislation – are quite often those who know the most about the issues; they 
achieved these powerful positions because of their expertise or their seniority and 
subsequent familiarity with the issues.  The legislators on subcommittees in particular 
tend to have a great deal of expertise which makes them especially important for an 
interest group to seek out.  The lobbyists’ comments indicate that their knowledge of 
policy makes subcommittee and committee members important House contacts despite 
their diminished capacity to act independently of the majority party. 
 In addition to being a bastion of policy expertise, the subcommittees and 
committees are also those places in which lobbyists and interest groups have 
cultivated long-term relationships with specific members of Congress, their personal 
staffs, and the staffs of the committees that deal with the majority of health policy 
concerns.  Because the Ways & Means and Energy & Commerce committees have 
jurisdiction over a wide range of health legislation, the interest groups involved in 
these issues work with the chairmen and members of these committees on a very 
regular basis.  As one lobbyist for a Republican-leaning organization pointed out, 
“Lots of [our group’s] issues are automatically referred to the Ways & Means and 
Energy & Commerce committees, so you build relationships there.”  He continued, 
“We were used to these staffers calling on [the group] for our input…We tended to 
have more access and a symbiotic relationship here.” 
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 The majority of an interest group’s work is done at the staff level rather than 
directly with a member of Congress.  Lobbyists from a wide range of groups indicated 
that, as one lobbyist of a mid-sized Republican-leaning organization put it, groups 
“tend to have more relationships with staff than any specific legislators.”  A lobbyist 
from a large nonpartisan group said bluntly, “We hardly ever meet with members.  
Ninety-five percent of the work is done at the staff level.”  Relationships develop over 
time as lobbyists work with staffers on a wide range of issues.  A lobbyist for a mid-
sized nonpartisan group indicated she and the other lobbyists for her organization see 
staff on a very regular basis and are constantly talking about a wide range of issues 
both in person and over the phone. 
These sorts of relationships are extremely valuable to any lobbyist or interest 
group; they represent a necessity for any lobbying success: access to important 
decision-makers.  Given the investment interest groups and their lobbyists have in 
these relationships, the degree to which they value them, and the ready access to 
Congress these relationships provide, it seems unlikely that groups would willingly 
sacrifice these lobbying opportunities.  Thus, while the internal power dynamics and 
institutional arrangements in the House may have changed, an interest group’s 
preference to work with committee and subcommittee members and, especially, their 
staff remain largely the same. 
A number of groups also have close connections to legislators through their 
membership and the individuals they represent.  Many of the trade associations within 
the healthcare industry have members of Congress who formerly worked in these 
professions.  For example, there are legislators in the House who formerly worked as 
doctors and dentists.  Similarly, groups like the National Council of State Legislatures 
have former state legislators now serving in Congress – members on whom they can 
call and to whom they presumably have access. 
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The importance of these sorts of long-term relationship became quite evident 
throughout the interviews.  Overall, thirty four groups were included in the study and 
the representatives for these groups were asked about that office’s work on three 
issues.  In all, data was collected on seventy-four observations, with each observation 
defined group by issue.46  In roughly twenty-one percent of these cases, the 
organization’s lobbyist mentioned a specific legislator in Congress with which the 
group had close ties and with whom they frequently worked on health care and other 
issues of concern. 
 Smaller groups and those with limited resources especially value these 
relationships and the ready access to members of Congress they provide.  As one 
lobbyist for a small organization said, “Our group is relatively small with minimal 
resources, so we tend to work with members who we’d worked with 
before…Longstanding relationships and constituency connections are extremely 
important for a small organization…[One particular legislator] was a former board 
member of one of our member organizations, so we worked with him…”  These 
comments highlight just how valuable lobbyist-staff relationships can be for an 
interest group.   
One important change implemented by the new Republican majority in the 
104th Congress concerned the staffing arrangements of the committees.  Rather than 
having separate and independent subcommittee staffs, the staffs of these committees 
were consolidated under the control of the full committee chairman.  A number of 
lobbyists interviewed for this project indicated that this change had important 
implications for how much they valued their work with the subcommittees and how 
effective these lobbyists felt this work could be.  As the lobbyist for a large 
                                                 
46 This number of observations does not equal the 34 groups multiplied by the 3 issues, or 102, because 
some groups did not lobby on all three issues and, in some cases, lobbyists could not be scheduled for 
an interview. 
 
 
159
Republican-leaning trade association said, “[After the changes], the staff worked for 
the full committee chairman.  The subcommittee chair might be favorable [to your 
group’s position on an issue] but then the staff does what the chairman wants [despite 
the subcommittee chair].”  The lobbyist from a smaller nonpartisan organization 
pointed out the same dynamic: “[Certain committees] had a top-down driven agenda.  
The subcommittees paled [in the legislative process] at this point.  [Staff] were paid 
and employed by the full committee.”  He continued,  
 
There was shift to a full committee focus [after the House reforms].  In 1993-
1994, we met with [the committee chairman]’s people about six times and with 
[the subcommittee chair]’s weekly.  In 1995, the chain was yanked.  It came 
back towards more of a balance but never to its pre-1994 level.  We do pay 
attention to the subcommittees but not to the degree we did before [the 
reforms]. 
This particular reform does seem to have dissuaded some interest groups from 
focusing their work at the subcommittee level.  Yet these groups did not, however, 
abandon the committee system altogether.  Instead, they focused their efforts on the 
full committee. 
These new staff dynamics are also closely connected to the power of 
committee and subcommittee chairmen relative to one another.  A common theme 
across all of the interviews concerned the varied relationships between the chairmen of 
a committee and their subcommittee chairmen, depending on which Health committee 
was discussed.  Following the Republican electoral victories in the 1994 elections, for 
example, the chairman of the Ways & Means Committee was Bill Archer (R-TX).  
Bill Thomas (R-CA) served as the chairman of the Ways & Means Subcommittee on 
Health.  One lobbyist for a small Republican-leaning organization said the following 
of these two men, “[Our organization] did have to work closely with the leadership 
once it was stronger but our focus was really on the committee structure.  This was 
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driven by…the personalities involved.  Archer and Thomas were very effective, so the 
leadership gave them more running room.” 
The powerful personality of Bill Thomas in particular was often mentioned by 
the lobbyists as an explanation for why the subcommittees remained important players 
following the reforms.  A lobbyist for a large nonpartisan group indicated that both 
Archer and the Republican leadership deferred to Thomas on health issues.  One 
respondent working for a mid-sized Republican-leaning group said the following, only 
somewhat jokingly, about the subcommittee chairman: “Thomas may not have lost 
any votes in the full committee when he brought something up.  The full committee 
rarely turned him down.”  A long-time lobbyist for a large nonpartisan organization 
described Thomas as “smart, comprehensive, and the meanest man in Congress.”  The 
same respondent also said he was “brilliant, a force of personality and intellect…[He] 
dominates any process that he chooses to be involved in.”  Given that many lobbyists 
attribute so much personal power to this particular subcommittee chair, it is only 
natural that interest groups would continue to highly value their work at this level and 
with the committee system in general. 
 The command that committee and, especially, subcommittee chairmen had 
over the issues had important consequences for the degree to which a group’s lobbying 
behavior was affected by the House reforms.  While the Republican changes may have 
shifted overall power from the subcommittee chairs to the full committee chairmen, 
the reaction to this shift in the health policy community was mitigated by the dynamic 
personalities that head up the committees with jurisdiction over health issues. 
One lobbyist pointed out that the distinction between full committee and 
subcommittee also “depends on where the bill is.  [Our group] moves from one point 
in Congress to another and it’s not always a linear process.”  This sense of pragmatism 
– following a bill through all possible points of entry – was a prevalent theme across 
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the lobbyists’ comments, indicating that they would not suddenly adjust or abandon 
lobbying strategies in light of House reforms.  This lobbyist, who worked for a small 
non-partisan group, continued, “It all depends on where you are in the legislative 
process.  We’d start at the subcommittee if there were hearings there and then move 
on to the full committee.  We just react to where the legislation is.”   
Another lobbyist echoed these sentiments, “In the congressional process, 
people become primarily important during the course of legislation.  For example, 
subcommittee members matter early [in the process].  [The group must decide] where 
certain legislators are in the pecking order.”  In short, the movement of legislation 
through the chamber also dictates who interest groups view as particularly important; 
the larger institutional arrangement of the House matters less for these lobbyists.  They 
are, for the most part, concerned with the nuts and bolts of committee and 
subcommittee work. 
The anecdotal evidence presented above supports the argument that, despite 
the fact that the committee system had been weakened relative to majority leadership, 
most interest groups continued their work at these levels for the pragmatic reason that 
this is where the bulk of the work gets accomplished and where they have developed 
useful relationships with members and staff.  A number of lobbyists indicated that, 
while they were aware of the shifting balance of power between party leaders and the 
committee system, they did not drastically alter their lobbying strategies.   
The director of a mid-sized nonpartisan organization said, “We still respected 
the committee structure perhaps in disbelief that the normal course of events was 
altered.  Even in my current approach, we still respect the process by which things get 
vetted.”  He described the committee system as “where you have to start” and 
continued, “You still need votes and [every piece of legislation] has to get out of 
committee.”  The lobbyist for a large nonpartisan group said, “Power did pull away 
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from the committee chairs in a strategic sense, but day-to-day, it still meant that the 
committees were the key for drafting legislation.”  She pointed out, though, that the 
group fully recognized the weakened autonomy of the committees: “After the changes, 
we still worked with the staff of the committees and subcommittees.  We just shared in 
their frustrations that they couldn’t set their own agenda.” 
 
Discussion of Results 
 The above discussion examined the degree to which interest groups reacted to 
the decreased autonomy of the committee system.  Those groups with interests similar 
to those of the Republican Party increasingly valued that party’s leadership after the 
House reforms – more so than prior to the changes, when the party did not exercise 
such strong control over its members.   
Also, while many lobbyists indicated that their organization recognized the 
reforms and their consequences, their work at the committee and subcommittee levels 
remained mostly unchanged for a number of reasons.  First, policy work was still 
conducted in the committee hearings and groups sought to influence policy at all 
stages of the legislative process.  Second, groups had long-term investments in the 
committee system that proved too valuable to abandon.  And, finally, the dynamic 
personalities among the legislators working on health care and private health insurance 
issues served to mitigate the tight control of the majority party leaders. 
 The results regarding party leadership highlight the importance of partisanship 
in group interaction with party leaders.  Typically, a group’s valuation of its work with 
Republican Party leadership, both before and after the reforms, depended on its own 
partisan alignment.  These results suggest that partisanship in Congress can be a useful 
organizing tool for the interest group community.  Groups that have a tendency to 
agree with one party more than another can find useful relationships with the leaders 
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of that party.  In those cases where a group pursues policy similar to the preferences of 
party leaders, each can coordinate their activities to bolster their effectiveness and 
chances of success.   
In instances of institutional change, group relationships with party leaders can 
improve or weaken, but the consequences depend largely on the relationships groups 
already have with party leaders.  As we saw, Republican-leaning groups increasingly 
valued their work with GOP leadership, but groups with other partisan persuasions did 
not.  This group preference for strong parties in Congress is taken up in greater detail 
in Chapter Eight.  It is worth noting here, though, that – under certain circumstances – 
groups may benefit from a powerful majority party in the House. 
Perhaps the most interesting result concerns the extent to which groups 
develop and maintain long-term relationships with the members and chairmen of 
relevant health committees in Congress.  In a majority of cases, despite the decreased 
autonomy of these legislators, interest groups continued to value these relationships.  
Institutional change had minimal impact.  This result has important implications for 
the democratic responsiveness of the House as a whole.   
Unlike the situation described in Chapter Four, in which certain groups were 
shut out of the political process by their inability to gain access to party leadership, the 
results on committee work demonstrate that groups of all partisan persuasions relied 
upon their long-term connections to individual legislators to maintain access after the 
reforms. The solid working relationships between members of Congress, their staffs, 
and the lobbying staffs of various interest groups suggest that those groups that work 
to maintain these relationships can have a continued say in the political process despite 
an ever-changing institutional environment that may or may not be politically 
favorable.  The importance of these relationships also highlights the close ties between 
the committee system and the interest group community. 
 
 
164
CHAPTER SEVEN 
OTHER CHANGES IN DIRECT LOBBYING 
 
In addition to changing the degree to which interest groups valued their work 
with party leaders and the committee system, a number of other aspects of direct 
lobbying were affected by the House reforms of the 104th Congress.  These changes 
are the topic of this chapter.  First among these is the attention given to the more 
ideologically moderate members of the House.  Under the Republican regime of 
strong party control, these members became increasingly valuable targets for 
lobbyists.  Second, the implementation of term limits for committee and subcommittee 
chairman had an important impact on one of a lobbyist’s most important functions: 
that of a policy educator.  It also mattered a great deal for the long-term relationships 
interest groups develop with powerful committee figures. 
The increased use of task forces after the 104th Congress also brought changes 
to how groups viewed the committee system; the leadership controlling the task forces 
became particularly important.  The final section of this chapter addresses the overall 
extent to which groups pay attention to the subject matter that is the focus of this 
study: House rules and procedure.  Like a number of the topics discussed in previous 
chapters, the level of a group’s attention to this type of House business varies with the 
depth of its resources.  Each of these four topics is addressed below. 
 
Working with Ideologically Moderate Members of Congress 
For interest groups, getting the legislation they want out of Congress often 
requires demonstrating that they have enough votes on their side to pass a bill.  This 
sort of “political intelligence”, as it is described by Schlozman and Tierney (1986), 
can lend credence to a lobbyists’ position.  They suggest that groups and legislators 
exchange information about supporters and opponents and their likelihood of success 
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(Schlozman and Tierney 1986: 299).  Along similar lines, groups often find that 
getting support from across the aisle can lend credibility to their position.   
The lobbyists interviewed for this project emphasized how important this sort 
of activity was after the Republican Party gained majority status.  The margin of 
control was very slim during each of the subsequent Congresses.  Immediately 
following the 1994 elections, the GOP controlled the House by just 26 members.  In 
the 105th Congress, that number decreased to just twenty (Davidson and Oleszek 2202: 
437).  Under these circumstances, if an interest group could get even a few legislators 
to break party ranks, it stood a good chance of getting the support needed to pass or 
defeat a particular piece of legislation.   
Prior to the Republican House reforms, many groups that found themselves 
working at odds with the Democratic majority were able to find legislators in the party 
who were willing to cross party lines.  A number of the lobbyists working for business 
and Republican-leaning groups, for example, cited their work with the “blue dog” 
Democrats on Clinton health reform as particularly important.  These members of the 
Democratic Party take a more moderate-to-conservative stance on fiscal, and 
sometimes social, policies.  As one lobbyist for a GOP-leaning group said, “In my first 
two years at [the organization], we were in the minority and going up against the 
leadership.  This wasn’t hard with the Democrats because they didn’t have control 
over their followers like the GOP later did.  Usually you could fashion a majority out 
of the Republicans and the blue dogs.”  The existence of an organized group within 
the party that was sometimes at odds with party leaders was a useful resource for those 
groups seeking the votes to thwart the majority’s policy goals. 
After the House reforms, though, the Republican Party leadership’s strong 
control of the House agenda and the content of legislation meant that few members 
were willing to suffer the potential consequences of party defection.  Lobbyists 
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certainly recognized this and found that it affected their ability to lobby members of 
the House.  As the lobbyist for a small nonpartisan group said, “The increased power 
of party leadership and the tighter party control meant it was harder to pick off party 
members.”  Yet, despite the increased difficulty of doing so, finding moderate 
members to support the group’s position or champion the group’s issue became an 
increasingly valuable tactic in a chamber where the majority had such a slim margin of 
control.  The lobbyist for a large nonpartisan group made the following comparison of 
the pre- and post-reform eras: “Now, as opposed to back then, the parties are…far 
apart with only a small core of moderates.  [Our organization] spends a lot of time 
with [these members] because their respective leaderships need them [to toe the party 
line].”   
Groups, especially those with goals at odds with the GOP leadership, also hope 
to cultivate relationships with members of the Republican majority in an effort to 
make progress despite the tight party control on a given issue.  The lobbyist for a large 
Democratic-leaning organization said, “We spent lots of time looking for Republicans 
to carry our water…When that happened, you could make headway sometimes.”   
The Patients’ Bill of Rights legislation provides a useful example.  The 
Republican Party leadership was largely opposed to the legislation, though it offered 
its own mild version of a bill to avoid criticism that it had failed to act on an issue that 
had so much public support.  The efforts in the House, however, were largely 
spearheaded by Charles Norwood (R-GA), a Georgia Republican who broke ranks 
with the leadership.  The lobbyist for a small Democratic-leaning organization 
highlighted how important it was to work with Norwood, especially given his position 
as a member of the majority party: “Because he was so forceful on the issue and was 
happy to be a leader and was a conservative Republican, he rose to the top of the list 
of who [our group wanted] to work with.  It was crucial given the nature of Congress 
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that [our organization] had Republican support and Republican leadership, though not 
the party leadership, on the issue.” 
 The House reforms weakened the autonomy of the committee system and to 
strengthen the majority party’s control over the agenda as well as its individual 
members.  Given the slim margins of the Republicans’ control, though, moderate 
members of Congress – those with a better chance of breaking party lines – became 
increasingly important to interest groups seeking to influence legislation in the 
chamber. 
 
Committee Chairman Term Limits 
The changes outlined in Chapter Two collectively weakened the autonomy of 
the committee system.  Included among these changes was the imposition of a term 
limit of six years for committee and subcommittee chairmen.  This particular change 
had important implications for interest group behavior; throughout the interviews, this 
change was remarked upon as one of the most significant among those implemented.   
A major reason for its prominence is the unique role that lobbyists play as 
providers of policy information to members of Congress.  Wright describes the three 
types of valuable information that lobbyists can provide to members of Congress: the 
status of bills, the electoral consequences of supporting or opposing legislation, and 
the potential economic, social, or environmental impact of various proposals (Wright 
1996: 88).  The third of these types of information is of particular importance for the 
implementation of committee chair term limits.  In addition to providing information 
about the policy consequences of bills, lobbyists also spend a great deal of time 
educating each legislator about their organization, its members, and the policies and 
goals that will best support those members.  As the lobbyist for a large interest group 
pointed out, “Before you can lobby a staff person [or member of Congress] with what 
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you want [on a bill], you have to educate [them about the issues from your group’s 
perspective]…You spend a lot of time doing that.” 
After a series of interactions with a group, presumably, a legislator has a good 
understanding of the group, its goals, and the unique concerns the group has about a 
variety of health policies.  When a committee chairman is forced to relinquish his 
position after a given number of terms, a new chairman takes over his position and 
interest groups can no longer presume a certain amount of background information 
when meeting with this new committee chair.  One lobbyist for a large Democratic-
leaning organization stressed the “importance of building a working relationship with 
someone who knows all the issues and [someone from whom the group] knows what 
to expect...The learning curve of a new chair throws things into a weird mix.  Groups 
feel obligated to educate [the new chair] and then you’re back to ground zero…” 
The departure of a new committee chairman is sometimes accompanied by the 
departure of his staff, with which interest groups had developed long-term working 
relationships and could also presume a certain level of expertise.  A lobbyist for a 
large Republican-leaning group described the situation shortly after the GOP gained 
majority status in the House: “The Republicans had to learn how to govern and they 
were handicapped for the first several months rules-wise.  It took longer for the 
chairmen to learn their jobs and their [committee] staffs [had already] left in 
anticipation [of the changes].  In [Representative Thomas] Bliley’s last year as 
chairman [of the Commerce Committee when he retired in 2001] there was a 300% 
turnover in staff.  As a lobbyist, I was constantly having to educate the staff.”  In this 
case, many staffers anticipated the chairman’s retirement and subsequently left the 
House for other jobs.  Lobbyists such as the individual quoted above had to develop 
new relationships with these new staffers and inform them about the policy goals of 
their particular organization.  Certainly, a similar situation would exist following the 
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replacement of a committee chair after he fulfilled a maximum number of terms in that 
position. 
 In those cases where the committee staff does not change jobs in anticipation 
of the chairman’s term limit, however, these individuals can gain an increasing 
amount of power.  The lobbyist for a mid-sized Republican-leaning organization said, 
“When term limits are implemented, staff can become more powerful because they 
stay with a committee after a term-limited chair has left.  Staff has a lot of power 
where a member does not do his homework, does not know the substance, or does not 
have an interest.”  In the case of a new committee chairman who may be slightly 
unsure of the policy details or of managing a committee, the chair may defer to the 
presumed expertise of the more experienced staff, granting them more power over the 
content of legislation and in negotiations with lobbyists and interested groups. 
 The lobbyists interviewed for this project expressed varied sentiment about the 
long term policy consequences of term limits for committee chairman.    As one 
lobbyist for a large Republican-leaning group opined, “I have mixed feelings about 
chairmen term limits.  You get fresh blood but you can lose a good crafter of 
legislation, like Bill Thomas [who would have been forced to step down as Ways & 
Means chair due to a term limit had the Republicans maintained their majority status 
in the 2006 midterm elections].”  His concern over losing expertise was echoed in 
other interviews.  The lobbyist for a large nonpartisan group said that “six years in 
Congress wasn’t enough to develop the expertise [required] to be a good chairman.”  
Another lobbyist for a smaller group, however, argued that an appointment process 
with term limits would be based on merit not simply seniority; better public policy 
may result.  Despite the varied concerns about the term limits, however, the vast 
majority of lobbyists lamented the loss of policy experts with a clear understanding of 
their groups’ concerns. 
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In addition to the education process that groups engage in with a new 
committee or subcommittee chairman, groups must also pay special attention to 
committee and party politics prior to that new chairman’s appointment to that position.  
As noted in Chapter Six, interest groups go to great lengths to cultivate relationships 
with the committee chairman and the members of those committees that regularly deal 
with health policy.  When committee chairmen in particular are required to step down 
from their position due to a term limit, groups must anticipate which legislator will 
assume the available position; groups often attempt to develop strong relationships 
with the candidates for replacement.   
The majority of the interviews conducted for this project took place in the early 
fall of 2006, prior to that year’s midterm elections.  At this point, the lobbyists 
interviewed were unsure which party would be the majority party at the start of the 
new Congress in January 2007.  Had the Republicans maintained control, powerful 
Ways & Means Chairman Bill Thomas would have stepped down from that position 
after serving the maximum number of terms.  The anticipation of this potential change 
in power was brought up by many of the lobbyists. 
As the lobbyist for a mid-sized Republican-leaning group said, “Groups start to 
jockey to see who will be the next guy in charge of the committee.  [The group’s] 
legislative strategy changed somewhat, [such as which legislators the] devoted their 
resources too.”  One lobbyist working for a large Republican-leaning group pointed 
out that the implementation of term limits had important consequences for interest 
groups activity and, in some aspects, changed the ways they conducted their direct 
lobbying strategies.  He said, “Term limits can make a difference because groups need 
to pay attention to who the next chair will be, even if the GOP stays in the majority.  
[Groups] used to assume that a chair would be there forever, but now they try to 
cultivate new relationships with potential chairs.”  This lobbyist continued, “Groups 
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need to be constantly looking at who is next and follow who makes these decisions 
and so on.  Many more people think about this more today than they did in the past.” 
 Among the specific changes introduced by the Republicans, the imposition of 
term limits for committee and subcommittee chairmen had the most uniform and 
strong effects on the interest group community.  The interest group literature strongly 
emphasizes the role of lobbyist as policy educator and source of information to 
members of Congress; interest groups see this role as one of their most basic.  An 
increased turnover in committee chairman means a greater need for groups to educate 
and reeducate incoming chairman.  Additionally, the turnover in committee leadership 
has important implications for an interest group’s constant need to cultivate its 
relationships with key players in the realm of health policy so as to maintain access to 
these important legislators. 
 
Task Forces 
 A third change in the inner workings of the House was the Republican 
leadership’s increased reliance on the use of ad hoc task forces to develop legislation 
at the expense of the traditional committee system.  This development was closely tied 
to the overall move to weaken the autonomy of committee leaders and to bolster the 
strength of leadership control over legislation.  Oleszek (1999) argues that the use of 
task forces was an important aspect of this broader trend. 
 Of the three issues on which this project focuses, one was handled outside of 
the traditional committee system: the debate over the Patients’ Bill of Rights 
legislation.  One bill in particular followed this path.  H.R. 4250, the Patient Protection 
Act of 1998, was the product of a House leadership task force led by Dennis Hastert 
(R-IL).  The bill was developed by the Republican task force and then referred to five 
separate House committees upon its introduction.  Despite these referrals, however, 
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the bill did not spend much time in committee.  On July 23, 1998, the House Rules 
Committee granted a modified closed rule allowing the bill to be considered on the 
floor; on the following day, the bill passed in the House and was placed on the Senate 
calendar. 
 A number of the lobbyists mentioned the roles of the task forces during our 
discussion of their group’s work on this issue.  The relative value of the committee 
chairmen or committee members to lobbyists declined under these circumstances.  The 
representative of a mid-sized Republican-leaning group said the following, “For [the 
Patients’ Bill of Rights] debate, there was an extra-committee process using task 
forces.  They were much more of an important body than any of the committees.  [The 
task force’s] ideas trickled into the committee discussion…The chairmen of the 
committees were important, but not as important as majority party leadership because 
they appointed the task forces.” 
 Many other lobbyists highlighted the increased importance of the leadership 
when legislative debate is taken out of the committee system.  The lobbyist for a large 
GOP-leaning group remarked, “The group had to adjust [its strategy] a little in light of 
[the task force].  It was a top-down, leadership-run process.  We placed a premium on 
[the group’s] close ties with the leadership, especially since no significant hearings 
were held in committee.”  The former head of a small nonpartisan group highlighted 
the importance of keeping track of the political process surrounding these issues by 
talking with party leaders – in addition to a lobbyist’s typical work on the substance of 
legislation.  She said, “As lobbyists in these situations, you have to have conversations 
with the caucuses and the whips and talk to them to see where things are.”  In those 
situations where the committee system is bypassed, groups are forced to focus more 
closely on the movement of a bill through the political process, anticipating where it 
will go and what key players will do with the legislation.  While lobbyists always have 
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these concerns in mind as they deal with the substance of legislation, a process that 
goes against standard operating procedure forces them to devote more of their efforts 
to such work. 
 Given the partisan nature of the Hastert-led task force, the Democrats also set 
up their own extra-committee counterparts.  As the lobbyist for a large Democratic-
leaning group said, “The Democratic task force on the Patients’ Bill of Rights 
developed in part because of multi-jurisdictional issues and to fight the Republican 
efforts to work outside of the committee.  Also, it gave Democratic members without a 
committee seat a chance to get involved in a popular issue.”  This lobbyist mentioned 
Marion Berry (D-AK) as an important player on the issue in the eyes of her 
organization due to his position as the chair of the Democratic task force.   
Again, the importance of a group’s partisanship is evident.  Those with fairly 
easy access to the Republican leadership changed their strategy to work and share 
political information with majority leaders.  Democratic-leaning groups without access 
to the task force worked more regularly with the task force spearheaded by the 
minority party.  All in all, however, the use of task forces shifted group attention – 
regardless of partisanship – from the committee system and forced them to devote a 
portion of their resources, such as time and lobbyist manpower, to additional centers 
of power beyond those with which they had cultivated relationships over time. 
  
Interest Group Attention to House Rules and Procedure 
 An important component of a discussion of interest group responses to 
institutional changes must include an assessment of how closely groups follow such 
changes.  The evidence collected across the lobbyist interviews strongly supports the 
argument that a group’s attention to House rules and procedure is closely linked to its 
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resources and therefore its ability to pay attention to these sorts of changes while 
simultaneously pursing policy goals. 
 Each lobbyist was asked an open-ended question designed to measure the 
degree to which his organization paid attention to House rules and procedure, 
especially the work of the House Rules Committee.  Responses were coded into one of 
three categories representing a scale of zero to two.  A score of zero suggests that the 
lobbyist indicated that the group did not engage in this sort of activity or did so very 
little.  A score of one indicates that the group engaged in this activity somewhat; that 
is, the organization followed House procedure at certain points in the legislative 
process, such as the beginning of a new session of Congress.  Lastly, a score at the top 
of the scale indicates that the organization followed House rules and procedures 
substantially.  Groups in this category, for example, often had lobbyists on staff whose 
sole responsibility was working with the Rules Committee or following the details of 
the legislative process. 
 A simple correlation test between this variable and the size of an 
organization’s staff indicate that larger groups tend to pay much more attention to 
these concerns.  The correlation coefficient is 0.42 and the p-value is reported as 0.00 
which is strongly statistically significant.  These results indicate that an increase in 
attention to House rules and procedure is closely associated with an increase in the 
size of an interest group’s staff, which serves as a proxy for that group’s overall 
available resources. 
Table 7.1 provides the percentage of respondents that fall into each of the three 
degrees of attention across four categories of group resources.  Those organizations in 
the Low Resources category represent those groups with a staff size of less than 50 
individuals.  The next category, Low to Mid Resources, have staffs of 50 to 100 
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people.  The Mid to High Resource organizations employ between 100 and 500, and 
the High Resource level groups has more than 500 individuals working for them.47   
The only groups reporting that they paid little or no attention to House 
procedure fell into the lowest resource category.  A majority of groups in the lowest 
two categories paid attention to House procedure somewhat, while a majority of 
groups in the top two categories devoted substantial time and resources to do so.  
Likewise, the percentage of groups paying close attention to House rules and 
procedure increases for each of the four categories.  Certainly, having greater 
resources affords certain groups the ability to devote time, money, and manpower to 
following the nuts and bolts of House procedure in addition to the group’s focus on 
policy and legislation as is relates to its stated goals.  
 
Table 7.1, Percentage of Groups Paying Attention to House Rules and Procedure,  
by Resource Level 
 
 Attention to House Rules and Procedure 
Resource Level None or Little Somewhat Substantial 
Low 21.4% 71.4% 7.1% 
Low to Mid 0.0 57.1 42.9 
Mid to High 0.0 40.0 60.0 
High 0.0 33.3 66.7 
 
 Many lobbyists pointed out that they or other employees of their organization 
were former Hill staffers and therefore knew the importance of the House procedure.  
The lobbyist for a small nonpartisan group said, “The President of our Association 
used to work for [a former chair of the Rules Committee], so [our organization] 
                                                 
47 The data on staff sizes were collected from a number of sources, including the Encyclopedia of 
Association, the Associations Yellow Book, and organization websites. 
 
 
176
appreciates the amount of power in procedure, rules, and the Rules Committee.”  It 
became apparent that lobbyists with former connections on the Hill especially valued 
the influence of House procedure and the work of the Rules Committee.  As a result, 
they readily paid attention to these issues on legislation of concern to the group. 
 While many organizations readily followed the work of the Rules Committee 
and paid attention to the rule changes within the party caucuses, most respondents 
indicated that their organization did not try to actively influence these sorts of 
decisions.  For example, a number of lobbyists pointed out that the Rules Committee 
is often very difficult to track and influence simply because it meets at a moment’s 
notice or convenes its meetings at odd hours.  Also, many lobbyists noted that they try 
never to involve themselves or their organizations in party caucus decisions.  The 
lobbyist for a large nonpartisan group notes, “We follow procedure closely, but we 
don’t protest the rules and changes in them because [these rules] can really only be 
modified by the party in charge.”  She continued by noting that the group does, 
however, sometimes try to get members of Congress to protest such changes or to 
influence the rule-making process: “[Recently], we tried to persuade members [of 
Congress] to speak up to leadership about cases where [some] members tried to work 
around the rules to pass legislation.  [This type of behavior] is pretty much a behind-
the-scenes thing [on the part of the organization].”  
The head of a small Republican-leaning group stressed the importance of 
paying attention to rules and procedural developments as a bill progresses through the 
House, despite an ability to strongly influence these decisions.  He said, “[Groups] 
have very little ability to play an active role in [rules and procedural] decisions.  It is 
an insider game by members themselves.  It is more a matter of paying attention than 
being directly involved.  And, really, you only pay attention when [major procedural] 
decisions are announced.” 
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A few lobbyists indicated that the changes implemented by the Republicans 
following the 1994 elections affected the degree to which their organization paid 
attention to House rules – and also the degree to which they could influence the Rules 
Committee to provide a favorable environment for legislative debate.  The lobbyist for 
a large Democratic-leaning organization said that his organization expanded the work 
of an internal committee designed to discuss issues, monitor members, and decide 
grassroots strategy “to include looking at the effects of the…Republican reforms, 
asking questions like, How would it affect the movement of legislation?  Would [the 
group] be able to get around [the new changes]?  Was there any way to challenge the 
changes?  Did they violate Robert’s Rules of Order?” 
The head of a smaller Republican-leaning group also highlighted the impact of 
the 1995 reforms on his organization’s focus on the Rules Committee in particular.  
He noted,  
 
[Pre-1995], we monitored the Rules Committee more closely than we do today 
because [the outcomes] used to be more up in the air.  With a looser, less top-
down leadership role, the Rules Committee was more likely to allow 
unfriendly amendments to a bill that might have a chance to pass.  [The 
Committee] had to allow some amendments because there was less discipline 
and unanimity within the caucuses and with the Speakers and strong 
committees.  Since the Republican takeover, [monitoring the Rules 
Committee] has been less crucial because [the Republicans] have a lot more 
[party] discipline and it is unusual that a rule doesn’t get approved.” 
A lobbyist for a large nonpartisan group emphasized that this sort of attention to 
procedure and rules was less productive in the House than the Senate, given the 
greater predictability of the House.  She said,  
 
[First], you focus on policy and it takes a long time to get a bill ready to go 
someplace.  At that point, it’s important to understand how it will proceed.  
There is more complexity on the Senate side so there is lots of strategy and 
planning and thought placed here [by the group].  In the House, the Republican 
leadership ultimately makes the decisions – that drives the shape of things. 
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Once again, we hear evidence that the Republican Party’s strong control over the 
committee system and its rank-and-file membership made the possible outcomes more 
predictable.  Consequently, lobbyists like those quoted above felt that devoting 
resources to lobbying or following the work of the Rules Committee could be better 
spent in places where their chances for influence were greater. 
 In general, while some groups did pay more attention to the House rules and 
procedure following the reforms in the 104th Congress, most groups continued 
monitoring this sort of work at their pre-reform levels.  Instead, the factor that greatest 
predicts how closely an interest group will follow House procedure is the resources 
such a group has available to devote to these sorts of legislative pursuits. 
 
Discussion of Results 
The above analysis has provided a discussion of how interest groups responded 
to the reforms, beyond the relative value of party leaders and the committee system 
that was discussed in the previous chapter.  The discussion presented here highlights 
how specific rule changes – such as the implementation of a term limit for committee 
chairman – can have important consequences for interest group behavior.  Groups 
were forced to devote more resources to develop relationships with potential incoming 
chairs and, once appointed, to educating these chairs about the unique demands and 
policy details of concern to each organization. 
Additionally, a larger change in House norms and procedure – like the 
increased reliance of ad hoc task forces as an alternative to the committee system – 
can also shape the ways in which interest groups approach their direct lobbying work.  
In this case, groups were forced to focus more attention on the majority party 
leadership as well as increase their ability to anticipate the movement of legislation 
through the process. 
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The changes described above did have important implications for the ways in 
which interest groups conducted their lobbying behavior.  Strong party control was 
one large consequence of the specific institutional changes introduced by the new 
Republican majority.  One result of this strong party control was to make ideologically 
moderate members of the House more useful targets for lobbyists.  Since the House 
was divided by slims margins of control – and since the GOP in particular exercised 
such strong party discipline – these moderate members became increasingly valuable 
lobbying targets.  Thus, the institutional environment altered the nature of group 
activity by changing those legislators targeted by lobbyists.  This example is one of 
many presented here that demonstrate the effect of the institutional environment on 
group behavior. 
Additionally, the discussion of committee chairmen term limits further 
emphasizes the importance of group access to key members of Congress and, 
especially, their ability to develop long-term relationships with these legislators.  
Throughout the dissertation, I have demonstrated the premium interest groups place on 
such relationships.  In particular, these relationships provide groups with a reliable 
means of transmitting the preferences of their membership and, to some extent, the 
preferences of the public.  The conveyance of these preferences is a hallmark feature 
of democracy and representative government.  Institutional change that either 
jeopardizes or improves these long-term relationships therefore jeopardizes or 
improves the ability of interest groups to serve this broader function.  This issue will 
be taken up in greater detail in the next chapter, as I discuss the broader implications 
of my findings. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding chapters have highlighted the health policy community’s 
reaction to the reforms of the 104th Congress.  Many of these groups’ adjustments 
depended on their partisan alignment.  In other cases, a group’s resources or the nature 
of an issue served to mitigate the impact of the reforms.  This chapter reviews these 
changes in group behavior with an eye toward their greater consequences for the 
political system and our understanding of interest groups more generally. 
Groups respond to specific rule changes; these include the imposition of term 
limits for committee positions or new staffing arrangements.  Groups also react to the 
broader shift in the balance of power between the committee system and party 
leadership.  The changes exhibited by the health policy community reiterate the 
importance of access for lobbyists.  Institutional change that alters group access to the 
House of Representatives has important consequences for group strategy-planning.  
This concluding chapter reviews the impact these findings have on the political 
science literature on interest groups and congressional organization. 
 
Interest Group Responses to Institutional Change 
Part I focused on the changes across the various Modes of Influence available 
to groups.  Due to the new Republican leadership’s tight partisan control over the 
House, groups at odds with GOP goals found their effectiveness in the direct lobbying 
Mode rather limited.  As a result, they turned their attention to indirect influences, 
such as grassroots work.  Additionally, groups of varied partisanship increasingly 
devoted their efforts to working in the more moderate and decentralized Senate. 
Campaign contribution behavior was slightly affected in the post-reform era, 
but not drastically.  Republican-leaning and nonpartisan groups increased their 
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contributions to Republican leaders, but no similar adjustments were made by 
Democratic-leaning groups.  These organizations made no donations to GOP 
leadership before or after the changes.  Contributions to key committee players from 
all groups declined slightly.  Additionally, many groups bolstered their staffs with 
lobbyists who had easy access to Republican leadership and the Republican Party. 
The subject of Part II was direct lobbying in the House.  Here, I again 
demonstrated the effects of partisanship.  Republican-leaning groups increasingly 
valued their work with Republican Party leadership.  Groups of all partisan 
persuasions, however, continued to value their work with the committee system 
despite its decreased influence over the legislative process.  Additionally, the slim 
margins of party control – and the need for political credibility in a highly partisan 
environment – made moderate members of the House valuable allies for interest 
groups.  The imposition of term limits for committee chairmen and the increased use 
of task forces also stood out among the changes as having especially important 
consequences for interest group activity. 
 Taken together, the above findings suggest that these changes in House 
institutions mattered to the interest group community for two reasons.  First, the 
reforms were dominated by partisan concerns.  The Republican Party leadership 
implemented the reforms, strengthened majority party control, and weakened the 
committee system in an effort to ensure the success of their legislative agenda.  Across 
the board, group partisanship played an especially powerful role in determining the 
response of an organization to this new legislative environment.   
Democratic-leaning groups, for the most part, were unlikely to value their 
work with Republican leaders prior to the reforms; these sentiments were unchanged 
after the reforms despite strong GOP control over the chamber.  Instead of donating 
more money or cultivating relationships with key Republican leaders, these groups 
 
 
182
largely responded to the new House environment by working outside of it.  They were 
unable to pursue their former strategies because the GOP leadership was less open to 
working with them.  Republican-leaning groups, on the other hand, increasingly 
valued their work with the party’s leadership.   
Certainly, some of this change can be attributed to the mere fact that the GOP 
had become the majority party.  Yet, to a large degree, the House Republican leaders 
became important to these groups due to the changes they introduced to the chamber 
and the legislative process.  The data analysis suggesting this trend is confirmed by the 
anecdotal evidence from the interviews with individual lobbyists.  As noted 
throughout the text, the data comparisons demonstrate that group behavior was 
different before and after the reforms.  They do not, however, offer any causal 
explanation for these changes.  Groups’ adjustments could feasibly be a reaction to a 
switch in party control or to the new institutional environment.  The anecdotal 
evidence from the interviews helps to understand what, in fact, caused groups to adjust 
their strategies; it is clear that institutional change did matter.  The evidence I have 
presented here demonstrates that House institutions did play a role in explaining group 
activity after the reform.   A majority of lobbyists interviewed indicated that the 
manner in the Republican Party ran the House affected their strategy, not simply the 
fact that the GOP was in control.   
My findings suggest that partisanship tends to matter most to interest groups in 
their relationships with party leadership.  This is a natural consequence of the role of 
party leaders, which is to promote the party agenda and stick to the party message.  
The centralization of power following the reforms likely amplified this tendency.  
Because the Republican Party exercised such strong control over its agenda and over 
rank-and-file members, partisan divisions dominated groups’ relationships with the 
leadership of the majority and minority parties.  Republican-leaning groups worked 
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with the strong GOP majority, while groups having a natural alliance with the 
Democrats sought out minority leadership.  The divergent platforms between the two 
parties – and the strong control exercised by the GOP – limited bipartisan or cross-
party efforts. 
Work at the committee level, I found, is instead driven by pragmatic concerns 
like maintaining access and developing relationships.  Despite the fact that, following 
the reforms of the 104th Congress, the balance of power in the House had shifted away 
from the committee system, groups of all partisan persuasions continued to work with 
the leaders of key Health committees.  Most likely, Democratic-leaning groups found 
natural allies in the ranking member while Republican-leaning groups worked 
regularly with chairmen.  Yet many of the respondents interviewed for this project 
spoke of working across the aisle at the committee level.  Many issues are not easily 
divided along party lines.  As a result, groups continually work with the 
knowledgeable and powerful members of a key committee despite party 
disagreements.  This sort of pragmatism tends to dominate interest group concerns at 
the committee level more than partisanship. 
The second reason the reforms mattered to interest groups is because they 
affected the long-term relationships that lobbyists develop with members of Congress.  
Groups of all partisan persuasions and resource levels place a high premium on their 
relationships with individual legislators and, especially, their staffs.  When power 
dynamics change in the House, the shift has consequences for these long-term 
connections.  Groups with a solid working relationship with a committee chairman or 
ranking member may find themselves with less influence over legislation if that 
legislator’s authority is usurped by party leadership.  A change in rules and norms also 
has important consequences.  When the chairman of a committee is forced to step 
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down due to a term limit, groups must plan accordingly to educate and develop new 
ties with his replacement and any new staffers.   
A common theme throughout the interviews was the regularity with which 
lobbyists work with committee staffers, the personal staffs of committee members, and 
committee members themselves.  When asked how often her organization met with 
committee and personal member staffs, one lobbyist said, “We see [these] people so 
often.  We talk constantly about all of the issues that we are working on.  Health issues 
[in the House] go through two or three major committees and you’re always talking 
about all the issues with these people at once.”  If the internal rules and organization of 
these committees – or their relative importance in the chamber – changes, groups must 
naturally make adjustments, simply because their work at the committee level 
dominates their daily activities in the office and on the Hill.  
Thus, my research suggests that the reforms of the 104th Congress had 
important consequences for interest group activity because, first, they were driven by 
partisan concerns and, second, they affected the long-term relationships interest 
groups develop with members of Congress.  Both of these changes are connected to 
the hallmark strategy of any successful interest group: access to key players within the 
House of Representatives.  It became clear in the course of the interviews that shared 
partisan interests are a powerful way for groups to gain access to members of 
Congress.  Partisan disagreements are also a strong reason groups are not granted 
meetings with legislators or congressional staff – and a possible explanation for why 
meetings are not pursued by the group.  The interviews also highlighted the 
importance of maintaining long-term relationships with members of Congress and 
their staffers.  Such relationships are another straightforward way for a lobbyist to get 
his foot in a legislator’s door.  Groups lacking these personal connections – especially 
smaller groups with little clout – can be left out of the process. 
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As demonstrated throughout the previous chapters, institutional context and the 
internal balance of power in the House has implications for partisan control of the 
chamber and for group-legislator relationships.  Therefore, a group’s access also 
depends on the institutional context.  Ainsworth points out, “Legislators cannot be 
forced to visit with a lobbyist.  The legislator must grant access to the lobbyist” 
(Ainsworth 2002:131).  Following the reforms in the 104th Congress, the balance of 
power strongly favored the strong majority party leadership.  The leadership’s 
centralized control over the chamber allowed it to control the access of interest groups 
to key policymakers, many of whom were GOP leaders.  In reshaping “who’s who” 
among these key policymakers, the reforms also altered the usefulness of various long-
term group-legislator relationships. 
In The Governmental Process, Truman describes access as “the facilitating 
intermediate objective of political interest groups” (Truman 1951:264).  His point is as 
follows: all groups, regardless of policy preference, must include gaining and 
maintaining access among its primary goals.  It is the means by which they can obtain 
other, policy-oriented ends.  Truman writes that a group’s access to key decision-
makers depends on a number of variables: the group’s position in the social structure, 
the “initiative of the petitioner”, the degree to which the group is organized, and the 
skills of the group’s leaders.  This dissertation suggests that the institutional context of 
the legislature itself has a powerful influence on a group’s access and therefore its 
strategic decisions. 
The need for access drives the pragmatic behavior of interest groups that 
allows them to adjust to a changing political and institutional environment.  In short, 
groups change strategies in order to increase their access.  As we saw in Chapter Four, 
they engage in more grassroots work if needed to gain indirect access to lawmakers.  
Chapter Five highlighted groups’ willingness to making staffing and hiring decisions 
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that increased their chances of access to the new power players in the House.  The 
discussion in Chapter Six stressed the value groups place on maintaining relationships 
and access to key committee players.  When the legislators in key positions change, 
groups must educate them on relevant issues and also develop strong working 
relationships with these new decision-makers.  Finally, in Chapter Seven, we saw, for 
example, groups’ willingness to work outside of the committee system with legislative 
task forces if necessary.   
All of this behavior is, to a large degree, driven by groups’ need for access and 
their desire to get things done in any way possible.  Because access is necessary to 
accomplish policy goals, groups must pursue those Modes of Influence that will bear 
the most fruit.  The institutional context in which they operate can have important 
implications for where and how they develop this ever-important access.   
 
 Implications for the Scholarly Literature 
Interest Groups Scholarship 
Chapter One reviewed the scholarly assessment of the interest group literature; 
specifically, critics have lamented the inattention to the political and institutional 
context in which interest groups lobby Congress.  The literature also fails to offer 
convincing explanations in two areas: first, which legislators do interest groups target?  
And second, how effective are they?  The conclusions presented here – especially the 
importance of access – can help to illuminate these unresolved issues.  While my 
findings do not provide clear-cut answers to these questions, they demonstrate a 
broader point: looking for clear-cut answers or strict recipes for group decision-
making is not especially useful.  Doing so underestimates the degree to which interest 
groups consider the context in which they exert their influence as well as the 
pragmatic approach they have to lobbying.  Instead, understanding the institutional 
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context in which groups operate allows us to better understand why they make the 
varied decisions we have seen in case studies and other scholarly accounts. 
 Research into the targets of group lobbying has been divided over whether 
organizations seek out their political allies for support or if groups seek to persuade, or 
at least demobilize, their opponents.  What the literature fails to fully explore is that an 
organization can be allies with a legislator on one issue and opponents with him on the 
next.  Many legislators are not easily categorized as friend or foe of an interest group.  
The evidence presented here suggests that interest groups target those legislators to 
whom they have access, regardless of party.  Larger groups may have more access to 
all members of Congress simply because of their financial and membership clout, 
while smaller groups often rely on legislators with whom their organization has close, 
natural ties, like former members or former professionals in a trade association.   
Likewise, Republican-leaning groups have access to Republican leaders, while 
Democratic-leaning groups have a harder time making headway with these legislators; 
they find allies in the Democratic leadership.  As noted above, partisanship seems to 
matter most in group interactions with House leadership – perhaps here the emphasis 
is on working with political friends.  At the committee level, however, groups work 
with both friends and foes.  Research that asks whether groups target friends or foes 
misses the broader point that group strategies vary across Congress and throughout the 
legislative process.  The “friend versus foe” dichotomy matters far less than finding 
those offices where an interest group can get in the door for a meeting. 
Additionally, the interest group literature has been unable to identify when 
groups are most effective – when they can sway public opinion, when they can insert 
language into bills, and so on.  In some case studies, groups made a big difference and, 
in others, group input mattered not.  The finding that group strategy is often driven by 
access has important consequences for which strategies they choose – and the 
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effectiveness of these strategies.  As noted in Chapter Four, groups with limited access 
to the legislature attempted to exert their influence elsewhere – in the Senate or 
through grassroots mobilization, for example.  Thus, access plays an important role for 
overall strategy choice; groups pick the strategy where they can maximize their 
effectiveness – a fact which is often determined by the institutional balance of power 
in the legislature itself.  Studies that evaluate the effectiveness of groups should pay 
explicit attention to the ways in which the institutional environment impacts group 
access to key policymakers and its subsequent consequences for group strategy choice 
and success.   
 As noted in Chapter One, the only previous comprehensive empirical research 
on this topic was conducted by Heitshusen (1995).  She concluded that House 
decentralization in the 1970s meant more work for interest groups; the reforms 
expanded the conflict over bills to other committees and therefore required lobbyists 
to work with more legislators.  The circumstances surrounding the reforms of the 104th 
Congress had a different effect.  Instead of expanding the scope of conflict, the 
reforms concentrated power into the hands of a few key party leaders who had tight 
control over the legislative agenda.  As a result, certain groups with now-limited 
access to the House were forced to expand their operations – not to additional 
committees, but to different Modes of Influence altogether.  This example is just one 
way in which the reforms influenced interest group strategy choice and behavior; the 
previous chapters outlined various other instances in which groups modified their 
behavior in light of changing institutions.  
Heitshusen’s conclusion that groups alter their behavior according to the 
institutional environment of the legislature is confirmed by the analysis here – the 
consequences, however, vary according to each unique context.  The specific 
adjustments made by lobbyists depend on the nature of the changes, but the impact of 
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these reforms is felt by political actors outside of Congress.  Our shared conclusion 
regarding the overall importance of institutional context suggests that most reforms – 
regardless of their specific nature – impact the interest group community.  As such, 
congressional institutions are worthy of greater attention from interest group scholars. 
 
Rational Choice Scholarship on Congress 
 In Chapter Two, I pointed out that the rational choice models of congressional 
organization do not address their implications for external political actors.  An albeit 
simplified version of the major debate within this field concerns the extent to which 
political parties are the dominant organizing features of the House of Representatives.  
Krehbiel in particular argues that parties play a less prominent role in congressional 
organization than conventional wisdom would suggest (Krehbiel 1991, 1993).  He 
suggests that recent analysis suggesting a rise in partisanship in Congress is, actually, 
a simple change in the preferences of members and not the broader forces of party 
organization in action (Krehbiel 1993:262)  Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) argue 
instead that parties – especially majority parties – dominate the legislative process, 
especially by setting the legislative agenda. 
 What do the results presented here offer in light of this debate?  The 
aforementioned texts focus on the nature of congressional organization from within 
the chamber itself.  The analysis here can only comment on how external actors view 
the legislature.  Do interest groups view the House in partisan terms, or do they look at 
the individual preferences of members or the committee system as the dominant 
means of congressional organization?  The results are mixed.   
As noted above, interest groups view partisanship and the parties as 
particularly important in their work with majority and minority party leadership.  
Leadership tends to get most involved in those issues with a high political profile; it 
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steers clear of smaller issues leaden with technical policy details of little consequence 
to the public at large.  On those issues in which leaders do get involved, partisan 
interest groups tend to align themselves with their respective leaderships; they tend not 
to work with their political opponents.  In these cases, then, groups tend to view 
Congress in partisan terms. 
Yet the data suggests also an overwhelming preference among groups to 
remain committed to the committee system, even after it lost a good deal of its 
autonomy.  Lobbyists representing groups of all ideologies spoke extensively of their 
work across party lines and with all members of the relevant congressional 
committees.  Chapter Six outlined their reasons for doing so: the pragmatic concern to 
work where legislation is actually written, the powerful personalities of certain 
committee members, and the established relationships lobbyists have with these 
individuals.     
The committee system then, it seems, is the dominant organizing body in 
Congress in the eyes of the interest group community.  On a majority of issues, groups 
concentrate on committee-based legislators instead of party leadership.  The issue-
based nature of committee jurisdiction and the specialization and policy expertise 
derived from this division of labor offer one possible explanation.  As a result of this 
system, groups are able to develop the long-term relationships with legislators and 
their staffs described in detail above.  These relationships supply ready access to 
members of Congress with jurisdiction over issues relevant to groups.  As such, they 
provide an efficient means for policy education and legislative input. 
  The rational choice debate described above deals with congressional 
organization in a theoretical and empirical sense.  These scholars develop formal 
models explaining the reality we see in Congress and test those theories using data that 
represent legislative action and decision-making.  The research presented here does 
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not weigh in on the debate with evidence of this sort.  My concern has not been with 
testing legislative behavior; instead, I have examined perceptions of the legislature 
among external political actors.  Given this difference, I offer no definitive support of 
the party-driven or committee-focused models.  Understanding perceptions is, 
however, an important aspect of understanding the political system more broadly.   
The perceptions described here have important consequences for how interest groups 
will make strategic decisions, their pursuit of policy goals, and the degree to which 
they achieve success.  Given these consequences, it is worth pointing out that interest 
group perceptions of Congress are dominated by the committee system, with the 
exception of those large-scale political issues with high leadership involvement. 
 Throughout the dissertation, I have emphasized two distinct trends that 
occurred as a result of the House reforms in the 104th Congress: a strengthening of 
majority party control and a weakening of the committee system.  These trends 
highlight a prominent point in any discussion of congressional development and 
changing House institutions: the tension between the committee system and party 
control of the legislature and its agenda.  Various instances of congressional reform – 
especially those of the mid 1990s – have heightened the tension between the 
committee system and parties in Congress.   
The rational choice literature on congressional institutions varies in the extent 
to which it recognizes this tension.  Cox and McCubbins in particular argue that 
committees are creatures of the parties and that, therefore, there is no significant 
conflict between the two organizing systems.  Alternative theories suggest that tension 
does exist between the party and committee systems.  What, then, characterizes the 
relationship between the committee system and parties in Congress: conflict or 
cooperation?  The reforms of the 104th Congress offer a useful case study for assessing 
this question. 
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 Beginning with the American Political Science Association’s call for 
“responsible party government” in the 1950s, there has been substantial debate among 
political scientists regarding both the value and existence of strong parties capable of 
implementing their legislative agenda.  The responsible party government model calls 
for a party system in which voters are offered clear, distinct choices among party 
platforms.  Textbooks describe responsible party government as “a set of principles 
that idealizes a strong role for parties in defining their stance on issues, mobilizing 
voters, and fulfilling their campaign promises once in office” (Ginsberg et al 2003).  
In such a system, those elected to office have a clear agenda approved by the public.  
If voters are unhappy with the results, legislators are then more easily held 
accountable in future elections.  Gingrich’s philosophy of governing owes much to the 
responsible party government model.  The Contract with America presented voters 
with a clear outline of what the Republican Party planned to enact if elected.  Once in 
the majority, the GOP quickly sought to meet its goals. 
The unique institutional changes introduced by Gingrich and the Republican 
Party leadership suggest that they viewed the committee system as a hindrance to their 
pursuit of responsible party government.  The changes brought with them a series of 
battles between the committees and majority party leadership which, in the end, 
resulted in a weakened committee system.  This specific period of congressional 
history suggests that conflict is the dominant mode of committee-party relationships.   
How do interest groups figure into this dynamic?  My interviews with 
lobbyists suggest that they believe a tension between parties and committees does 
exist.  Interest groups are highly attuned to the conflicts this tension creates.  As one 
lobbyist described, “[Following the reforms], members were in a hard spot having to 
decide between [being loyal to their party] and what works for their 
jurisdiction…Party [loyalty] was important in terms of a member’s standing, their 
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ability to move up [within the committee hierarchy], and their funds for reelection.”  
Increased party discipline – a direct consequence of Gingrich’s push for responsible 
party government – put individual legislators into difficult positions with tough 
choices to make.  Interest groups seeking to persuade these members were 
increasingly aware of these members’ divided loyalties and, therefore, had to account 
for this tension in their lobbying strategies. 
The existence of responsible party government creates a unique situation for 
interest groups.  If the majority party has a clear plan, effectively implements that 
plan, and is reluctant to deviate from the plan, what role do interest groups play in the 
political system?  There is less room for negotiation, deal-making, and, in short, 
lobbying to change legislation.  How, then, do interest groups feel about responsible 
party government?  What were their qualitative evaluations of the Gingrich reforms?   
It became clear in my interviews that interest groups benefit from strong party 
control only when they share the policy preferences of the majority.  Some of the 
GOP-leaning groups with whom I spoke expressed satisfaction with and appreciation 
for the strong coordination on the part of the Republican leadership to pass legislation 
they favored.  Agreement with a well-organized leadership led to a clear strategy to 
pursue.  One business lobbyist described his work on the Patients’ Bill of Rights and 
the close coordination his organization had with the Republican Party leadership on 
the issue.  He said, “[After the House reforms], the Republican leadership exerted a lot 
of control and discipline [over the House].  Had the leadership not been able to 
manage the rules as tightly, the outcome might have been different.  Without the 
reforms, the legislation that passed would have been unacceptable from our 
standpoint.”  Because of its similar preferences to the majority leadership, the group 
was able to get what it wanted and work in coordination with GOP leadership to 
achieve this goal. 
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Despite the few examples where GOP-leaning groups preferred the strong 
party control, however, many lobbyists expressed frustration with the competing 
demands that legislators felt between party loyalty and constituent service or personal 
policy preference.  The especially tight majority party control over post-reform 
Republicans was a widely-mentioned challenge for groups seeking to pass legislation 
at odds with the goals of the majority party, as evident from the earlier quote regarding 
party loyalty.  Very few interest groups will be in agreement with the majority party 
leadership on all issues.  As such, I conclude that only those groups with very strong 
connections to the controlling party value responsible party government.  Typically, 
groups appreciate the ability to negotiate, make deals, and work out the details of 
policy directly with legislators and their staffs.  Groups exist to accomplish these very 
goals; responsible party government tends to limit their input. 
 
Normative Implications of Results 
In addition to the scholarly contributions of my findings to political science 
research, I must also consider the broader normative implications of my results.  That 
is, what do my findings say about the overall quality of American government?  Here, 
I am particularly concerned with the ability of interest groups to serve their function 
within the political system; that function, in particular, is to represent the demands and 
preferences of their membership before lawmakers.  Interest groups, among other 
components of the political environment, serve as transmitters of the public’s 
preferences to Congress – and also as transmitters of information about Congress to 
the public, or at least their group’s members.  Certainly, there are many aspects of the 
political system that engage in this important role: elections, polling and public 
opinion, constituents, and legislators themselves all combine to promote – or 
sometimes hinder – the democratic responsiveness of the legislative branch.  By 
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democratic responsiveness, I mean the ability of the government – in this case the 
House of Representatives – to receive, interpret, and act upon the will of the people.  
In a representative government, this is one of the most essential functions of the 
legislative branch.  Because interest groups play an important part in this process, it is 
worthwhile to consider what my findings suggest about the ability of the interest group 
community to perform this function. 
Before drawing any comprehensive conclusions, however, it is worth noting 
that my analysis covers only a small period of congressional history.  The interviews 
addressed prominent health issues two years before the changes implemented in the 
104th Congress and four years after.  These eras, especially the large-scale Clinton 
reform efforts, may be unique in congressional history.  My results therefore may not 
be generalized to other periods of congressional reform.  I can only offer an 
assessment regarding one small piece of congressional history.  Given these 
limitations, though, I believe my results still offer insight into the effect of institutional 
change in the House on the ability of interest groups to serve as democratic 
representations of the popular will.  To assess my findings, I ask two questions. 
 First and foremost, did the changes that I saw in group behavior enhance the 
ability of the interest group community to serve their democratic function?  That is, 
did the interest group community believe that it could still effectively transmit their 
unique “public’s” preferences – the preferences of their membership – to legislators?  I 
argue that the changes of the mid-1990s did not especially enhance the ability of the 
interest group community to serve its democratic function, but a majority of interest 
groups still felt they could effectively transmit their members' preferences to 
legislators.   
Throughout the dissertation, I have emphasized the importance of group access 
to key decision-makers in Congress.  In Chapter Four, I highlighted the fact that many 
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Democratic-leaning and bipartisan groups found themselves on the outside of the 
Republican Congress looking in.  In short, following the reforms, these groups lacked 
ready access to prominent decision-makers.  These groups, then, did not have as great 
an opportunity to convey their members’ preferences directly to members of Congress.  
My research, however, demonstrated that these groups pursued other modes of 
influence to achieve this goal; they increased their grassroots work, partnered with 
other organizations through coalition work, and devoted additional resources to their 
work in the Senate.  Thus, though their ability to represent the public may have been 
hindered in the House, the multiple points of entry in the American system of 
government allowed these groups to continue its work on their members’ behalf in 
other branches and through alternative means of influence.  Those Republican-leaning 
groups that had ready access to prominent leaders and decision-makers in the House 
naturally continued their work with these individuals after the House reforms.   
While some of the lobbyists interviewed expressed dismay at their inability to 
accomplish their goals in the House, none claimed their group had an inability to fully 
represent their members or protect their interests.  The lobbyists simply and 
pragmatically adjusted their strategies to increase their effectiveness elsewhere.  Thus, 
the institutional reforms did not effectively alter the ability of the interest group 
community to represent its members before Congress; they simply altered the specific 
avenues some of these groups were able to successfully pursue. 
My second question regarding the normative implications of my findings 
concerns the preferences of the interest group community itself.  How would these 
groups have designed the reforms, if they could have?  What would their ideal 
legislature look like?  A prominent theme throughout my analysis has been the 
importance of long-term relationships between lobbyists and members of Congress or 
their staffs.  I have reiterated the constant conversation between interest group 
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representatives and the staffs of both individual legislators and committees in 
Congress.  A vast majority of lobbyists spoke in detail of their regular contact with 
these congressional staffers.  An overwhelming number of the respondents indicated 
that they worked more regularly with committee members and their staffs than with 
party leadership, regardless of the changing institutional context.  In Chapter Six, I 
offered a number of reasons why interest groups continued their extensive work at the 
committee level despite its decreased autonomy; the most prominent among these 
reasons was the long-term relationships between groups and congressional staffers. 
Given these strong ties between interest groups and prominent committee 
members and their staffs, I believe that, on the whole, the interest group community 
prefers a Congress with a strong committee system rather than strong responsible 
party government.  As noted in the previous section, many lobbyists expressed 
dissatisfaction with the strong party disciple associated with the responsible party 
government model.  Strong party discipline and incentives to toe the party line limit a 
legislator’s ability to negotiate and strike deals with interest groups and their lobbyists.  
It is through this process of negotiation and education that lobbyists are able to 
influence legislation.  A strong committee system is far more conducive to this type of 
law-making.  As such, lobbyists, like the committee themselves, naturally prefer a 
House of Representatives in which the committee system has substantial autonomy 
from party leadership. 
  
Conclusion 
 The preceding chapters have argued that the changing institutional context had 
important consequences for how the interest group community lobbied the House of 
Representatives in the mid-1990s.  While group partisanship, group resources, and the 
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nature of an issue intervened to mitigate these effects, the internal workings of the 
chamber did, in fact, impact group activity.   
The analysis presented here is based on interest groups with a particular 
concern for health policy and, therefore, specific committees in Congress.  While the 
findings may be the same for interest groups with other substantive concerns, this is 
not addressed.  Future research would be well-served to consider other policy areas 
and different segments of the interest group community.  In particular, it would be 
worthwhile to investigate policy areas in which the committees are not dominated by 
strong personalities.  Chapter Six described the powerful individuals who served on 
health-related committees.  Groups continued to value their work at the committee 
level despite the reforms partially because party leadership deferred to these men on 
health issues.  An examination of group activity on committees that lacked strong, 
knowledgeable personalities may offer a different result: groups might have 
increasingly valued their work with party leadership across the board.   
Also, as noted previously, corporate lobbyists and private lobbying firms might 
respond to the House reforms differently.  A broader understanding of institutional 
change and special interests must include this sort of lobbying operation.  Campaign 
finance behavior in particular may exhibit stark differences.  Private lobbying firms 
and in-house corporate lobbyists, on average, have far greater personal and 
organizational financial resources than many of the groups included in this study.  One 
lobbyist I interviewed suggested that private firm and corporate lobbyists have more 
extensive and savvy knowledge of House rules and procedure than the men and 
women who typically work for independent groups and trade associations.  This 
variation too might alter the results. 
The 2006 midterm elections returned the Democrats to majority control in the 
House.  While the new majority leadership did not introduce sweeping institutional 
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changes like those implemented in the 104th Congress, a changeover in party control 
has inevitable consequences for the legislative process.  Shortly after the Democrats 
took over the House, for example, new Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) appointed a 
select committee on global warming to remove the issue out from the oversight of 
powerful Energy & Commerce committee chairman John Dingell (D-MI).  Dingell 
immediately organized his fellow committee chairmen in an effort to prevent this type 
of infringement against committee jurisdictions (Von Drehle 2007).  This example 
illustrates the turf wars that exist any time a new party has control of the chamber.  
Naturally, we would expect groups with a stake in these issues to adjust their behavior 
accordingly.  Only time will tell how the interest group community will react to the 
specific jurisdictional fights and other institutional arrangements brought on by the 
new Democratic majority. 
The main contribution of this research is the explicit attention it pays to 
institutional context.  The findings indicate that interest groups are, as expected, highly 
attuned to where power lies within the House of Representatives; they target their 
work in the most effective ways in light of how this power – both partisan and 
institutional – is distributed across members of Congress.  The results also serve as a 
reminder of the degree to which to the interest group community values access to 
legislators and the legislative process.  Since access is a precursor to group success, 
organizations have a pragmatic approach to strategy, seeking to gain entry through the 
many available Modes of Influence.  Groups therefore also have a pragmatic approach 
to adjust these strategies as the institutional context undergoes change.   
Because interest groups are such influential and important players in the 
political system, it is certainly a worthy research agenda to understand how various 
institutional arrangements can impact their work on and off Capitol Hill.  At the very 
least, the analysis presented here suggests that there are no easy answers to the 
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questions about who groups target and when they will be influential; strategic 
decisions and outcomes largely depend on the circumstances surrounding an issue.  
Scholars who hope to create a single blueprint for group behavior – a blue print that 
outlines who they will contact, when, and the expected result – will likely never find 
an answer simply because there is no blueprint for group activity.  My analysis 
demonstrates that House institutions can have an effect on group behavior, but 
institutions will not dictate what groups do entirely.  Nor will partisanship or resource 
level.  These elements are just one piece of a puzzle that determines which strategies 
interest groups use under certain circumstances.  The research here demonstrates that 
institutional context is an important, unavoidable piece of that puzzle. 
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APPENDIX I 
GROUPS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY 
 
 
AFL-CIO 
American Association of Retired Persons 
American Dental Association  
American Health Care Association  
American Hospital Association 
American Medical Association 
American Nurses Association 
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association  
Catholic Hospital Association 
The ERISA Industry Committee  
Families U.S.A. 
Federation of American Health Systems 
Health Insurance Association of America 
Independent Insurance Agents of America 
National Assembly of National Voluntary Health & Social Welfare Organizations 
National Association for Home Care 
National Association of Community Health Centers 
National Association of Health Underwriters 
National Association of Manufacturers 
National Association of Professional Insurance Agents 
National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems 
National Conference of State Legislatures 
National Coordinating Committee for Multi-employer Plans 
National Council on Aging 
National Federation of Independent Business 
National Governors’ Association 
National Health Council 
National League of Cities 
National Partnership for Women and Families 
National Small Business Association 
Physicians Insurers Association of America 
Small Business Council of America 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce  
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APPENDIX II 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Instructions: 
For the questions about specific issues considered by the House of Representatives 
during the 1990s, it is important that your answers apply specifically to the issues 
identified. 
 
This project focuses on what your organization did, not its policy position.  Please try 
to limit your answers to this sort of information.   
 
This project is most concerned about how organizations like yours perceived the 
House of Representatives when it set out to lobby its members.  Please try to forget 
any retrospective evaluations about the success of these strategies. 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this study. 
 
 
Interview Subject Characteristics 
 
 
During what years did you work for this organization? 
 
What was your position(s) during your time there?  How would you describe your job 
responsibilities? 
 
How would you rank your personal involvement in deciding legislative strategy for 
this organization?   
I was… 
1- not involved in planning legislative strategy. 
2- sometimes involved in planning legislative strategy. 
3- often involved in planning legislative strategy. 
4- extensively involved in planning legislative strategy. 
 
 
Organizational Management Strategies and Characteristics 
 
On a scale on 1 to 5, how often did your organization use the following tactics:  
• Disseminating information to specific legislators via formal meetings with 
legislators and their staff? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
• Actively writing bills and legislation to be considered in the House of 
Representatives? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
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• Initiating informal contact with legislators and/or their staff? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
• Meeting with journalists or other members of the press to gain coverage for 
key issues? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
• Donating money and/or time to support a legislator’s electoral campaign? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
• Contacting constituents in an effort to generate grassroots support? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
 
Using the same scale of 1 to 5, during your time at this organization, how often did the 
group work with legislators… 
• Who agreed with the group’s policy position on an issue? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
• Who disagreed with the group’s policy position on an issue? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
• Who were undecided on an issue? 
1-Never          2-Rarely          3-Sometimes          4-Often          5-Very often 
 
During your time there, was your organization closely aligned with one of the two 
parties or is it largely nonpartisan?  If it had ties to one party, which one?  
 
What effects, if any, did these partisan ties have on the group’s legislative lobbying 
behavior? 
 
Proposals to Overhaul the U.S. Health Care System in the 103rd Congress 
 
Bill Summary & Review 
H.R. 1200: American Health Security Act of 1993 
• Sponsored by James McDermott, (D-WA), this bill was one of two prominent 
single-payer plans presented in the House during the Clinton administration 
health care initiative.  The bill would provide health benefits to all Americans, 
financed by payroll taxes, which would be distributed to the states to pay 
doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers directly.  The bill would also 
set an annual cap on health spending. 
• Upon its introduction in March of 1993, the bill was referred to five separate 
House committees: Armed Services, Energy & Commerce, Post Office & Civil 
Service, Veterans’ Affairs, and lastly Ways & Means.  Cosponsors were added 
over the course of the first legislative session.  In early February of the second 
session, the House Ways & Means Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment held hearings on the bill. 
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H.R. 3222: Managed Competition Act of 1993 
• Sponsored by James Cooper (D-TN), this bill proposed a “managed 
competition” plan under which health care providers would form networks and 
compete for consumers.  The bill did not mandate that employers pay for 
employee health insurance, nor did it require individuals to purchase insurance.  
• The bill was introduced on October 6, 1993.  It was referred to four House 
committees (Energy & Commerce, Ways & Means, Education & Labor, and 
the Judiciary) and was the subject of subcommittee hearings in February of 
1994.  Full committee hearings in The House Committee on Education & 
Labor took place in February and March of 1994. 
H.R. 3600: Health Security Act 
• This proposal, supported by the Clinton administration, would require all 
individuals to obtain health insurance by purchasing it from large cooperatives 
called health alliances.  Premiums would be paid by contributions from 
employers and individuals, supplemented by federal subsidies for certain 
classes of patients.  The bill would create a national health care budget for 
expenditures covered under the comprehensive package.  Initial premiums and 
annual rate increases would be limited, and premiums could not grow faster 
than the rate of growth in per capita GDP. 
• After being introduced in November of 1993, the bill was referred to 10 
different House committees, including the Ways & Means, Energy & 
Commerce, and Education & Labor committees, and was subject to a very 
large number of subcommittee and full committee hearings and markups 
throughout both legislative sessions.  Various amended versions of the bill 
were reported to the House from July to August 1994, but no further action 
was taken. 
H.R. 3960: American Health Security Act of 1994 
• This bill, sponsored by George Miller (D-CA), was the other prominent single-
payer plan presented in the House and was nearly identical to McDermott’s 
plan.  This version, however, included sections dealing with school health 
services and ERISA, in order to bring it under the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on Education & Labor. 
• The bill was introduced in March of 1994 and was referred to a series of House 
committees (Energy & Commerce, Ways & Means, Armed Services, 
Education & Labor, the Post Office & Civil Service, and Natural Resources).  
It was the subject of markups in the House Subcommittee on Labor-
Management Relations through May and June of 1994.  The bill was reported 
to the House on July 22, 1994 by the Education & Labor committee. 
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How accurately can you recall your organization’s work on this issue during the 103rd 
Congress? 
1- I cannot recall our work on these bills. 
2- I recall our work on these bills somewhat. 
3- I recall our work on these bills well. 
4- I recall our work on these bills extremely well. 
 
How important was this issue to your organization? 
This issue was… 
1- not important to our organization. 
2- somewhat important to our organization. 
3- rather important to our organization. 
4- extremely important to our organization. 
 
 
Which of these legislators – or any others you might remember – were viewed as most 
important to your office’s success on this issue?  Why?  
Thomas S. Foley (D-WA), Speaker of the House 
Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO), House Majority Leader 
Robert H. Michel (R-IL), House Minority Leader 
David E. Bonior (D-MI), House Majority Whip 
Newt Gingrich (R-GA), House Minority Whip 
Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Democratic Caucus Chairman 
Richard K. Armey(R-TX), Republican Conference Chairman 
John Joseph Moakley (D-MA), Rules Committee Chairman 
Sam Gibbons (D-FL), Ways & Means Committee Chairman 
Fortney Pete Stark (D-CA), Ways & Means Subcommittee on Health Chairman 
William D. Ford (D-MI), Education & Labor Committee Chairman 
Pat Williams (D-MT), Education & Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management 
Relations Chairman 
John D. Dingell (D-MI), Energy & Commerce Committee Chairman 
Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), Energy & Commerce Subcommittee on Health & the 
Environment Chairman 
 
Which of these traits mattered most to your office’s decision to contact a legislator on 
this issue? 
- Holding a seat on a key House committee 
- Serving as chairman on a key House committee 
- Serving as ranking member on a key House committee 
- Holding a seat on a key House subcommittee 
- Serving as chairman on a key House subcommittee 
- Serving as ranking member on a key House subcommittee 
- Having a high level of seniority on a key House committee 
- Having expertise and experience on health policy and issues of health 
insurance 
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- Having substantial influence over other legislators within the chamber 
- Serving on the majority party’s leadership team 
- Serving on the minority party’s leadership team 
- Having a long-standing relationship with your organization 
- Having a constituency with strong connections to your organization 
 
When your organization planned its legislative strategy for this issue, did it place more 
emphasis on the relevant subcommittees of the House or the full committees?  
 
How often did your organization meet with the staff of the most important committees 
during its work on this legislation? 
 
How often did your office meet with majority and minority party leadership during its 
work on this issue? 
 
Which of the following strategies were most essential to your organization’s work on 
this issue? 
- Meeting with members of key House committees and their staff 
- Meeting with members of key House subcommittees and their staff 
- Meeting with the staffs of key House committees 
- Meeting with majority party leadership 
- Meeting with minority party leadership 
- Testifying before congressional committees 
- Making contributions to key committee/subcommittee members’ reelection 
campaigns 
- Making contributions to majority party leaderships’ reelection campaigns 
- Making contributions to minority party leaderships’ reelection campaigns 
- Campaigning on behalf of electoral candidates with policy positions 
favorable to your organization 
- Generating grassroots support and/or contacting legislators’ constituents 
directly 
- Advertising in the mass media 
- Meeting with officials in other branches of the federal government 
- Working with state-level government officials and agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Continued    - 
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Legislation Resulting in HIPAA 
 
Bill Summary & Review 
 
H.R. 995: ERISA Targeted Health Insurance Reform Act of 1995 
• Sponsored by Harris Fawell, (R-IL), this bill provided for limited portability of 
health insurance between jobs.  Small business would be allowed to form 
group purchasing cooperatives with other small businesses, giving them more 
leverage when negotiating premiums and benefits with insurance companies.  
The plan would also limit the ability of the states to regulate health benefits by 
extending the ERISA preemptions to these group purchasing cooperatives. 
• The bill was introduced in February of 1995 and referred to both the 
Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Economic & Educational 
Opportunities.  The House Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations 
held hearings on the bill in March 1995 and the bill was ordered reported on 
March 6, 1996.  It was officially reported to the House floor later that month 
by the Economic & Educational Opportunities Committee.  The bill was later 
combined into amended version of H.R. 3103, which eventually became The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 
H.R. 3070: Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996 
•  This proposal, introduced by Michael Bilirakis (R-FL), included a number of 
restrictions on insurers regarding pre-existing conditions, and would provide 
portability of health insurance when an individual with group coverage 
switches jobs.  The bill would also help workers seeking individual coverage if 
they leave a job with a group health plan. 
• After its introduction in March 1996, the bill was referred to four House 
committees: Commerce, Economic & Educational Opportunities, the Judiciary, 
and Ways & Means.  Following brief subcommittee and full committee action, 
it was reported to the House floor by the Commerce Committee on March 25, 
1996. Provisions of the bill were combined with H.R. 3103 and H.R. 995 and 
introduced as H.R. 3160, which became an amendment in the stature of a 
substitute to H.R. 3103. 
H.R. 3103: Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996  
• Sponsored by Bill Archer (R-TX), this bill included a number of components, 
the highlight of which was portability provisions to help individuals who lose 
or change their job to maintain health insurance coverage.  It also included tax 
breaks to promote long-term care insurance, an increase in the deduction for 
self-employed workers, and a pilot medical savings account program.  
• The bill was introduced March 18, 1996 and referred to the Commerce, Ways 
& Means, Economic & Educational Opportunities, and Judiciary committees.  
On March 19, the bill was ordered reported with amendments by the Ways & 
Means committee and was officially reported in the House on March 25.  
Amended by the text of H.R. 3160 (also sponsored by Archer), the bill passed 
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in the House on March 28, 1996.  The conference report was approved by the 
House and Senate in early August.  The legislation, officially named the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, was signed into law by President 
Clinton in late August. 
 
How accurately can you recall your organization’s work on this issue during the 104th 
Congress? 
1- I cannot recall our work on these bills. 
2- I recall our work on these bills somewhat. 
3- I recall our work on these bills well. 
4- I recall our work on these bills extremely well. 
 
How important was this issue to your organization? 
This issue was… 
1- not important to our organization. 
2- somewhat important to our organization. 
3- rather important to our organization. 
4- extremely important to our organization. 
 
 
 Which of these legislators – or any others you might remember – were viewed as 
most important to your office’s success on this issue?  Why? 
Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Speaker of the House 
Richard K. Armey (R-TX), House Majority Leader 
Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO), House Minority Leader 
Tom DeLay (R-TX), House Majority Whip 
David E. Bonior (D-MI), House Minority Whip 
John A. Boehner (R-OH), Republican Conference Chairman 
Vic Fazio (D-CA), Democratic Caucus Chairman 
Gerald H.B. Solomon (R-NY), Rules Committee Chairman 
Bill Archer (R-TX), Ways & Means Committee Chairman 
William M. Thomas (R-CA), Ways & Means Subcommittee on Health Chairman 
William F. Goodling (R-PA), Economic & Educational Opportunities Committee 
Chairman 
Harris W. Fawell (R-IL), Econ. & Educ. Opportunities Subcommittee on Employer-
Employee Relations Chairman 
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. (R-VA), Commerce Committee Chairman 
Michael Bilirakis (R-FL), Commerce Subcommittee on Health & the Environment 
Chairman 
 
Which of these traits mattered most to your office’s decision to contact a legislator on 
this issue? 
- Holding a seat on a key House committee 
- Serving as chairman on a key House committee 
- Serving as ranking member on a key House committee 
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- Holding a seat on a key House subcommittee 
- Serving as chairman on a key House subcommittee 
- Serving as ranking member on a key House subcommittee 
- Having a high level of seniority on a key House committee 
- Having expertise and experience on health policy and issues of health 
insurance 
- Having substantial influence over other legislators within the chamber 
- Serving on the majority party’s leadership team 
- Serving on the minority party’s leadership team 
- Having a long-standing relationship with your organization 
- Having a constituency with strong connections to your organization 
 
When your organization planned its legislative strategy for this issue, did it place more 
emphasis on the relevant subcommittees of the House or the full committees?  
 
How often did your organization meet with the staff of the most important committees 
during its work on this legislation? 
 
How often did your office meet with majority and minority party leadership during its 
work on this issue? 
 
Which of the following strategies were most essential to your organization’s work on 
this issue? 
- Meeting with members of key House committees and their staff 
- Meeting with members of key House subcommittees and their staff 
- Meeting with the staffs of key House committees 
- Meeting with majority party leadership 
- Meeting with minority party leadership 
- Testifying before congressional committees 
- Making contributions to key committee/subcommittee members’ reelection 
campaigns 
- Making contributions to majority party leaderships’ reelection campaigns 
- Making contributions to minority party leaderships’ reelection campaigns 
- Campaigning on behalf of electoral candidates with policy positions 
favorable to your organization 
- Generating grassroots support and/or contacting legislators’ constituents 
directly 
- Advertising in the mass media 
- Meeting with officials in other branches of the federal government 
- Working with state-level government officials and agencies 
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Proposals to pass a Patients’ Bill of Rights 
 
Bill Summary & Review 
H.R. 820: Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997 
• This bill, sponsored in the House by John Dingell (D-MI), was intended to 
establish a series of consumer protections, including measures for dispute 
resolution and guaranteed access to specialists for individuals with chronic or 
life-threatening conditions.  The plan would also stipulate the circumstances 
under which coverage for emergency care could not be denied or prior 
authorization for such care could not be required.  Health plans would also be 
required to establish quality control standards. 
• The bill was introduced in late February of 1997.  After being referred to the 
Commerce Committee, the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment held 
hearings on the bill on October 28, 1997 before it was overshadowed by 
similar bills. 
H.R. 1415: Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997 
• Sponsored by Charles Norwood (R-GA), this legislation would similarly 
establish standards for consumer protection and impose requirements 
applicable to emergency care.  The bill would also allow patients to appeal 
when services were denied and prevent health plans from intervening in 
communication between doctors and patients.  Finally, the proposal would 
allow patients to sue their health plans under state malpractice laws. 
• After being introduced in April of 1997, the bill was referred to two House 
committees (Commerce and the Education & Workforce Committee), where it 
was the subject of subcommittee hearings in late October of 1997. 
H.R. 4250: Patient Protection Act of 1998 
• Like the other bills, this one, sponsored by Newt Gingrich (R-GA), included 
provisions for broader access to emergency room care.  While the bill would 
expand patients’ rights to appeal coverage decisions and denials of care, it 
would not allow those patients enrolled in managed care plans exempt from 
state regulation to sue these plans under state laws.  The bill also includes 
provisions to cap non-economic damages in medical malpractice suits at a 
certain level, and would establish purchasing cooperatives for smaller business 
to obtain coverage at more affordable rates. 
• This bill was the product of a House leadership task force led by Dennis 
Hastert and was referred to five House committees upon introduction: 
Commerce, Government Reform & Oversight, Education & the Workforce, 
Ways & Means, and the Judiciary.  On July 23, 1998, the House Rules 
committee granted a modified closed rule allowing the bill to be considered on 
the floor.  On July 24, 1998, the bill passed in the House and was placed on the 
Senate calendar a few days later. 
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How accurately can you recall your organization’s work on this issue during the 105th 
Congress? 
1- I cannot recall our work on these bills. 
2- I recall our work on these bills somewhat. 
3- I recall our work on these bills well. 
4- I recall our work on these bills extremely well. 
 
How important was this issue to your organization? 
This issue was… 
1- not important to our organization. 
2- somewhat important to our organization. 
3- rather important to our organization. 
4- extremely important to our organization. 
 
 Which of these legislators – or any others you might remember – were viewed as 
most important to your office’s success on this issue?   Why?  
Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Speaker of the House 
Richard K. Armey (R-TX), House Majority Leader 
Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO), House Minority Leader 
Tom DeLay (R-TX), House Majority Whip 
David E. Bonior (D-MI), House Minority Whip 
John A. Boehner (R-OH), Republican Conference Chairman 
Vic Fazio (D-CA), Democratic Caucus Chairman 
Gerald H.B. Solomon (R-NY), Rules Committee Chairman 
Bill Archer (R-TX), Ways & Means Committee Chairman 
William M. Thomas (R-CA), Ways & Means Subcommittee on Health Chairman 
William F. Goodling (R-PA), Economic & Educational Opportunities Committee 
Chairman 
Harris W. Fawell (R-IL), Econ. & Educ. Opportunities Subcommittee on Employer-
Employee Relations Chairman 
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. (R-VA), Commerce Committee Chairman 
Michael Bilirakis (R-FL), Commerce Subcommittee on Health & the Environment 
Chairman 
 
Which of these traits mattered most to your office’s decision to contact a legislator on 
this issue? 
- Holding a seat on a key House committee 
- Serving as chairman on a key House committee 
- Serving as ranking member on a key House committee 
- Holding a seat on a key House subcommittee 
- Serving as chairman on a key House subcommittee 
- Serving as ranking member on a key House subcommittee 
- Having a high level of seniority on a key House committee 
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- Having expertise and experience on health policy and issues of health 
insurance 
- Having substantial influence over other legislators within the chamber 
- Serving on the majority party’s leadership team 
- Serving on the minority party’s leadership team 
- Having a long-standing relationship with your organization 
- Having a constituency with strong connections to your organization 
 
When your organization planned its legislative strategy for this issue, did it place more 
emphasis on the relevant subcommittees of the House or the full committees?  
 
How often did your organization meet with the staff of the most important committees 
during its work on this legislation? 
 
How often did your office meet with majority and minority party leadership during its 
work on this issue? 
 
Which of the following strategies were most essential to your organization’s work on 
this issue? 
- Meeting with members of key House committees and their staff 
- Meeting with members of key House subcommittees and their staff 
- Meeting with the staffs of key House committees 
- Meeting with majority party leadership 
- Meeting with minority party leadership 
- Testifying before congressional committees 
- Making contributions to key committee/subcommittee members’ reelection 
campaigns 
- Making contributions to majority party leaderships’ reelection campaigns 
- Making contributions to minority party leaderships’ reelection campaigns 
- Campaigning on behalf of electoral candidates with policy positions 
favorable to your organization 
- Generating grassroots support and/or contacting legislators’ constituents 
directly 
- Advertising in the mass media 
- Meeting with officials in other branches of the federal government 
- Working with state-level government officials and agencies 
 
Coordination with the Group’s Political Action Committee 
 
Does your organization have a PAC? 
 
How involved were the legislative affairs representatives at your organization with the 
group’s campaign contributions and political action committee? 
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How closely did the organization monitor the federal electoral landscape, relative to 
the work that was devoted towards legislative issues?   
 
 
Procedural Aspects of the House of Representatives 
 
In your time there, how closely did your organization and its lobbyists follow the 
procedural aspects of the legislative process, including the work of the Rules 
Committee? 
 
In January of 1995, the new Republican majority made a number of changes to the 
ways in which the House conducted its legislative business.  How did these changes 
influence your office’s approach to lobbying Congress, in both the short-term and 
long-term?  (A list of the changes has been provided below to help refresh your 
memory). 
- The Speaker of the House of Representatives was limited to a term of eight 
years.  
- The Speaker of the House of Representatives was granted more authority in 
the appointment of committee chairmen. 
- Committee and subcommittee chairmen were limited to six year terms. 
- Majority party leadership increased its control over the committee 
assignment process within the party. 
- Joint referral of bills to committees was abolished.   
- Many of the administrative offices of the House of Representatives were 
reorganized and placed under the authority of the Speaker’s office. 
- A portion of the work of the Energy & Commerce Committee’s jurisdiction 
was transferred to other committees. 
- Members of the House of Representatives were limited to two full 
committee assignments and four subcommittee assignments. 
- Members of the House of Representatives were allowed to chair only one 
committee or subcommittee. 
- Committee chairs were granted the authority to appoint subcommittee 
chairmen. 
- Three standing committees were abolished. 
- Proxy voting in committees was abolished. 
- Most committees were limited to a maximum of five subcommittees. 
- Many committees were renamed to reflect the priorities of the new 
Republican majority. 
- Separate subcommittee staffs were abolished and subcommittee funding 
was consolidated under the full committee. 
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